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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines interrelated questions concerning distribution of 
healthcare financing and human resource for health (HRH), access to healthcare services, 
and health outcomes on international and national levels of analysis.  The dissertation is 
comprised of three papers, addressing the following questions: What is the relationship 
between the government’s share of total health spending and infant mortality?  How do 
developing countries cluster along the lines of critical health and development indicators?  
How successful has Cuba been, a country with a highly public health and development 
model, in reducing inequality in human resource for health distribution?  While this study 
does not ignore the relationships among inequality, per capita gross national income, food 
security and health outcomes, the central focus is on key dimensions of healthcare 
accessibility - the distribution of human resources for healthcare services and the extent 
to which governments reduce financial barriers to care. 
 Although previous research has examined the relationship between public health 
spending and the infant mortality rate (IMR), few if any studies have examined the 
impact of government expenditure on healthcare services as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health (GEHPTEH) on the IMR.  In the first paper, I employ additive and 
interactive multivariate regression models with cross-sectional data gathered from the 
World Health Organization and the World Bank to examine the relationship between 
GEHPTEH and IMR while controlling for gross national income, doctor density, the 
percentage of children under 1 year vaccinated for polio, and the percentage of the 
population with access to improved water sources.  The findings of the additive models 
 ix
indicate a non-trivial inverse association between GEHPTEH and IMR, while the 
interactive model indicates that the level of GEHPTEH makes a greater difference among 
poorer nations. 
 The second paper contributes to the social science literature on health and 
development by creating a typology of primarily non-Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to more precisely understand the nature 
of the challenges facing them.  Using cluster analysis to classify developing nations on 
the basis of eight health and development variables, I find that a tier of countries in 
above-average and below average situations of health and development subdivides into a 
tier of Mild, Moderate, Severe, and Critical situations, which then further subdivide into 
nine relatively distinct groupings. These results indicate the importance of designing 
development strategies that address particular configurations of per capita gross national 
income level, inequality, food insecurity, healthcare financing and vaccination coverage. 
Though much past research has examined developments and transformations in 
Cuba’s healthcare system, national IMR trends, and the government’s commitment to 
universal healthcare access in the face of economic difficulties, the reduction of HRH and 
IMR spatial inequality among and within Cuban provinces has received less attention.  
Drawing from Cuban Ministry of Health data, the third paper examines the changes in 
absolute and relative inequality in HRH distribution by personnel type and IMR among 
Cuban provinces over time, and contrasts these distributions with the global, OECD, and 
developing country distributions using formal and informal inequality measures.  Using 
municipal level data from Cuba’s National Statistical Office, the paper also examines the 
levels of absolute and relative inequality in HRH distribution and IMR within Cuban 
 x
provinces in 2010.  This paper’s contribution to the broader literature lies in the 
significance of the measurable strides towards greater within country equality of HRH 
within a global context of high between and within country disparities of HRH.  Cuba’s 
experience in this regard is especially salient when taking into consideration the high 
levels of spatial inequality in HRH prior to 1959 as well as a set of particularly adverse 
economic circumstances, particularly during the ‘special period’ of the 1990s, 
characterized by material and financial resource scarcity. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In spite of reduction in infant and child mortality in previous decades, large 
disparities remain in health resources and outcomes both between and within countries. 
These inequalities reflect significant structural threats to the attainment of a world 
characterized by equitable and sustainable development.  A person’s life chances tend to 
vary considerably depending on where he/she is born.  For example, children born in 
Sierra Leone in 2012 were fifty-three times more likely to die before their first birthday 
than children in Norway.  Even within the same geographical region, we still observe 
acute disparities in health outcomes.  In 2012, a child born in Guatemala was six times 
more likely to die before his/her first birthday than a child born in Cuba.  These 
disparities in infant mortality are largely seen as the result of other acute dissimilarities in 
development, including inequalities in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Filmer 
and Pritchett 1999; Rajan, Kennedy, and King 2013), education, (Song and Burgard 
2011) poverty (Rajan, Kennedy, and King 2013; Houweling et al. 2005), human 
resources for health (Anand and Bäringhausen 2004) income inequality (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2006) and improved sanitation (VanDerslice, Popkin, and Briscoe 1994). 
While all of the aforementioned variables exert an important influence on health 
outcomes and many are included as variables in different papers in this study, the primary 
focus of this dissertation is the government’s share of a country’s total health expenditure 
(GEHPTEH) and human resources for health.  This dissertation is comprised of three 
papers that focus on different aspects of health and development.  The first two papers are 
international cross-sectional analyses using country level data from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and World Bank.  The third paper is a case study of Cuba based on 
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data from Cuba’s Ministry of Health (MINSAP) and the Cuban National Statistics Office 
(ONE).    
The first paper focuses on the relationship between GEHPTEH and the infant 
mortality rate (IMR) using multivariate ordinary least squared (OLS) regression 
techniques for 186 countries.  The second paper constructs a nested typology of 123 
primarily non-OECD countries using hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis.  The 
third paper is a case study of Cuba and uses provincial level data from MINSAP to look 
at changes in human resource for health and health outcomes over time.  The paper also 
looks at distributions of these variables within Cuban provinces for 2010 using municipal 
level data from ONE. 
As shown in Figure 1, these papers share central concepts and measures. 
GEHPTEH reflects the government’s share of healthcare financing and is an important 
component of treating healthcare as a human right and/or public good rather than as a 
commodity.  GEHPTEH is the predictor variable of most interest in the first paper and is 
one of the variables based on which countries cluster in paper two.  While paper three 
does not analyze variance of Cuba’s GEHPTEH over time, it should be noted that 
according to the data gathered for this dissertation and using GEHPTEH as a measure of 
the level of publicly financed healthcare financing, Cuba has one of the most publicly 
financed healthcare systems in the world. 
The number of doctors per 1000 people (hereafter referred to as doctor or 
physician density) is another central variable in this dissertation.  Doctor density is a key 
predictor in the regressions in the first paper, an important variable in the cluster analysis 
of the third.  The third paper involves examination of the degree of human resource for 
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health (HRH) inequality in a country that, next to the tiny and extremely wealthy 
Monaco, has the highest doctor density of the 186 countries examined in paper 1.  All of 
the papers conceptualize and utilize the infant mortality rate (IMR) as a key health and 
development outcome. 
The dissertation’s focus progressively sharpens.  It begins with a study about the 
relationship between various predictor variables and the IMR in a cross-sectional 
analysis.  Although this paper highlights some salient cases in regards to these variables, 
its primary focus lies on the relationship between GEHPTEH and the IMR while 
controlling for other socioeconomic and health related variables.  The goal of the second 
paper is to construct a typology of health and development using eight socioeconomic 
and health related variables by conducting a cluster analysis that maximizes homogeneity 
within county groupings and maximizes heterogeneity among them.  The final paper uses 
several mathematical techniques to estimate the degree of inequality in the provincial and 
municipal distribution of HRH and IMR in Cuba. 
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The first paper “The Case for Government Funded Healthcare: An International 
Analysis of Government Expenditure, Socioeconomic Development and Infant 
Mortality” examines the relationship between GEHPTEH and the IMR.  Existing studies 
that look at the relationship between government expenditure and the IMR or similar 
health outcomes focus either on government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
GDP (Ssozi and Amlani 2015; Filmer and Prichett 1999), or government expenditure on 
health per capita (May and Smith 2011; Farag 2010; Schell et al. 2007).  Although these 
measures are useful in understanding the relationship between spending and the IMR, 
they do not capture the government’s share of total healthcare financing.   
The results of previous studies have tended to be mixed.  Farag (2010) and May 
and Smith (2011) found a significant inverse relationship between government health 
spending and the IMR, while Filmer and Prichitt (1999) and Schell and company (2007) 
did not.  It should be noted that most of these studies did not utilize any variable that 
captured any aspect of the relationship between accessibility and health spending.  Ssozi 
and Amlani’s found that government expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 
significantly inversely associated with CMR but not IMR.  Although, the theoretical 
discussion of Ssozi and Amlani (2015: 172) correctly captures the danger of increased 
out of pocket expenditure leading to delayed care or increased poverty, they do not use a 
measure of its percentage of the total expenditure on health and only used its aggregate as 
a percentage of GDP. 
I selected GEHPTEH because it is a measure of the private/public split as a 
percentage of the total amount the society spends on health, and because a higher 
GEHPTEH connotes lower out of pocket expenditure (since the WHO correctly classifies 
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out of pocket as part of private expenditure).  As indicated above, a high GEHPTEH 
reflects a more public and less commodified healthcare system while a low GEHPTEH 
reflects a more commodified privatized healthcare system.  The central hypothesis (H1) 
of the research is that countries with higher GEHPTEH will have lower IMR. 
Doctor density is also a variable of special interest, as it is another important 
component of accessibility.  If healthcare is free, but there are no physicians near the 
populations that need them due to outmigration or insufficient efforts to bring them to 
populations that have historically not had access to physicians, then accessing healthcare 
is understandably compromised.  While it is important to note that there is much within 
country variation in doctor density that is not captured at our level of analysis (due in part 
to the absence of a doctor distribution GINI variable by country), physicians tend to 
migrate from poorer countries to wealthier ones, leaving poorer countries with less HRH 
to address disease and/or promote population health (WHO 2006; Dussault and 
Franeschini 2006).  The second hypothesis postulated in this research (H2) is that 
countries with a higher doctor density will have a lower IMR.  A third hypothesis (H3) is 
the presence of an interaction between GEHPTEH and log10 GNI per capita (GNIPC), 
indicating that the lower the GNIPC the greater the effect of GEHPTEH on IMR. 
A bivariate analysis examines correlations among GEHPTEH, doctor density, 
GNIPC, the percentage of children under one year of age who have received the polio 
vaccine, the percentage of the population with access to improved water supplies, total 
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP (TEHPGDP) and IMR.  Eleven centered 
OLS regression models are run using SPSS.  Lastly, I test for the presence of an 
interaction between GEHPTEH and GNIPC when regressed on IMR. 
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The second paper “Health and Development Challenges: A Nested Typology of 
123 Non-OECD Countries” divides 123 countries into a three-tiered nested classification 
system.  This paper lists Dr. David Peters, Associate Professor of Sociology at Iowa State 
University as a co-author in recognition of his assistance in SAS coding, input on 
diagnostic interpretation and discussions with me concerning naming clusters.  In this 
paper, we seek to establish a health and development typology for predominately non-
OECD countries based on eight important health and development indicators. 
With the exception of Wood and Gough (2006), all the previous health typology 
research reviewed (Karim, Eikemo and Bambra 2010; Chung and Muntaner 2007; 
Navarro and Shi 2001) focused on wealthier nations, often using a predetermined 
political-welfare regime typology as a predictor of health outcomes.  Navarro and Shi 
(2001) found that social-democratic regime types tended to have less income inequality, 
higher taxes and public employment than other political-welfare regime types, and better 
health outcomes than the other types examined (Christian Democratic, Liberal, or 
Fascist).  Chung and Muntaner (2007) used multilevel models to analyze panel data for 
18 countries over 38 years.  They used welfare type as fixed effects predictors and 
controlled for (log) GDP per capita to explain annual variation in IMR and low birth 
weight.  Like Navarro and Shi (2001), they found that Social Democratic countries had 
better health outcomes than other welfare types (Christian Democratic, Liberal or Wage 
Earner Welfare States).  Like the studies of Palma-Solis et al. (2009), Coburn (2004) and 
Field Kotz and Bukham (2000), the typology work of Chung and Muntaner (2007) and 
Navarro and Shi (2001) provide evidence that neo-liberal policies are deleterious to 
population health. 
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Wood and Gough (2006) used k-means cluster analysis to group 61 developing 
countries from Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa based on human 
development index, aid and remittance inflow, public expenditure on health and 
education.  They found four distinct ‘types’ or groupings: actual or potential welfare 
regimes, more effective informal security regimes, less effective informal security 
regimes and insecurity regimes.  Higher social spending and socio-economic 
development outcomes characterized actual or potential welfare regime types, while low 
public spending, a high dependency on remittances and a low level of social-development 
characterized the ‘insecurity regimes’. 
The research presents a model of virtuous circle of equitable health and 
development where strong political-economic, health and educational structural and 
infrastructural, and human resource inputs contribute to positive economic and health 
outcomes that feed back into a ‘virtuous circle’.  The model’s development is based on 
previous research (including paper 1) which indicates that a higher government’s share of 
healthcare financing, lower inequality, higher GNIpc, higher rates of social investment, 
higher human resources for health leads to better health outcomes (Palma-Solis et al. 
2009; Wilkinson and Pickett 2006; Navarro and Shi 2001; Field, Kotz and Bukham 2000; 
Navarro 1993; Wilkinson 1992). 
The standardized z-scores for GNIPC, GEHPTEH, doctor density, TEHPGDP, 
the percentage of children under the age of five underweight, the percentage of children 
under one year of age who have received the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (3 dose) 
vaccine (DPT3), the GINI coefficient and the IMR are used to classify 123 countries 
using a Wards method cluster analysis.  Traditional tools such as dendrograms, and 
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agglomeration schedules of fusion coefficients as well as statistical plots of the pseudo R2 
and the pseudo t2 are used to determine the number of clusters.  We name clusters 
according to their countries’ mean z-scores on the variables used to conduct the analysis.  
The third paper “Human Resources for Health and Health Outcomes: An Analysis 
of their Distributions over Time and Space” measures the changes in the levels of 
inequality in the distribution of HRH in Cuba among provinces from 1989 to 2014, and 
measures inequality in the distribution of HRH within Cuban provinces using municipal 
level data for 2010.  The paper also examines changes in IMR by province over time and 
looks at the variation of IMR within provinces using municipal level data. 
One reason to focus on an equitable geographic distribution of health system 
inputs, like HRH, is that one would expect that greater equality in the distribution of 
health system inputs would lead to greater equality in health system utilization and 
ultimately in health outcomes.  For this general model to maintain validity, one would 
expect to find a relationship between higher HRH density and better health outcomes.  
Previous studies have tended to find such associations (Anand and Bärnighausen 2004; 
Hanmer, Lensink and White 2003).  It would then logically follow that rural populations 
that have to overcome greater geographic barriers for healthcare would tend to experience 
worse health outcomes.  In this regard, a recent study by Dare et al. (2015) showed that 
increased distance between population and access to surgical care led to increased 
probability of being in a cluster that exhibited higher rates of mortality resulting from 
acute abdominal conditions.   
Previous research has documented the evolution of Cuba’s healthcare system 
(Feinsilver 1993; Danielson 1981; Danielson 1979; Ochoa and Serrano 2000), its 
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emphasis on primary care (Whiteford and Branch 2008), and other variables influencing 
its success in achieving health outcomes comparable to those of the wealthiest nations in 
spite of the island’s lower GNIPC (Franco et al. 2007; Speigel and Yassi 2004).  Other 
studies have examined trends in infant mortality (Corteguera and Henriquez 2001; 
Corteguera 2000) or how the Cuban government responded to the crisis that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist economies in terms of 
healthcare financing, planning and organization (Nayari and López–Pardo 2005; Borowy 
2011, 2013).   
This research is distinct from these previous studies in that the emphasis is on 
changes in the distribution of HRH and IMR over time and space in Cuba.  I examine 
changes in the level of inequality beginning with the distribution of physicians by 
province in Cuba from MINSAP data provided by Danielson in 1958, to their distribution 
by province on the eve of the crisis in 1989, up through the recent transformations of the 
health sector emanating from the ‘Guidelines for the Economic and Social Policy of the 
Party and the Revolution’.  Due to the difficulties in obtaining sufficient data on variables 
such as the number of physicians, family doctors or nurses serving on international 
missions by province (and municipality), the research is limited in terms of causal 
inference regarding fluctuations in annual HRH inequality.  Therefore, causal inferences 
regarding changes in HRH inequality are limited to comparing health policy goals and 
shifts to changes in HRH distributional patterns. 
I use descriptive and formal inequality measures (GINI and Theil coefficients) to 
examine trends in HRH distribution by personnel type in Cuba across provinces over 
time, and I hypothesize a general decline in the level of inequality in these distributions 
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over time.  I also examine provincial variation in IMR over time and uses box plots to 
help the reader visualize this variation.  Choropleth maps generated in ArcGIS are 
provided to display the geographic variation in provincial HRH and IMR over time. 
In this paper, I also examine variation at the municipal level, and hypothesize that 
inequality in HRH distribution will be greater within provinces than among them.  As on 
the provincial level of analysis, descriptive and inequality measures are used to capture 
the level of inequality of HRH distribution among municipalities within provinces.  In 
addition, box plots and choropleth maps display variation in IMR at the municipal level.  
The broader theoretical argument is that within a national health care system it is 
far easier to address disparities in HRH distribution than in a system characterized by 
private financing and providers since privatized healthcare tends to lead to greater HRH 
concentrations in wealthier areas.  In part, imbalance in privatized healthcare systems 
would be due to the influence of economic push and pull factors.  Physicians will be 
more likely to open up a practice in areas where people are wealthy enough to afford their 
services or private insurance and less likely to practice in areas where people are too 
impoverished to acquire insurance or pay for services.  In a state controlled system, 
where HRH are essentially state employees, the state will have more control in deciding 
placement. This is largely the case in Cuba, where private practice was largely eliminated 
by 1965 (Feinsilver 1993). 
This research may be of value to those who are interested in Cuba’s health system 
and to those who are interested in health equity.  Equitable distributions of material and 
human inputs are essential elements for an equitable distribution of health outcomes.  
Cuba’s experience shows that an equitable distribution of HRH personnel is possible, 
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even in times of economic crisis. Furthermore, these results show that over time, 
disparities in health outcomes have narrowed.  While this research does not permit much 
in the way of making causal inferences regarding these distributions, it is the view of the 
author that Cuba’s socialist healthcare organization and political commitment to treating 
health as a right and not a commodity are essential elements to achieving equity in HRH 
distribution.    
  
  
13
Bibliography 
 
Anand, Sudhir and Bärnihausen Till. 2004. “Human Resources and Health Outcomes: 
Cross-country Econometric Study.” The Lancet 364(9445):1603-1609. 
Borowy, Iris. 2011. “Similar but Different: Health and Economic Crisis in 1990s Cuba 
and Russia.” Social Science and Medicine 72:1489-1498. 
Borowy, Iris. 2013. “Degrowth and Public Health in Cuba: Lessons from the Past?” 
Journal of Cleaner Production 38:17-26. 
Chung, Haejoo and Carles Muntaner. 2007. “Welfare State Matters: A Typological 
Analysis of Wealthy Countries.” Health Policy 80:328-339. 
Coburn, David. 2004. “Beyond the Income Inequality Hypothesis: Class Neo-Liberalism 
and Health Inequalities.” Social Science and Medicine 58:41-56. 
Corteguera, Raúl R. 2000. “Estrategía para reducir la mortalidad infantil, Cuba 1959-
1999.” Revista Cubana de Pediatría 72(3):147-164. 
Corteguera, Raúl R. and Pedro A. Henríquez. 2001. “Mortalidad infantil en Cuba 1959-
1999.” Revista Cubana de Pediatría 73(3):143-157. 
Danielson, Ross. 1979. Cuban Medicine. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Danielson, Ross. 1981. “Medinice in the Community: The Ideology and Substance of 
Community Medicine in Cuba.” Social Science and Medicine 15:239-247. 
Dare, Anna J., Joshua S. Ng-Kamstra, Jayadeep Patra, Sze H. Fu, Peter S. Rodiguez, 
Marvin Hsiao, Raju M. Jotkar, J. S. Thakur, Jay Sheth, and Prabhat Jha. 2015. 
“Deaths from acute abdominal conditions and geographical access to surgical care 
in India: a nationally representative spatial analysis.” The Lancet 3:e646-e656. 
Dussault, Giles and Maria C. Franeschini. 2006. “Not Enough Here Too Many There: 
Understanding Geographical Imbalances in the Distribution of the Health 
Workforce.” Human Resources For Health 4(12). 
Farag, Marwa. 2010. Spending on Health Care: What Drives it and Does it Matter?: 
Three Essays on Wealth, Health Spending, and Health of Nations. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Brandeis University, ProQuest Publishing. Dissertation. 
Feinsilver, Julie M. 1993. Healing the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at Home and 
Abroad. Berkley, CA: University of California Press. 
Field, Mark G., David M. Kotz, and Gene Bukham 2000. “Neoliberal Economic Policy, 
"State Desertion" and the Russian Health Crisis.” Pp. 155-173 in Dying for 
Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor. Monroe, ME. 
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett. 1999. “The Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does 
Money Matter?” Social Science and Medicine 49:1309-1323. 
Franco, Manuel, Joan Kennelly, Richard Cooper, and Pedro Ordúñez Garcia. 2007. “La 
Salud en Cuba y los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.” Revista Panamericana 
de Salud Pública/ Pan American Journal of Public Health 21(4):239-250. 
  
14
Hanmer, Lucia, Robert Lensink, and Howard White. 2003. “Infant and Child Mortality in 
Developing Countries: Analysing the Data for Robust Determinants.” The Journal 
of Development Studies 40(1):101-118. 
Houweling, Tanja A., Anton E. Kunst, Casper W. Looman, and Johan P. Mackenbach. 
2005. “Determinants of Under-5 Mortality Among the Poor and the Rich: A 
Cross-national Analysis of 43 Developing Countries.” International Journal of 
Epidemiology 34:1257-1265. 
Karim, Syahirah A., Terje A. Eikemo, and Clare Bambra. 2010. “Welfare State Regimes 
and Population Health: Integrating the East Asian Welfare States.” Health Policy 
94:45-53. 
Mays, Glen P. and Sharla A. Smith. 2011. “Evidence Links Increases in Public Health 
Spending to Declines in Preventable Deaths.” Health Affairs 30(8):1585-1593. 
Project Hope. 
Navarro, Vicente and Leiyu Shi. 2001. “The Political Context of Social Inequalities and 
Health.” Social Science and Medicine 52:481-491. 
Nayari, Kamran and Cándido López-Pardo. 2005. “Economic Crisis and Access to Care: 
Cuba's Health Care System since the Collapse of the Soviet Union.” International 
Journal of Health Services 35(4):797-816. 
Palma-Solis, Marco A., Carlos Álvarez-Dardet Díaz, Álvaro Franco-Girardo, Ildefonso 
Hernandez-Aguado, and Santiago Pérez Hoyos. 2009. “State Downsizing as a 
Determinant of Infant Mortality and Achievment of Millenium Development Goal 
4.” International Journal of Health Services 39(2):389-403. 
Rajan, Keertichandra, Jonathan Kennedy, and Lawrence King. 2013. “Is Wealthier 
Always Healthier in Poor Countries: The Health Implications of Income, 
Inequality, Poverty and Literacy in India.” Social Science and Medicine 88:98-
107. 
Schell, Carl O., Marie Reilly, Hans Rosling, Stefan Peterson, and Anna M. Ekström. 
2007. “Socioeconomic Determinants of Infant Mortality.” Scandinavian Journal 
of Public Health 35:288-297. 
Song, Shige and Sarah A. Burgard. 2011. “Dynamics of Inequality: Mother's Education 
and Infant Mortlaity in China, 1970-2001".” Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior 52(3):349-364. 
Speigal, Jerry and Yassi Annalee. 2004. “Lessons from the Margins of Globalization: 
Appreciating the Cuban Health Paradox.” Journal of Public Health Policy 
25(1):85-110. 
Ssozi, John and Shirin Amlani. 2015. “The Effectiveness of Health Expenditure on the 
Proximate and Ultimate Goals of Healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World 
Development 76:165-179. 
VanDerslice, J., B. Popkin, and J. Briscoe. 1994. “Drinking-water Quality, Sanitation, 
and Breast-feeding: Their Interactive Effects on Infant Health.” Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization 72(4):589-601. 
  
15
Wilkinson, Richard G. 1992. “Income Distribution and Life Expectancy.” British 
Medical Journal 304:165-168. 
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Kate Pickett. 2006. “Income Inequality and Population 
Health: A Review and Explanation of the Evidence.” Social Science and Medicine 
62:1768-1784. 
Wood, Geof and Ian Gough. 2006. “A Comparitive Welfare Regime Approach to Global 
Social Policy.” World Development 34(10):1696-1712. 
World Health Organization. 2006. “Working Together for Health: The World Health 
Report 2006.” Annual, The World Health Organization, Geneva.  
  
16
CHAPTER 2: THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDED HEALTHCARE: AN 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INFANT MORTALITY 
 
A paper to be submitted to Sociology of Development 
 
Isaac Christiansen 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Public funding of healthcare is a critical component of ensuring access to care for the 
poor.  It varies considerably among countries and its relationship with healthcare 
outcomes deserves attention.  This paper examines the relationship between public 
funding of health care, doctor density and the infant mortality rate (IMR).  While 
previous research has examined the role of public health spending on the IMR, few if any 
studies have examined the impact of government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
total expenditure on health (GEHPTEH) on the IMR.  Using World Health Organization 
data for 186 countries, I find a statistically significant and non-trivial relationship 
between GEHPTEH and the IMR, while controlling for gross national income, doctor 
density, percent of the population with access to improved water sources, and the 
percentage of children under 1 year who have received the polio vaccine.  An interactive 
model is run, which suggests that although GEHPTEH has an impact on IMR reduction 
across nations, the effect is greater in poorer nations than in wealthier ones. These 
findings may be pertinent to strategies to reduce infant mortality and improve healthcare 
outcomes, particularly among low-income nations.  
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Introduction 
 Despite the significant progress made globally in reducing infant and under-five 
mortality, high infant and child mortality rates remain a significant problem in many 
developing nations, particularly within the WHO Eastern Mediterranean and African 
regions.  A glance at these regions’ averages is sufficient to highlight the global disparity 
in life chances.  So, for example, while in the WHO Americas region infant and child 
mortality averaged 13 and 16 per 1000 live births in 2011, respectively, the WHO 
African region endured average infant and under-five mortality at 63 and 97 per 1000 live 
births, and the Eastern Mediterranean had an infant mortality rate (IMR) and a CMR of 
45 and 59 per 1000 live births, respectively.1   
 Researchers have documented relationships between various socio-economic and 
public health variables and the infant mortality rate (IMR), including education (e.g., 
Rajan, Kennedy, and King 2013; Song and Burgard 2011; Pamuk, Fuchs, and Lutz 2011; 
Arik and Arik 2009), quality of housing/living conditions (e.g., Urdiola 2011), poverty 
(e.g., Rajan et al. 2013; Houweling, Kunst, Looman, and Mackenbach 2013), social class 
(e.g., Antonovsky and Bernstein 1977) vaccination rates (Breiman et al. 2004) and 
aspects of clean water and sanitation (e.g., VanDerslice, Popkin and Briscoe 1994).  
Since many of these variables, in turn, vary among countries depending on the quantity of 
income and the resources the country has at its disposal, the relationship between income 
and the IMR has a prominent place in the literature.  In this regard, there is ample 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that a country’s per capita income is inversely 
causally related to infant mortality (Arik and Arik 2009; Schell et al. 2007; Filmer and 
                                                 
1 These 2011 regional estimates of infant and child mortality are from the WHO Global Health Observatory Data 
Repository accessed on 10/31/2014.  The national figures are from the WHO data gathered on 11/2013.    
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Prichett 1999; Prichett and Summers 1996; Wilkinson 1992).  The importance of income 
as a predictor of IMR has led to much research examining the impact of inequality in 
general on the IMR (e.g., Avendano 2012; Arik and Airk 2009). 
 Although there is relative consensus regarding the correlation between income 
and the IMR, the research regarding the causal role of the level of inequality in income 
distribution within a society in general (as opposed to the overall level of income of a 
society) in determining the IMR has led to somewhat mixed results. Though Schell et al. 
(2007), Hosseinpoor et al. (2005), Lynch et al. (1998) demonstrated that the income 
inequality itself was an important determinant of IMR, other studies (Rajan et al. 2013; 
Avendano 2012; Chung and Muntaner 2006) indicated that the impact of inequality alone 
on the IMR was insignificant when controlling for income level or poverty rates.  
Furthermore, in a meta-analysis of studies of IMR determinants, Kim and Saada (2013) 
observed that nine of 14 cross-country studies focusing on the relationship between 
inequality and infant mortality found that inequality controlling for average income 
exacerbated the IMR but the remaining five studies found no significant relationship 
when controlling for income.  In another review study, Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) 
found that of 168 studies examining inequality and healthcare outcomes, 78% found that 
inequality significantly exacerbated population health. 
Schell et al. (2007) reported that of five independent variables, GNP per capita 
had the largest independent inverse effect on the IMR with the female illiteracy rate and 
the GINI index (an important measure of inequality) having the second and third 
strongest independent effect on the IMR, respectively.2  In a study using a dichotomous 
hierarchical probit model to analyze the impact of inequality on the IMR in Iran’s 
                                                 
2 Poverty rate and public health spending were insignificant in Schell et al.’s multivariate regression analysis. 
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provinces while controlling for health service availability and a province’s overall IMR, 
Hosseinpoor et al. (2005) showed that socioeconomic inequality helped to explain within 
province IMR variation.  Arik and Arik (2009: 41-42) showed that while both income 
and its distribution were robust indicators of IMR, when income is controlled for 
inequality, income’s coefficient declined significantly.  
Conversely, although Rajan et al. (2013) showed in a logistic regression that the 
GINI coefficient was significantly related to an increase in reports of illness/ailments 
while controlling for average income, individual income and educational level, they 
rejected the hypothesis that inequality was significantly related to under-five mortality 
rates across Indian states and districts.  Avendano (2012) found in a cross-sectional 
longitudinal study over a 48-year period that inequality often correlated with the IMR, 
but the impact disappeared when controlling for country fixed effects or for economic 
variables (e.g. unemployment).  Therefore, although inequality among those who have 
sufficient resources to ensure life’s necessities may in itself be insufficient to explain 
IMR variation, there is less doubt that the greater the portion of the population that 
suffers from poverty and absolute depravation, the higher the IMR.   
 The above-reviewed literature on the relationship between income, the level of 
within country inequality and the IMR indicates that there is a need for research that 
focuses specifically on what measures or policies will likely reduce the IMR among 
poorer populations.  Tying together the issue of inequality and societal measures that may 
protect more impoverished populations, Avendano (2012: 759) reasoned that  “strong 
social protection policies such as universal access to care and favorable maternity leave 
benefits may reduce infant mortality directly and may at the same time cluster in 
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countries with strong redistribution policies, without necessarily having an impact 
through reducing income inequality”.  Thus, social spending that increases access to care 
may serve as a countervailing force protecting poorer populations by buffering the impact 
of inequality on the IMR.  
Still other studies have examined the relationship between neoliberal policies and 
population health (Laurell 2014; Palma-Solís et al. 2009; Shoepf et al. 2000).  For 
example, while Wilkinson and Pickett (2006; 1992) argue that higher income inequality 
leads to worse population healthcare outcomes through reducing social cohesion, Coburn 
(2000) argues that both increased inequality and the decline in social cohesion are caused 
by neoliberal policies.  Exploring the implications of dependency on the IMR, Shandra et 
al. (2004) analyzed the impact of commodity concentration, multinational penetration, 
and International Monetary Fund conditionality on the IMR.  In a series of interactive 
panel regressions they found that the aforementioned explanatory variables had more 
harmful impacts on the IMR at lower levels of political democracy than at higher ones.  
Navarro and Shi (2001) examined the impact of socio-political and economic 
variables on health outcomes.  They identified that among OECD nations those countries 
classified as social democratic that had higher union density, public employment, larger 
public health and social security expenditures had lower IMR than countries classified as 
Christian democratic, ex-fascist or liberal where these predictor variables were 
progressively lower.  Consistent with Navarro and Shi, other research has shown an 
inverse relationship between neoliberal cuts in government expenditure and better 
population health (Palma-Solís et al. 2009; Shoepf et al. 2000). 
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Breiman and colleagues (2004) found that polio and diphtheria, pertussis and 
tetanus (DPT3) vaccination were associated with lower mortality for babies between 6 
weeks and nine months of age.  Although some studies have documented (e.g. Aaby et al. 
2004) increased mortality associated with the DTP3 vaccine children young infants 
(potentially due to a Th2 immune response from the vaccine leading to atopy or allergic 
hypersensitivity), it is critical to emphasize the importance of the DTP3 vaccine in 
eliminating high mortality from these diseases (Sadoh and Oladokun 2012; Soares 2007: 
268-269).  Sadoh and Oladokun (2012) express concern for Nigeria in the context of a 
global resurgence of both diphtheria and pertussis and argue for a strengthening of 
vaccination coverage. 
 Insufficient human resources for health and prohibitive costs of healthcare 
services may constitute barriers to poor populations that ultimately affect the IMR. 
Governments may potentially mitigate the effect that low income has on the IMR by 
increasing public health expenditure and by encouraging health professionals to practice 
in areas where they are relatively scarce.  While some research has focused on or 
included human resources for health (Arik and Arik 2009; Anand and Bärnighausen 
2004; Gbessemete and Jonnson 1993) and aspects of health financing (Houweling et al. 
2013; Mays and Smith 2011; Flimer and Prichett 1999; Gbessemete and Jonnson 1993) 
into their models, few (e.g., Khun 2010) have accounted for the relationship between the 
public/private split in health care spending and the IMR.  My research seeks to fill these 
gaps by examining the relationship of physician density and the government’s share of 
total health expenditure to IMR variation across countries. 
  
22
 Regarding the relationship between public spending on health and the IMR, the 
results have varied.  Mays and Smith (2011) found a robust inverse relationship between 
public health spending and the IMR in a time series multivariate analysis of U.S. city and 
county data.  Conversely, Schell et al. (2007) observed that public spending on health 
was ultimately insignificant when examining the IMR as a function of inequality, GNP 
per capita, public health expenditure, and female literacy.  Like Filmer and Prichett 
(1999), these researchers also found that, even though public spending on health care in a 
simple regression had a significant effect on the IMR, once GDP per capita and female 
illiteracy rate were entered into the model the significance of their public spending 
variable disappeared.   
Schell and colleagues (2007) concluded that increased public health spending 
alone is not sufficient and needs to be coupled with effective strategies to better use 
health care dollars and to address other factors such as female illiteracy, income levels, 
and inequality.  Farag (2010) used fixed-effect regression models and found that both 
total spending on health as a share of GDP and government health spending as a 
percentage of GDP (in separate models) had statistically significant impacts towards 
reducing IMR on data from 131 and 133 countries.  In another key study, Houweling et 
al. (2005) showed that although the level of public spending on health was an 
insignificant predictor of IMR across income levels when controlling for income, literacy 
and region; they did find that public spending reduced infant mortality more dramatically 
among poorer population quintiles than among wealthy ones.   
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Underlying theory and research design 
 The aforementioned studies examined the contribution of the level of public (i.e., 
government) spending on health to IMR variation. However, a problem lies in the 
concept they sought to operationalize.  Their chosen predictor variable to represent public 
expenditure was simply the absolute value of public spending on health irrespective of its 
proportion to the society’s total spending on health.  I feel that this overlooks a central 
function of public health care spending, since the greater the portion of the total health 
care bill covered by the government the lower the portion of the total cost is incurred by 
individuals and families.   
Hence, while their chosen measure of public spending may provide a measure of 
government commitment to health care and absolute financial resources poured into the 
health sector, it does not measure the degree to which government spending reduces 
financial barriers to healthcare.  If the costs of accessing care are prohibitive, these 
financial barriers could lead to adverse health effects among the population, particularly 
among its most vulnerable and poorest members.  Emanating from this logic, this 
research’s primary focus is to examine the impact of general government expenditure on 
health as a percentage of total expenditure on health (GEHPTEH) on the IMR.  
 The model for examining the impact of public health spending on the IMR 
presented here is distinct from the aforementioned studies.  Drawing upon WHO data, I 
select GEHPTEH to help explain variation in the IMR while controlling for doctor 
density, gross national income per capita, the percentage of children under one year of 
age who received the polio vaccine, and the percentage of the population with access to 
improved water sources.  I expect that financial barriers emanating from low GEHPTEH 
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(and thus higher out of pocket or insurance costs) would lead people to postpone or 
abandon care leading to worse health care outcomes reflected in higher IMR and that this 
will be more acute for poorer nations.  It is my hope that this research will provide a 
scientific contribution to understanding the importance of the government’s role in the 
reduction of financial and human resource barriers to care.  
Underlying this research is a philosophy in favor of a rights-based approach to 
healthcare provision.  A rights-based approach to health implies that the state has the 
responsibility to provide healthcare services regardless of the residing population’s ability 
to pay (Farmer 2005; Alma Ata 1978; UN 1948).  This is fundamentally at odds with the 
trend in growing commodification of health services through increased privatization.  
When healthcare is commodified, the gap between absolute need for healthcare among a 
population and its demand backed by the ability to pay leads to inequality among the 
population in healthcare outcomes, and to distortions in which services are provided and 
where.3  Although GEHPTEH does not capture all of the elements of a rights-based 
approach, it does provide a measure to the degree of socialization of healthcare financing. 
Reflecting on the inequality debate, most discussions regarding the impact of 
inequality and income on the IMR seems to overlook the point that income is unequally 
distributed between countries as well as within them.  Nevertheless, since GNI per capita 
is often noted as a significant predictor of IMR (and in my findings as well), I ask, how 
unequal is the international distribution of GNI per capita?  As a minor contribution to 
this discussion, I calculate the GINI index of GNI per capita (PPP) dollars to address this 
                                                 
3 For example, Rodelis Therapeutics, a private pharmaceutical company, recently increased the price of cycloserine 
more than 21-fold, a drug that treats multiple drug resistant tuberculosis and Turning Pharmaceuticals increased the 
price of Daraprim, (pyrimethamine) a drug that is used to treat parasitical infections like malaria, from $13.50 a tablet 
to $850.00 a tablet (Pollack 2015).  These increases in price are sure to reduce the availability of medication for more 
vulnerable populations who have greater need for them.    
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question.  I hope that this research will provide a scientific contribution to understanding 
the importance of the government’s role in the reduction of financial and human resource 
barriers to health care. 
 
Methods 
 I used both additive and interactive multivariate linear regression models to 
measure the impact of the explanatory variables on the IMR.  This method is standard 
and the same or similar methods have been used in similar studies (Rajan et al. 2013; 
Schell et al. 2007; Filmer and Prichett 1999).  Multivariate regression provides a way of 
examining the direct effect of each of the explanatory variables while controlling for 
other predictors (Cohen et al. 2003: 75-80). 
 
Data sources 
 All the data for the 186 countries used in this study came from the World Health 
Organization Global Health Observatory Data Repository with the exception of Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita, which came primarily from the World Bank.4  GNI 
per capita data for 173 of 186 countries are from the World Bank’s “World Development 
Indicators Size of the Economy” table for 2013 (or most recent year) values updated on 
                                                 
4 Data for four missing countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Serbia and Macedonia) for doctor density came from 
the World Bank.  The few countries for which no information on doctor density could be gathered were excluded from 
the sample.   
5  Purchasing-power parity gross national income (GNI) per capita was gathered from the World Bank for the year 2013 
with the exception of Andorra and Argentina, which were from 2008 and 2011, respectively.  I used stand-in measures 
as estimates for missing cases when the World Bank did not report the data.  In the cases of Djibouti and Libya GNP 
per capita was used and drawn from the Google public data explorer.  In the cases of Monaco and Myanmar their 
(2011) GNI per capita figures were gathered from the United Nations.  For the Cook Islands, I was unable to find the 
GNI per capita figure so the most recent (2005) GDP per capita figure was used and came from the CIA World 
Factbook.  The figure for Brunnei Darressalam is the GDP per capita in US dollars for 2013 reported by Knoema that 
cited the IMF World Economic Outlook 2014. 
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April 9th 2014.5 Data for the IMR were for the year 2012, data for general government 
expenditure on health as a percentage of total expenditure on health (GEHPTEH) were 
from 2011, data for percent population with access to improved water sources were from 
2012 (or most recent year) while data for doctor density, was from the most recent year 
reported.6 The percent population with access to improved sanitation was excluded from 
the analysis to avoid multicollinearity. 
 
Variables  
 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the 186 countries included in this 
study.  The dependent variable, the IMR, is the number of infants born that die before 
reaching one year of age per 1000 live births.  The high standard deviation indicates that 
the chances of a child surviving to his/her first birthday fluctuate considerably based 
upon where he or she is born.  Infant mortality ranges from 1.7 per 1000 live births in 
Luxembourg to 117.4 in Sierra Leone. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics*  
Variable Min. Max. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
GEHPTEH 15.90 99.90 59.43  19.60 
Doctor Density 0.01 7.06 1.59 1.49 
GNI per Cap 600.00 167,021.00 17,394.40  21,254.47 
LogGNIpc 2.78 5.22 3.97  0.52 
TEHPGDP 1.65 19.48 6.98  3.11 
LogTEHPGDP 0.22 1.29 0.80  0.19 
PolioVac 30.00 99.00 89.75  11.34 
                                                 
 
6  The reported doctor density ranges from 1998-2012; only one (Haiti) is from1998, three are from 2000, and the 
majority of cases are between 2004-2011. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
ImprWater 40.00 100.00 88.13  15.00 
IMR 2012 1.70 117.40 25.99  24.38 
*N=186 
 
 
 GEHPTEH refers to the government’s portion of the total health care bill.  This 
indicator could thus be viewed as a measure of how ‘socialized’ a country’s total health 
care system is, in that it provides a numerical measure of the public/private mix.  
Furthermore this variable provides me with an operationalized measure of how much 
governments reduce financial barriers to care.  One way this is reflected is in 
GEHPTEH’s strong inverse correlation (-0.87) to out of pocket expenditure on health.  
The numerator of GEHPTEH measures the total amount of government expenditure on 
health of pooled government funds including government funds budgeted for health 
services, “expenditure on health by parastatals, extra-budgetary entities and notably 
compulsory health insurance payments” (WHO 2011).  The denominator is the sum of 
governmental and private expenditures on health.7  
 Doctor density is the number of physicians per 1000 people in the population.  
This provides a simple, albeit imperfect, operationalized measure of human resources for 
health.  The inclusion of doctor density with GEHPTEH in the model allows me to 
capture another important dimension of healthcare accessibility. Physician density ranged 
from .01 for Tanzania to 7.05 for Monaco.   
                                                 
7 Private expenditure on health includes “expenditure from pooled resources with no government control, such as 
voluntary health insurance, and the direct payments for health by corporations (profit, non-for-profit and NGOs) and 
households. As a financing agent classification, it includes all sources of funding passing through these entities, 
including any donor (funding) they use to pay for health” (WHO 2011a). 
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 Since the negative relationship between access to safe drinking water and the IMR 
has been amply documented (McKinlay and McKinlay 1977; Van DerSlice et al. 1994) I 
included this variable in the study.  The WHO indicates that increasing the percentage of 
the population with access to improved drinking water sources is a key means to reduce 
population exposure to drinking water contaminated by fecal material.  The WHO 
(2014c) classifies “piped water into dwelling, plot or yard, public tap/stand pipe, tube 
well/borehole, protected dug well, protected spring and rainwater collection” as improved 
drinking water sources.  Countries ranged from 40% of the population with access in 
Papua New Guinea to 100% in much of Europe, Japan, the US and the UAE. 
  GNI per capita (PPP) helps provide a standardized measure of purchasing power 
between countries (World Bank 2014).  GNI per capita ranged from $600 in Central 
African Republic to $167,021 in Monaco.  GNI per capita was also the variable that most 
significantly violated the assumption of normality.  Its kurtosis score was 16.10 with a 
skewness score of 3.24.8  For this reason, I transformed the variable to log base 10.  This 
corrected the kurtosis to -0.65 and the skewness to -0.23.  
 It is important to note that GNI per capita in PPP dollars (as opposed to in U.S. 
dollars) may reflect the value of state subsidies on population living expenses.  For 
instance, Cuba, which provides ample state subsidies to various basic needs of the 
population (a fact that partially reflected in its high GEHPTEH), had a GNI per capita of 
$5,890 in 2011 (the most recent year available) in US dollars using the Atlas Method 
reported by the World Bank, while the GNI per capita for PPP reported by the World 
Bank for the same year was $18,520.  This 3:1 ratio can be contrasted to the 
                                                 
8 The next highest score of kurtosis was 1.3 for percentage of the population with improved water with a negative skew 
of -1.47.  Only GNI per capita was the only variable log transformed. 
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corresponding U.S. figures of $50,660 and $53,960, respectively.  It is for this reason that 
the PPP version was selected, as I thought it would provide a more accurate reflection of 
a country’s overall economic level.   
 The percentage of children under one year of age covered by the polio vaccine 
provides a good measure of overall vaccination coverage.  It is correlated in our sample 
with the percentage of children under one year of age who receive the diphtheria, 
pertussis and tetanus 3-dose (DTP3) vaccine at 0.97.  This variable was chosen over 
DTP3 largely because its kurtosis (5.32) and skewness (-2.04) were lower than those of 
DTP3 (9.22 and -2.63, respectively).  This variable was not log transformed since the 
transformation (as in the case of DTP3) exacerbated the abnormality.  The percentage of 
vaccination coverage ran from 30% in Equatorial Guinea to 99% in 30 different countries 
around the globe.   
 Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP (TEHPGDP) is the WHO 
estimate sum of all public and private expenditures as a percentage of purchasing power 
parity GDP (WHO 2011b). The variable had some kurtosis and skewness (2.74 and 1.27, 
respectively), which was reduced by the log10 transformation to 0.342 and -0.267, 
respectively. 
 
Hypotheses 
 H1: The higher the proportion of government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total expenditure on health, the lower the infant mortality.  I expected there 
to be a significant inverse relationship between these two variables in a simple regression 
model as more people will have access to healthcare when the government helps in 
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reducing or eliminating financial barriers to care.  I anticipated that the relationship 
would be sufficiently robust to remain significant in a multivariate additive regression 
models that control for the other variables included in this study.  
 H2: I expected that the higher the doctor density, the lower the IMR and I expect 
this relationship to be quite strong especially in a simple regression model.  I anticipated 
that this relationship would remain significant when the other variables are added to the 
model.  This reflects the importance of human resources for health as a central 
component of making health services and care available to the population (WHO 2006; 
Dussault and Franceschini 2006; Schrecker and Labonte 2004; Chen et al. 2004; Padarath 
et al. 2003).  Additionally, I expect that a review of the scatterplot will reflect a 
relationship in which the effect tapers off after doctor density gets beyond a certain point 
and where it becomes more difficult to affect infant mortality. 
 H3: I expected there to be a significant interaction effect between GEHPTEH and 
GNI per capita.  I hypothesized that there is a greater importance for GEHPTEH at lower 
levels of GNI than at higher levels.  I suspect this because previously cited research has 
indicated an inverse relationship between GNI and the IMR.  Thus, because the IMR 
cannot fall below zero and since high levels of GNI tend to indicate a low IMR, I expect 
the impact of GEHPTEH on the IMR to diminish at higher levels of GNI per capita.      
 
Analysis and procedures 
 SPSS was used for all statistical analysis.  First, I examined simple regressions 
between each of the independent variables and the IMR.  This provided some preliminary 
evidence toward evaluating H1 and H2.  Scatterplots were examined to ascertain the 
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nature of the relationship between the IVs and the IMR.  Here it became apparent that 
quadratic terms needed to be added to the models for GNI and doctor density.  A cubic 
term was also added to doctor density, largely due to the particular spread of this data that 
led to too strong a quadratic pull.  This had created a strong U-shape curve that implied a 
total reversal in the relationship between doctor density and IMR rather than a mere 
tapering off of its effect as we approach IMR’s lower bound.  The addition of the cubic 
term corrected that problem (see Figures 1a-1c).  Following Cohen et al. (2003: 204) all 
independent variables were centered to avoid nonessential multicollinearity that results 
from the inclusion of polynomial or interaction terms.  Although doctor density, and its 
quadratic and cubic terms will all be interrelated leading to higher multicollinearity 
among these terms even when centered, this phenomenon can be safely ignored (Cohen et 
al. 2003: 208).  
Next, I conducted a bivariate analysis to examine relations among predictors.  
Here, it was noted that several variables were approaching 0.7 collinearity with GNI.  
Therefore, variance inflation factors (VIF) and the condition index were monitored 
throughout the process.  However, even in models where the VIF is somewhat augmented 
among correlated control variables, this does not affect the reliability of the coefficients 
of the other independent variables (Cohen et al. 2003: 422).  Since the primary purpose is 
to test the impact of GEHPTEH on the IMR while controlling for other predictors, the 
models were run and presented.  Furthermore, when variables represent different 
concepts, researchers may proceed with caution depending on the level of 
multicollinearity.  It should be noted that Cohen et al. (2003) reject the ‘rules of thumb’ 
(VIF > 10 or condition index > 30) regarding multicollinearity as too lenient for social 
  
32
science research, demonstrating that it reduces the estimate’s precision by increasing the 
standard error, no variable in any model in this research has VIFs or a collinearity index 
that even remotely approach the ‘rule of thumb’ values.  Additionally, no changes in 
predictor signs were observed. 
 After the bivariate analysis, I added each of the other IVs in two-predictor models 
before developing more complex regression models.  This allowed me to examine the 
effect of each IV in improving the model’s predictive capacity and to analyze the effect 
of the controls on GEHPTEH’s predictive power.  The results of 11 regression models 
are shown.  I report R-squares, unstandardized and standardized beta coefficients, 
standard error and significance of the predictors in all models. 
 Due to the importance of GNI per capita reflected both in my own study and in 
the literature, I calculated the GINI index for GNI (PPP) relative to the population.  The 
GINI was calculated using the formula .  The GNI 
was obtained by multiplying the per capita values by the population.  A GINI score 
provides a number between 0 and 1 with 0 representing maximum inequality and 1 
representing maximum inequality.  This measure roughly captures between-country 
inequality in GNI per capita and does not capture within country inequality, contrasting 
each countries share of the total GNI (PPP) with its share of the population. 
 To prepare the interaction model, the centered log10 of GNI per capita and 
GEHPTEH were multiplied together to create the centered cross product.
was the interactive model 
used to test H3.  Next, I provided a table with the relevant results and interpreted the 
G = 1 − (σYi +σYi−1)(σX i +σX i−1)
i=0
N
∑
IMˆR = β0 + β1GEHPTEH + β2LogGNIpcap + β3XPGNIGEH
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coefficients at low, mean and high levels of GNI.  Finally, I provided two tables of the 15 
countries with the highest and the lowest GEHPTEH to facilitate discussion. 
 
Study limitations 
 Ideally, this research would demonstrate the connections between GEHPTEH and 
IMR more clearly by accounting for country estimates of forgone care rates. These 
provide a measure for the amount of needed healthcare services that were needed but not 
obtained by a given population.  According to the theory that GEHPTEH reduces 
financial barriers to care, there should be a strong inverse correlation between GEHPTEH 
and the forgone care rate, which in turn leads to worse health outcomes. Unfortunately, 
data for forgone care rates are presently unavailable at the international level.   
This study was also limited by the regularity of data reported for some variables.  
Initially, I wished to control for inequality while simultaneously examining its impact on 
the IMR.  Unfortunately, many countries do not report their GINI coefficient, and for 
those who do, they are often for the most recent year available- data that is at times more 
than twenty years out of date.  Similar problems affect data on union density.  Also, both 
doctor density and GNI per capita are most recent year data, since in many cases those 
data were all that was available.  In order to provide a longitudinal analysis, solid panel 
data needs to be available for each of the variables of interest.  Since this study was 
limited in this way, it only provides a cross-sectional analysis of country characteristics 
using recent data.  Finally, the data do not account for how public health spending is 
actually used, therefore the research could not identify which allocation strategies are 
most effective towards reducing IMR. 
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RESULTS 
 Using multiple regression analysis, I examined the specific contribution of each of 
public health and socioeconomic variable on variation in the IMR.  Similar results were 
obtained (not shown) using the under-five mortality rate as the dependent variable in all 
tests.  In this section I provide the simple regression coefficients of each of the 
explanatory variables regressed on IMR, bivariate correlations among predictors, additive 
regression models and lastly, I test for an interaction between GEHPTEH and log of GNI 
per capita. 
 Examining the simple regression coefficients regressed on the IMR, I observed 
that the largest negative effect (standardized) results from population with access to 
improved drinking water (-0.79) followed closely by GNI (-0.77), doctor density (-0.66), 
polio vaccination coverage (-0.58), GEHPTEH (-0.46) and lastly TEHPGDP (-0.13).  
Since TEHPGDP did not even produce a significant correlation with the IMR it was 
dropped at this point.  The relatively low R2 for GEHPTEH (0.209) is not entirely 
surprising, given that IMR is a function of a plethora of proximate and distal factors.  
Nevertheless, the significant coefficients and critical theoretical and practical importance 
imply that this is still an important variable to include.  By comparison, GNI and GNI2 
produced an R2 of 0.612.  Figure 1a illustrates the scatter of the countries and provides 
the simple regression equation and line for IMR as a function of GEHPTEH and the log10 
of GNI, respectively.  Figure 1b indicates that as doctor density reaches 1 per 1000, there 
is a significant drop in the IMR, with a more modest impact after 2 per 1000, with the 
particular scatter in the data best explained with a downward S distribution and the 
  
35
inclusion of a cubic term.  This suggests that training and retaining an adequate number 
of physicians is of greater importance for countries with a doctor density score under one.  
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Infant mortality rate as a function of GEHPTEH. 
 
  
 
Figure 1b: Infant mortality rate as a function of LogGNIpc and LogGNIpc2.  
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Figure 1c: Infant mortality rate as a function of doctor density, doctor density2 and 
doctor density3. 
 
Reviewing Table 2, the strong inverse correlation observed between GNI and 
IMR reflects the well-documented inverse relationship between these two variables 
(Schell et al. 2007; Arik and Arik 2009; Filmer and Prichett 1999).  The simple 
regression coefficient for GEHPTEH provides some initial evidence in support of H1 
while the strong negative correlation between doctor density and IMR provides some 
support for H2.   
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients  
 GEHP-
TEH 
Doc Den LogGNI 
pc 
Polio 
Vac 
LogTEH
PGDP 
Impr. 
Water 
IMR 
2012 
GEHPTEH 1       
Doc. 
Density 
0.37** 1      
LogGNIpc  0.44** 0.69** 1     
Polio 0.29**  0.40** 0.43** 1    
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Table 2: continued 
 GEHP-
TEH 
Doc Den LogGNI 
pc 
Polio 
Vac 
LogTEH
PGDP 
Impr. 
Water 
IMR 
2012 
LogTEHP
GDP  
0.16* 0.28** 0.03 0.23** 1   
Impr. 
Water 
0.37** 0.57** 0.70** 0.55** 0.17* 1  
IMR2012 -0.46** -0.66** -0.77** -0.58** -0.13 -0.79** 1 
Note: N=186 ** correlation significant at 0.01 * significant at .05 level (two tailed test).  
 
Relations among predictors  
 Table 2 shows strong correlations of GNI with access to improved drinking water 
(0.70) and doctor density (0.69) indicating that variance inflation factors and other signs 
of collinearity need to be monitored when these variables are included in the same model.  
It must be noted that some other variables could not be included directly in the study to 
avoid multicollinearity.  For example, for the 163 countries for which I had data on 
female literacy, the correlation between log of GNI and female adult literacy rate was 
0.75. Also, the percent population with access to improved sanitation was correlated with 
the percent population with access to improved water sources at 0.76, and with GNI at 
0.81. Thus, by controlling for GNI, we are in a loose way controlling for these other 
variables. 
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Table 3a Centered Predictor Additive Regression Models with IMR as Dependent Variable  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 25.99 (1.60)*** 
 
11.93 (1.74)*** 22.79 (1.46)*** 26.00 (1.36)*** 26.15 (1.08)*** 14.52 (1.90) 
GEHPTEH 
 
 
-0.57 (0.08)*** 
[-0.46] 
-0.29 (0.06)*** 
[-0.23] 
-0.19 (0.06)** 
[-0.15] 
 
-0.39 (0.07)***  
[-.31] 
-0.23 (0.06)*** 
[-0.19] 
-0.22 (0.06)*** 
[-0.18] 
Doc. Density  -12.21 (0.93)*** 
[-0.75] 
   -8.50 (1.22)*** 
[-0.52] 
Doc. Density2 
 
 
 7.80 (0.86)*** 
[1.12] 
   5.26 (0.98)*** 
[0.75] 
Doc Density3  -1.04 (0.18)***  
[-0.75] 
   -0.70 (0.19)*** 
[-0.50] 
LogGNIpc 
 
 
  -31.34 (2.40)*** 
[-0.67] 
  -12.97 (3.19) *** 
[-0.28) 
7.26 (3.32) * 
[0.09] 
LogGNIpc2   11.75 (3.56)** 
[0.15] 
   
Polio vac.    -1.04 (0.13)***  
[-0.49) 
  
Impr. water     -1.17 (0.8)*** 
[-0.72] 
 
R2 0.209 0.689 0.630 0.424 0.645 0.722 
DF 1 4 3 2 2 7 
Note: N = 186. Unstandardized coefficients with standard error in parenthesis. Standardized coefficients reported in brackets. *P < .05 1 **P < .01 *** P < .001 
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Table 3b Centered Predictor Additive Regression Models with IMR as Dependent Variable  
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Intercept 13.70 (1.67)*** 17.30 (1.66)*** 23.28 (1.34)*** 24.66 (1.25)*** 18.40 (1.81)*** 
GEHPTEH 
 
 
-0.25 (0.05)*** 
[-0.20] 
-0.19 (0.05)*** 
[-0.15] 
-0.14 (0.06)* 
[-0.12] 
-0.12 (0.05)* 
[-0.10] 
-0.16 (0.05)** 
[-0.12] 
Doc. Density -10.68 (0.92)*** 
[-0.65] 
-7.67 (0.98)*** 
[-0.47] 
  -5.96 (1.15)*** 
[-0.36] 
Doc. Density2 
 
 
6.80 (0.83)*** 
[0.98] 
4.86 (0.85)*** 
[0.69] 
  3.71 (0.92)*** 
[0.53] 
Doc Density3 -0.90 (0.17)*** 
[-0.65] 
-0.64 (0.17)*** 
[-0.46] 
  -0.48 (0.17)** 
[-0.35] 
LogGNIpc 
 
 
  -26.77 (2.32)*** 
[-0.57] 
-17.99 (2.57)*** 
[-0.38] 
-8.07 (2.98)**  
[-0.17] 
LogGNIpc2   9.99 (3.27) ** 
[0.13] 
5.09 (3.12)  
[0.07] 
3.41 (3.03) 
[0.04] 
Polio vac. -0.48 (0.10)*** 
[-0.23] 
-0.30 (0.09)** 
[-0.14] 
-0.60 (0.10)*** 
[-0.28] 
-0.38 (0.10)*** 
[-0.18] 
-0.31 (0.09)** 
[-0.15] 
Impr. Water  -0.54 (0.09)*** 
[-0.33] 
 -0.59 (0.10)*** 
[-0.36] 
-0.45 (0.09)*** 
[-0.28] 
      
R2 0.727 0.773 0.692 0.744 0.784 
DF 5 6 4 5 8 
Note: N = 186. Unstandardized coefficients with standard error in parenthesis. Standardized coefficients reported in brackets. *P < .05 1 **P < .01 *** P < .001 
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Additive regression models 
 As reported in Tables 3a and 3b, with the exception of LogGNIpc’s quadratic 
term that lost significance in models 10 and 11, all variables maintained statistical 
significance in these models.  The intercept is the predicted IMR when all variables are at 
their mean (for descriptive statistics see Table 1 above).  Model 1 is the simple regression 
model using GEHPTEH as the sole predictor of IMR.  Models 2-5 estimate the IMR as 
the function of GEHPTEH with one other variable (and if necessary their power 
polynomials).  Of the first five models, Models 2 and 5 do the best job of predicting IMR.    
GEHPTEH retains significance in all of these models and the R2 of these models 
improved significantly as compared to Model 1.  However, a drop in the size of 
GEHPTEH’s coefficient is largest when it is in the same model as GNI, likely as a result 
of the correlation between these two variables and/or as an artifact of the logarithmic 
transformation of GNI per capita.  Even here, however, GEHPETH’s unique contribution 
to explaining IMR (it’s pr2) is -.22.  The standardized coefficients reflect that doctor 
density has a relatively larger impact upon the IMR than does GEHPTEH, while the 
quadratic term’s positive value indicates that the negative impact of increasing doctor 
density of the IMR wanes as IMR approaches its lower bound which is in turn tempered 
by the cubic term.  Thus, as we increase from a score of 1.59 (the mean) to 2.59 doctors 
per 1000 people the predicted IMR drops from 11.93 to 6.48. 
In Model 3, the GEHPTEH was regressed on IMR controlling for GNI and its 
quadratic term, the standardized coefficient of GEHPTEH dropped to -0.152 but retained 
significance at 0.003.  In this model, R2 increased modestly to 0.630 from 0.612 when 
GNI and the quadratic term are the sole predictors of IMR (not shown). Models 4 and 5 
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show that the percentage of children under 1 year who received the polio vaccine and the 
percentage of population with access to improved water both make significant 
contributions to the explanation of the variance of IMR when added to the model. 
 Models 6 through 11 combine the operationalized central concepts analyzed in 
this study.  In model six we see that some of the effect of GNI’s quadratic term is 
weakened, but remains significant.  Estimating the net effect of the unstandardized beta 
for GNI on Model 6’s intercept, a one-unit increase in the log of GNI per capita (the 
equivalent of country going from low average income to very high income, in our 
example, from a GNI of 103.97 or $9332.54 to a GNI of 104.97 or $93,325.43) would 
reduce the IMR by 5.71 deaths per 1000 live births (-12.97 + 7.26).  Some caution should 
be taken as doctor density’s VIF is raised to 3.6 and GNI is raised to 3.0.   Nevertheless, 
both coefficients remain largely interpretable since the confidence intervals for the beta 
coefficients never approach zero.  Contrary to expectations, in this model doctor density 
(pr2 = -.461) and not GNI (pr2 = -.29) was the strongest predictor of IMR.  In this model 
GEHPTEH’s original contribution (pr2 =-.28) and to the model and its effect size 
approximate those of GNI. 
 Models 7 and 8 are both very strong, with Model 8 having a high R2 and low VIFs 
for doctor density and percent population with improved access to water (2.7 and 2.3, 
respectively).  GEHPTEH’s pr2 remains high in model 8 (-.27), although it drops 
somewhat in Models 9 and 10 to -.18 and -.17 respectively.  Nevertheless, even in these 
models with reduced significance (p = 0.27), GEHPTEH’s upper bound of the confidence 
interval does not cross the zero point, allowing us to safely reject H1’s null hypothesis.  
If, using model 8, we were to increase GEHPTEH’s value ten points above the mean (to 
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69.43) and hold doctor density, access to better water sources and polio vaccinations at 
their mean, we would observe a 1.88 drop in the IMR from 17.30 to 15.42. 
In model 11, due to doctor density being added to a model with GNI, we see that 
both GEHPTEH’s significance and unique contribution improved to p = .003 and pr2 -.25, 
respectively.  Although this model contains the highest multicollinearity, GEHPTEH’s 
coefficients remain unaffected.  GEHPTEH’s VIF is low in all models, its highest value 
at 1.32 in model 11.  Since doctor density and GNI’s coefficients become somewhat 
unstable here, their precise beta values should be interpreted with greater caution (VIFs 
of 3.9 and 3.3, respectively).  Also, GNI’s confidence interval widens considerably here 
(-13.95 to -2.19) and its polynomial’s confidence interval crosses the zero point but the 
beta does not change signs.  The improved water variable’s VIF increased only to 2.6, 
and retains a narrower confidence interval (-0.64 to -0.27).     
 Models 2, 6, 8 and 11 provide support for H2 (that doctor density adds to the 
explanation of IMR controlling for the study’s other variables).  These findings are 
consistent with Anand and Bärnighausen’s (2004) study, which found that doctor density 
significantly added to the explanation of IMR while controlling for GNI, female adult 
illiteracy and income poverty.  GNI’s importance, in terms of its predictive power of the 
IMR and in its relation to other variables in this study, is reflected in all models in which 
it is included.  Thus, I calculated the GINI coefficient for GNI (against its cumulative 
population) as 0.55, reflecting substantial inequality in GNI among countries.  Finally, 
while GEHPTEH is not the strongest predictor, it contributed significantly to the 
explanation of IMR in all models, and in the expected direction leading to the rejection of 
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H0 for H1.  These models suggest that countries tend to experience lower IMR when 
governments cover a greater portion of the total health care bill. 
 
 An Interactive model 
 Next, I check for an interaction between GEHPTEH and GNI with IMR as the 
dependent variable to test whether GEHPTEH has a greater effect on reducing the IMR in 
poorer nations than in wealthier ones.  Table 3 and the regression equations below 
provide evidence for the presence of an interaction effect between these predictors, 
indicating that GEHPTEH matters more in reducing infant mortality in poorer nations 
than in wealthier ones.  Calculating GEHPTEH’s effect at a given level of GNI, one 
observes that as income increases the effect of GEHPTEH becomes weaker until the 
effect in the model disappears around GNI per capita $20,000.  To illustrate, I ran a few 
cases through the interaction model.  Examples of low, medium, and high values are 
given within the range of observed data and are presented in their natural (not logged) 
form to facilitate interpretation. 
 
Table 4: Centered interactive model with IMR as dependent variable 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized  
Coefficients 
Collinearity 
      
 B Std. Error      Beta     Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 24.562            1.214              .000  
GEHPTEH    -.140    .065 -.113 .031            1.304 
LogGNIpc -33.230     2.366               -.713 .000 1.249 
XPGNIGEH     .316    .111   .132 .005            1.049 
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For low (2.97) GNI or -1.0 in centered model: 
 = −0.14 + 0.316(−1) + −33.23(−1) + 24.562 
 = −0.456 + 57.792 
For the mean GNI (3.97) represented as 0 in centered model: 
 = −0.14 + .316(0) + −33.23(0) + 24.562 
 = −0.14 + 24.562 
For high (4.30) or -.33 GNI per capita:  
 = −0.14 + .316(0.33) + −33.23(. 33) + 24.562  
 = −0.036 + 13.926 
 So, in the case of low GNI ($933) a country with a high GEHPTEH, say 89.43 or 
30 points above the mean, would have a predicted IMR of 44.11, or a 13.68 reduction in 
the IMR as compared to a case where the country’s GEHPTEH was at the mean 
(predicted IMR of 57.79).  Likewise, if one reduces GEHPTEH when GNI is low, to 
29.43 or 30 percentage points below the mean, an increase in the IMR by 13.68 to 71.47 
would be observed.  Given an average GNI ($9,332) and a high GEHPTEH, the predicted 
IMR would be 20.36, or 4.2 fewer deaths per 1000 live births as compared to the mean 
GEHPTEH.  In the case of high GNI ($21,378) the impact of a high GEHPTEH versus 
the mean is minimal, with a reduction of 1.08 in the IMR and a predicted IMR of 12.85.    
 
Implications of results  
 One should keep in mind that while according to this study’s models moving up 
one doctor per 1000 population leads to a significant drop in infant mortality, many 
physicians need to be trained and retained to achieve that.  Furthermore, the curvilinear 
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relationship suggests that, as there is an increase in doctor density the impact on the IMR 
decreases.  Similarly, the vast gulf between rich and poor nations reflects that it is 
difficult for a country to increase its GNI per capita sufficiently.  Finally, increasing 
GEHPTEH, while important in its own right as a reflection of the government’s role in 
reducing financial barriers to care, helps reduce infant mortality.  Results of the 
interactive model indicate that GEHPTEH plays a much larger role in reducing infant 
mortality among poorer nations than among wealthy ones.  These results support the 
importance placed on human resources for health and access to health care emphasized 
by the World Health Organization (2006, 2010).    
Nevertheless, while all these variables are important, and a holistic approach 
would be ideal given abundant resources, many countries must be selective in designing 
strategies to reduce the IMR.  These models and the bivariate correlation tables also 
suggest that many of these variables are interrelated.  More human resources for health 
and increased GEHPTEH may help increase vaccine coverage, while higher GNI attracts 
more physicians and enables governments to invest in infrastructure that helps provide 
water to vulnerable populations.  Ultimately, each country will have to decide how to 
allocate its resources in order to maximize the short and long term health impacts of those 
allocation decisions. 
 
Discussion  
 In this study, I found that all of the study’s variables - except TEHPGDP - 
contributed significantly to the explanation of IMR.  Below, I provide a discussion of 
countries with the 15 highest and lowest percentages of GEHPTEH followed by a 
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discussion of results of each variable in the context of other pertinent studies.  I conclude 
the paper by providing suggestions for future research and by positioning the results 
within the present and historical contexts of austerity measures that tend to cut public 
health care spending. 
 
Table 5a: Characteristics of the 15 countries with the highest GEHPTEH in 2011 
Country GEHPTEH Doc. 
Density 
GNI pc Impr. 
Water 
Polio 
Vac. 
IMR 
Tuvalu 99.9 1.09 5,990 98 97 24.8
Niue 99.8 6.00 5,800 99 98 21.2
Solomon Is. 96.7 0.22 1,810 81 86 25.9
Cuba 95.0 6.72 18,520 94 98 4.3
Seyechelles 94.8 1.51 23,270 96 98 11.2
Brunei 
Daruss 
92.0 1.36 39,943 … 90 6.7
Micronesia 91.0 0.18 3,840 89 98 31.3
Cook Islands 91.0 2.89 9,100 100 81 9.1
Monaco 88.6 7.06 167,021 100 99 3.1
Samoa 88.5 0.48 4,840 99 95 15.3
Nauru 88.1 0.71 6,746 96 79 30.3
Vanuatu 87.3 0.12 2,840 91 67 15.3
San Marino 85.9 4.89 64,480 … 96 2.9
Denmark  85.3 3.24 44,440 100 94 3.0
Norway 85.1 4.16 66,520 100 95 2.2
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Table 5b: Characteristics of the 15 countries with the lowest GEHPTEH in 2011 
Country GEHPTEH Doc. Density GNI pc Impr. 
Water 
Polio 
Vac.
IMR
Liberia 29.7 0.01 790 75 93 56.0
Tajikstan 29.6 1.90 2,500 72 56 49.0
Chad 29.6 0.04 2,000 51 96 89.4
Yemen 26.8 0.20 3,820 55 78 46.3
Guinea-Bissau 26.8 0.07 1,240 74 89 80.8
Uganda 25.0 0.12 1,370 75 82 45.4
Côte d'Ivoire 24.5 0.14 2,900 80 83 76.2
Guinea 24.3 0.10 1,160 75 64 65.2
Cambodia 22.6 0.23 2,890 71 95 33.9
Azerbaijan 21.6 3.38 16,180 80 92 30.8
Haiti 21.5 0.25 1,710 62 67 56.5
Afganistan 19.0 0.19 2,000 64 71 71.0
Georgia 18.1 4.24 7,040 99 93 17.8
Sierra Leone 16.2 0.02 1,750 60 91 117.4
Myanmar 15.9 0.50 1,144 86 87 41.1
 
 
A look at the extremes 
 Tables 5a and 5b show the scores of key variables9 for the countries whose 
government expenditure accounted for the most and the least of the total health care bill, 
respectively.  It is noteworthy that the majority of the 15 countries in Table 4a are small 
island nations.  While some of the countries in Table 4a have high GNI per capita, nine 
have GNI under $20,000, and eight have GNI under $10,000 in PPP dollars.  Among the 
countries with the highest GEHPTEH, those with the highest IMR (Micronesia, Nauru 
and Solomon Islands) have very low doctor density, indicating serious problems in 
sufficient human resources for health, while 19% of the population of the Solomon 
                                                 
9 GNI is presented in its natural (not logged) form to facilitate interpretation. 
   
48
Islands lack access to improved drinking water sources and 14% of children under 1 year 
of age have not received their polio vaccine.   
Though each of these three countries also had a low GNI, some interesting 
exceptions (Cuba, Cook Islands, Vanuatu, and Samoa) seem to reflect that an increased 
portion of public healthcare spending has helped some poor countries overcome a low 
GNI when accompanied by high access to clean water, high doctor density, and/or 
vaccination coverage. This suggests that although improving access to clean water is 
highly correlated with GNI, it may be among the more feasible steps that countries with 
low income can take to reduce IMR.  
Nevertheless, increasing GEHPTEH and improving access to clean water alone is 
not enough.  Based on model 11, the Solomon Islands’ predicted IMR would be 40.6 
(14.7 infant deaths more than the actual figure), and while their high GEHPTEH reduced 
the predicted IMR by 6 infant deaths, increasing doctor density to the mean value of 1.49 
from 0.22 would decrease the predicted value by 16.3 deaths per 1000 live births.  If 
Solomon Islands increased access to clean water supplies to our sample mean of 88.13, 
the predicted IMR would drop by 3.2 infant deaths.  Thus, model 11 suggests that the 
most important step to improve health outcomes in the Solomon islands is to train and 
retain more physicians. 
 Table 5b examines the opposite side of the spectrum regarding public health 
expenditure.  Here I note the deviant case10 of Georgia as a country that has a highly 
privatized health care system with relatively medium income and moderately low infant 
mortality. Nevertheless, Georgia has high doctor density, and all of its population has 
                                                 
10 Singapore and Lebanon are other exceptions, 21stand 24th lowest GEHPTEH, respectively. They both had very low 
IMRs of 4.56 and 6.28 in 2012, respectively. Singapore’s high income per capita, however, partially helps explain its 
success at 76,850 for 2013, which is higher than the GNIs of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.     
   
49
access to clean water.  Most concerning, however, are the cases of Sierra Leone, Chad, 
Guinea Bissau, and Afghanistan.  These countries suffer from low physician density, high 
poverty, and poor access to clean water.  Furthermore, when residents of these countries 
do have access to a physician, the bill or cost of insurance is the individual’s 
responsibility.  The IMR for these countries suggests that this combination is devastating.  
For example, Guinea Bissau’s predicted IMR using model 11 is 62.5 (18.3 fewer 
than the reported figure) if increasing its GEHPTEH from 26.8 to the mean of 59.4, the 
predicted IMR would drop to 57.3.  However, according to model 11, if Guinea Bissau 
increased its doctor density to the mean of 1.49, this would reduce the county’s IMR by 
19.3.  In addition, Guinea Bissau’s lower than average percent population with access to 
improved water supplies contributes 6.4 infant deaths to the predicted value.   
 
GNI per capita  
My results show that the GNI has the second largest effect on reducing the IMR 
in our linear multivariate models.  This finding is generally consistent with the results of 
previous research (Arik and Arik 2009; Schell et al. 2007; Filmer and Prichett 1999; 
Prichett and Summers 1996).  Consistent with our results, Arik and Arik (2009) found 
that the effect of GNI per capita on the IMR tapers off as IMR approaches its lower 
bound.  
 Although I did not have sufficient data to include measures of within country 
inequality in the study, due to the importance of this variable in predicting IMR (both 
directly and indirectly) I asked in the introduction how unequal is the distribution of GNI 
per capita between countries.  Considering each country as an individual case (since I am 
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already dealing with income per capita), I calculated the GINI coefficient as 0.55.  This 
means that the between country income distribution is highly unequal, and this study’s 
findings suggest, that this translates into highly unequal life chances.  
 
Doctor density 
 Similar to Anand and Bärninghusen’s (2004) cross-country study, my findings 
show doctor density contributes to the overall explanation of IMR (and CMR) in the 
expected direction. These findings differ from Arik and Arik’s (2005) results that did not 
find doctor density to be a significant predictor of IMR in their provincial level study of 
IMR in Turkey.  Arik and Arik offer the reduced variation of physician density resulting 
from Turkey’s policy requiring physicians to serve in rural areas as a possible 
explanation.   
Gbesemete and Jonsson (1993) found mixed results concerning the significance of 
physician density in their cross-country study of 28 countries in Africa. My results are 
consistent with their second OLS model that found a statistically significant inverse 
relationship for physician density while controlling for seven other variables including 
GDP.  I speculate that the lower coefficients and statistical power obtained for this 
variable in Gbesemete and Jonsson’s study could have resulted from the small sample 
size imposed by their specific research question.  My study’s finding that showed that 
increasing doctor density had the largest effect in reducing the IMR provides further 
support for the WHO’s (2006) emphasis on addressing global disparities in human 
resources for health. 
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GEHPTEH 
 Since I am unaware of other studies that have used this particular variable as a 
predictor of IMR, I can only compare these findings with research on the impact of public 
health care expenditure in general.  An increase in GEHPTEH is not the same as an in 
increase in government spending per se, but is an increase in the government’s share of 
spending relative to the share of private insurance and out of pocket expenditure.  Despite 
the distinction between GEHPTEH and aggregate government/public health care 
spending one may reasonably expect that the relationship between each of these variables 
and the IMR to be similar.  In this regard, these findings are consistent with May and 
Smith (2011) that found a robust inverse relationship between public health care spending 
and the IMR using U.S. county and city data. 
 My results appear somewhat inconsistent with Filmer and Prichett’s (1999) 
results.  They found a small but significant correlation for public spending on health with 
the CMR and an insignificant relationship with the IMR when accounting for eight other 
variables including GDP per capita.  My findings are also relatively inconsistent with 
Schell et al. (2007).  As in these studies, the inclusion of GNI did reduce GEHPTEH’s 
effect size in the overall model, but in the case of using the log of GNI (PPP), GEHPTEH 
retained significance.  This could be attributable to the inclusion of smaller island 
countries that have relatively small GNI per capita but high GEHPTEH, or to my choice 
of expenditure measure.  The choice of measures was theoretically informed as 
GEHPTEH approximates the levels to which a government reduces financial barriers to 
health care access through increased expenditure.   
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 The results of the interaction model tends to support the findings of Houweling et 
al.’s (2005) study which found that public health spending had a stronger impact in 
reducing the IMR in poorer countries than in wealthier ones.11  This model suggests that a 
10-percentage point increase in GEHPTEH would result in 4.56 fewer deaths per 1000 
live births for poorer countries.  Thus, although there are many high-income countries 
(Monaco, Norway, Denmark) that have both high GEHPTEH and very low IMR, this 
model indicates that the more significant partial effect of GEHPTEH originates from 
poorer countries whose scores on IMR are lower than GNI alone would predict.  
While in part the limited impact in wealthier countries may be related to the fact 
that they are closer to IMR’s lower bound, it may also be overshadowed by these nations’ 
accumulation of other advances in public health care and education (i.e., greater portion 
of population with access to better sanitation and water supplies, higher female literacy 
rates etc.).  Although higher GEHPTEH is associated with lower IMR, increasing 
GEHPTEH should not be construed as sufficient to address the challenges in improving 
health outcomes nor as a succinct and inclusive measure of public health.  Other 
measures, such as the percentage of the population with access to clean water and 
sanitation are central to public health and IMR reduction.  
 These results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the greater the 
GEHPTEH the lower the IMR.  I suggest that this is likely the case for two reasons.  
First, GEHPTEH is strongly inversely correlated with out of pocket expenditure on health 
as a percentage of total expenditure on health (-0.858), indicating that the higher the 
GEHPTEH the lower the financial barriers to care.  Secondly, poorer populations are 
                                                 
11It should be noted, however, that a strong inverse bivariate correlation exists between GEHPTEH and IMR (-.549 p < 
.001) for the 33 OECD countries that comprise a sub-sample of this research.   
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poor sources of effective demand despite having an abundance of health care needs, and 
thus would likely not attract the necessary health services when the bulk of the financing 
of these services is relegated to the private sector. 
 
Research and policy implications 
 This research opens up potential directions for future research.  The importance of 
income on the IMR suggests that policies should be examined not only regarding overall 
national growth but also on their ability to reduce between-country inequality.  Further 
research should also be pursued on the relationship between within-country human 
resource for health density and health care outcomes.  Another potential avenue for future 
research would be to analyze the impact of GEHPTEH on IMR over time both among 
and within countries.  Finally, future research could examine the connection between 
GEHPTEH and the forgone care rate given reliable estimates of the latter.  
 These findings reinforce the importance of a rights-based approach to health care 
financing and are pertinent to the international, and potentially national, efforts to reduce 
infant and child mortality.  One of the central arguments of proponents of neo-liberal 
policies is that governments are inherently inefficient and, in terms of health care, private 
sector control, provision and financing would lead to better health outcomes.  If this were 
true, however, one would expect a positive (rather than an inverse) association between 
GEHPTEH and IMR.  The results of this research are thus wholly inconsistent with the 
neoliberal paradigm.  
The focus on GEHPTEH is particularly pertinent given that many countries feel 
pressured to pursue austerity policies in the wake of ongoing economic difficulties.  
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Many of these austerity measures are aimed at decreasing the role of government in 
health care provision and finance (Kentikelenis et al. 2014; Hermann 2009) and more 
recent neo-liberal policies have been detrimental to health care outcomes, by increasing 
inequality and creating more barriers to health care services (Palma-Solis et al. 2009; 
SAPRIN 2004; Schoepf et al. 2000;).  Likewise, according to my research, governments 
that cover more of the total financial healthcare burden tend to have lower IMR 
particularly among poor counties.  This research thus suggests that reductions in 
GEHPTEH may be harmful to the goal of improving healthcare outcomes, particularly 
among poorer countries. 
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TYPOLOGY OF 123 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
A paper to be submitted to International Journal of Health Services 
 
Isaac Christiansen12,13 and David Peters1 
 
Abstract 
Although previous researchers have analyzed development dynamics and theories 
as well as the relationship between societal level health outcomes and various indicators 
of development, relatively few have provided typologies of health and development.  
Health and development typologies enhance understanding of which countries are most 
similar in terms of the key variables that serve as the basis for clustering.  These 
classifications can then facilitate comparisons of the various health and development 
types identified in the analysis and assist in the generation of appropriate policy 
strategies.  Due largely to problems of insufficient data, previous studies have focused on 
wealthier nations’ political, developmental and health indicators.   
This study contributes to the social science literature on health and development 
by creating a nested typology of non-OECD countries to more precisely understand the 
nature of the challenges facing them.  Developing nations are classified using cluster 
analysis based on eight key health and development factors: income inequality, GNI per 
capita, under-nutrition, government share of total expenditure on health, total expenditure 
on health as a percentage of GDP, DPT3 vaccination coverage, number of physicians per 
1000 people and infant mortality.  We find tiers of country clusters characterized by 
above average health and development, high inequality, and below-average health and 
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development.  These tiers then subdivide into nine relatively distinct groupings.  By 
identifying groupings of countries that share in particular arrangements of health and 
development challenges this research may assist policymakers, and health and 
development scholars to identify broad but appropriate strategies for country clusters. 
 
Introduction 
Theoretical and empirical research on health and development has focused on 
dynamics of socioeconomic development relationships between societal level health 
outcomes and indicators of development.  Development has been seen by some to be 
largely a product of policies that favor foreign investment and economic growth, often 
measured in terms of GNP (e.g., Marquardt 2005; Dollar 2001) while others (e.g., 
Kruetzman 2008:679; Gershman and Irwin 2000; Jaffe 1998:8) have argued that 
economic growth by itself is an inadequate measure of development, since the costs and 
benefits of that growth may be very unequally distributed.  Other measures such as 
whether production is geared towards internal and/or external markets, access to adequate 
productive technology, the degree of income and wealth inequality, the nature of class 
relations, infrastructural development, political and socioeconomic independence, 
population health, educational and nutritional indicators, diversity of exports, 
governmental redistributive policies and ecological sustainability are considered 
important components of development (Amin 2013; Gershman and Irwan 2000:17-18; 
Foster 1999; Jaffe 1998; Rodney 1972).  Other significant bodies of research (e.g., De 
Vos and Van der Stuyft 2015; Arik and Arik 2009; Palma Solís et al. 2009; Leys 2009; 
Shandra et al 2004; Millen and Holtz 2000) have focused on the relationships among 
aspects of political economy, development indicators and population health.   
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The goal of this paper is to construct a typology of health and development for 
developing, primarily non-OECD countries.  There have been relatively few studies 
leading to taxonomies of health and development, with the majority of studies focused on 
the developed world, due in part, to the greater availability of data.  This research adds to 
the existing health and development literature by creating a nested taxonomy of primarily 
non-OECD countries that cluster around particular scores on key health, health system 
and socioeconomic development variables. 
These variables include gross national income per capita (GNIPC), the 
government’s share of total health expenditure (GEHPTEH), income inequality (GINI), 
physician density (number of doctors per 1000 people), the percentage of children under 
age five that are underweight (U5UW), the percentage of children under age one that 
have received the diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT3) vaccine, total expenditure on 
health as a percentage of GDP (TEHPGDP), and the infant mortality rate (IMR).  GNIPC 
provides an overall measure of a country’s economic level and is a known determinant of 
cross-national variation in health outcomes.  The GINI measures how unequal a nation’s 
income is distributed and is also considered a determinant of health outcomes.  
GEHPTEH measures the degree of government’s share of health financing in a given 
country.  TEHPGDP furnishes an idea of how costly care is in a particular country.  
Physician density is an important element in health systems, since a health system cannot 
function effectively without sufficient doctors or other health professionals.  U5UW 
provides a measure of the degree of hunger in a country, and by extension, of food 
security.  The level of DPT3 vaccination coverage imparts a measure of the level of 
epidemic and illness prevention.  Finally, in addition to being a direct measure of infant 
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survival, the infant mortality rate (IMR) is a good general indicator of health outcomes in 
a society.  By clustering developing countries based on these variables we are sure to 
obtain a typology that captures vital facets of health and development.  
Below, we provide a brief review of the health and development literature 
focusing primarily on relationships among various socioeconomic variables and health 
outcomes, with an emphasis on variables that are included in this study followed by a 
review of key studies that have provided health and development typologies and/or 
‘welfare regime’ typologies linked to health outcomes.  Immediately following the 
typologies in health and development research sub-section, we highlight the unique 
contribution of this research and introduce a conceptual model for health and 
development that reflects relations among variables.  This is then followed by a 
discussion of methods and presentation of the research findings.  This paper concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the findings and suggestions for future research.  
 
Development and health    
Much research has indicated links between important aspects of development and 
population health.  Higher GNIpc and/or gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are 
related to better population health indicators up until a level after which, other variables 
explain remaining variation (Arik and Arik 2009; Schell et al. 2007; Prichitt and 
Summers 1996).  Many researchers (e.g., Wilkinson and Pickett 2006; Wilkinson 1992; 
Schell et al. 2009; Lynch et al. 1998) have also conducted studies indicating that income 
inequality leads to worse health outcomes, although others (Rajan et al. 2013; Avendano 
2012) did not find significant relationships when controlling for other economic 
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variables.  Taken together, however, the research suggests that inequality (in addition to 
poverty) is deleterious to population health outcomes.  This may occur either through a 
relationship with increased poverty for the many or indirectly through psychological 
stresses that result from a decline in social cohesion originating from increased relative 
depravation, as Wilkinson (2006) suggests.  Other socioeconomic determinants of 
population health outcomes, such as infant and child mortality rates, include the average 
educational level of the population and female literacy rates (Song and Burgard 2011; 
Filmer and Pritchett 1999), percentage of the population with access to clean water and 
sanitation (Urdinola 2011; VanDerslice, Popkin, and Briscoe 1994) and quality of 
housing (Urdinola 2011). 
 Another key socioeconomic determinant of health outcomes is the nature of the 
healthcare system itself.  The WHO (2010) has argued that universal health coverage is a 
central element in reducing barriers to care and that reducing direct out of pocket 
payments for services is especially important.  In a previous cross-sectional study, 
Christiansen and Mazur (unpublished) showed how GEHPTEH was inversely related to 
the IMR while controlling for GNI per capita (PPP), doctor density, percentage of 
children under one year of age vaccinated for polio, and percentage of the population 
with access to improved water sources.  A higher GEHPTEH reflects a lesser degree of 
privatization of health care financing, an important element of healthcare systems.   
Navarro (1993) showed that in advanced capitalist countries, whether healthcare 
system financing is primarily linked to employment with non-comprehensive means 
tested programs targeting poorer populations, or whether there is a universal public 
healthcare system in place, is largely determined by the balance of class forces.  It is thus 
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not surprising that neoliberal policies, consisting of privatization and shrinking roles of 
the state have had detrimental effects on health in many countries (Laurell 2015; Rao 
2009; Coburn 2009; Mohan 2009; Farmer 2005; Field, Kotz and Bukham 2000).  
Neoliberal policies lead directly to a reduction in the role of state services, reduced tax 
revenue, erosion of social, environmental and worker protections, and to increased global 
and domestic inequality.  A downward spiral intensifies through intense interstate 
competition for foreign direct investment often to gain access to critical technologies or 
through pressures, or as part of austerity packages imposed by international financial 
institutions, as more countries choose an export oriented industrialization strategy based 
on foreign capital investment (Harvey 2005).  Ultimately, the higher rates of surplus 
value extracted and held on to by multinational corporations are linked to both poorer 
health and lower social cohesion (Coburn 2004).   
 
Typologies in health and development research 
With few exceptions (e.g., Wood and Gough 2006), most of the research that has 
either developed a typology of countries for studies in health and development or utilized 
a typology as a predictor variable for population health outcomes has focused on 
wealthier countries (Karim, Eikemo and Bambra 2010; Chung and Muntaner 2007; 
Navarro and Shi 2001; Epsing-Anderson 1990).  Navarro and Shi (2001) adapted a four-
class typology from Huber and Stephens (1998) that divided developed capitalist 
countries according to welfare governance type as defined by the political orientation of 
the party that governed the country (social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal and 
fascist) for the greatest portion of the 1946-1980 period.  They found that the social 
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democratic countries had considerably greater working class power (measured by higher 
union density), higher taxes as a percentage of GDP, lower inequality, higher percentage 
of the population publically employed in health, education and welfare, a higher 
proportion of women in the labor force, and more universal coverage.  Their results also 
showed that Social Democratic countries exhibited lower average IMR for each decade 
during 1960-1996 than each of the other governance types.    
Chung and Muntaner (2007) provided further support for Navarro and Shi’s 
(2001) findings that welfare regime type was significantly related to better health 
outcomes in longitudinal multilevel models controlling for (log) GDP per capita.  They 
showed that the populations of social democracies (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Finland) had better health indicators (measured by infant mortality and low birth weight) 
than other welfare regime types.  Karim et al. (2010) used a one-way ANOVA to test 
whether significant differences existed in terms of life expectancy, IMR, GDP per capita, 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and TEHPGDP between regime types.  They 
used a six-class regionalized typology based on geographic region and specifically 
incorporated an East Asian welfare state type into the model.  The welfare-regime types 
that they used were Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Bismarkian, Southern, Eastern 
European, and East Asian.  They found significant differences in each of the variables by 
welfare state type.  They further showed that the East Asian welfare state type performed 
much better than would be expected based on GDP per capita, and social and health 
expenditures in health outcome indicators.  They suggest that this may be due to different 
cultural dietary patterns and lower rates of smoking. 
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Still, few researchers have sought to establish typologies of health and 
development among poorer countries.  In one such study, Wood and Gough (2006) 
created a global typology of security regimes focusing on developing/underdeveloped 
countries.  The crux of their argument is that for poor countries to improve their social-
development outcomes they need to undo ‘clientelist’ political-economic forms and 
establish formalized rights structures.  Using a k-means cluster analysis, Wood and 
Gough (2006) divided 61 countries into four distinct clusters, based on human 
development index (HDI) score, public expenditure on education and health as a 
percentage of GDP, and the total remittance flow of émigrés plus international aid as a 
percentage of GDP.  Their typology was divided as follows: “Actual or potential welfare 
regimes” were predominately Eastern European countries but also included Kenya, 
Thailand and several Latin American countries that exhibited high social spending with 
generally positive social development outcomes.  “More effective informal security 
regimes” were a mix of Asian, Middle-Eastern and Latin American countries that had 
relatively positive social development outcomes but displayed low average state spending 
and aid/remittance inflow.  “Less effective informal security regimes” were South Asian 
and a few sub-Saharan African countries and were characterized by “poor levels of 
welfare coupled with low public commitments and moderate international flows” while 
“insecurity regimes” were comprised of only sub-Saharan African nations that depend on 
aid/remittances almost entirely and exhibited very poor social development outcomes 
(Wood and Gough 2006: 1703-1704).  
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Direction of this research 
This research is distinct from the previous typologies that have predicted 
particular health and development results from a variant of a welfare-state typology.  In 
this research we used eight socioeconomic health and development indicators with a 
hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis for 123 non-OECD countries to construct a 
nested taxonomy of health and development.  The goal of this research is not to replicate 
Human Development Index rankings, but rather to examine country groupings based on 
the variables listed below in Table 1.  From there, the salient characteristics of each 
cluster are identified reflecting more specifically the particular health and development 
challenges faced by countries in each grouping.       
Figure 1 provides a model for a virtuous circle of health and development. 
Elements in black are variables used in the cluster analysis, while the elements in grey are 
considered important, but were excluded from the clustering process due either to 
insufficient data or excessive multicollinearity with other variables used in the cluster 
analysis.  Starting at the top of Figure 1, the first two boxes represent a high degree of 
political-economic sovereignty and greater workers’ power, which are necessary to gain 
greater public control of the social surplus and decommodification of social benefits, 
such as health and education provision.  These factors would ideally lead to a greater 
capacity to develop human resources (which then are fed back into the cycle as inputs) 
and to better and more equitable economic, educational and health outcomes that, in turn, 
feed back into the system completing the virtuous circle of equitable health and 
development.
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Figure 1: Virtuous circle of equitable health and development 
Political and Economic Inputs:
Higher GEHPTEH 
Higher rates of social investment, e.g., TEHPGDP
Presence of peace
Diversified production/exports
Access to adequate technology
Greater public control of economic surplus
Socialist/communist/social democrat governments 
prioritizing social and economic justice
Higher union/ cooperative density
Low corruption
Economic Outcomes:
Higher GNI 
Low income and wealth 
inequality
Low foreign debt
Health and Educational Structure and Infrastructure:
Higher percent of population with access to improved drinking 
water sources and improved sanitation
Universalized care free at point of delivery
Population access to appropriate health care facilities and 
technology
Free education through university
More schools and universities throughout country
Human Resource Inputs:
Higher doctor density
Nurse and midwife density
Higher teacher density 
Educational Outputs and Outcomes:
Higher primary and secondary school 
enrollment rates
Higher literacy rates
Higher percentage of population with 
advanced education
Health Outputs and Outcomes: 
Higher DPT3 immunization Coverage 
Fewer children under five suffering from malnutrition
Lower IMR and CMR
Higher life expectancy
Lower morbidity
Cyclical Results Feeding Back Into Economic 
Inputs: 
Less cause for absenteeism 
Lower brain drain (fewer push factors)
Greater productivity 
Higher tax base  
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Research limitations 
This cluster analysis uses variables that capture particular characteristics of 
nation-states but does not encapsulate the relations between these countries and the 
wealthier nations, or between these countries and industry, transnational corporations or 
international financial institutions.  Likewise, between country capital, import and export 
flow dynamics are not evaluated.  This study also does not reflect within country 
inequalities (by province or district) in doctor density, vaccination rates or IMR.  These 
are important considerations because physicians tend to be concentrated in more 
developed/ urban areas, leading to salient geographic variations in vaccination rates and 
IMR between a country’s urban and rural areas (Dussault and Franeschini 2006).  Finally, 
this typology is derived from cross-sectional data and is not based on change over time, 
and therefore cannot measure the level of potential dynamism between typological 
categories.  
 
Data and Methods  
The goal of this research is to construct a typology of health and development 
among non-OECD countries.  The primary way to create an empirically based 
classification of cases is cluster analysis.  Here we used Ward’s Method, a form of 
hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis, to group cases into clusters.  The variables 
were standardized and the analysis was run in SAS.  The number of clusters was 
determined by a variety of traditional and statistical diagnostic criteria, and the clusters 
were named based on an examination of the mean scores, standard deviations and ranges 
of the variables in each cluster. 
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Data Sources 
Data for 123 developing countries were obtained primarily from the World Bank 
(WB) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Health Observatory Data 
Repository.  The goal for the data gathering stage was to acquire recent data for as 
complete a set of countries as possible within close temporal proximity to obtain an 
accurate snapshot of the countries health and development profile.  Data for purchasing 
power parity gross national income (GNI) per capita and the GINI coefficient for 2012 or 
most recent year available were obtained primarily from the WB, while data on infant 
and child mortality rates (2012), the percentage of children under one year of age that 
have been vaccinated by the diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT3) vaccine (2012), 
physician density per 1000 (most recent year), the TEHPGDP (2011) and GEHPTEH 
(2011) all come from the WHO.  Some estimates for the GINI coefficient were gathered 
from Global Peace Index when they were not available from WB.  Data on the 2008-2012 
estimates for the percentage of children under-five that are underweight were gathered 
from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
 
Variables and Assumptions 
 Table 1 provides a list of variables used in this research, their description, and the 
source of the data.  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in 
the study.  In Table 2, the values are for the raw (non-standardized) scores of the 
variables over the data set.  Table 3 provides a correlation table for the study’s variables.  
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Table 1: Variables and their Descriptions 
Variable 
Abbreviation* 
Description  Source 
ZGNIPC The log10 of gross national income in 
purchasing power parity dollar per capita in 
2013  
World Bank 
ZGINI GINI coefficient for 2012 or most recent 
year 
World 
Bank/GPI 
ZU5UW 2008-2012 estimates of the percentage of 
children under the age of five that are 
classified as underweight 
IFPRI 
ZDocDen Number of doctors per 1000 population in 
2012 or most recent year 
WHO 
ZDPT3 Percentage of infants under the age of one 
year that have received the diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus vaccine in 2012 
WHO 
ZTEHPGDP The log10 of total expenditure on health as a 
percentage of gross domestic product in 
2011 
WHO 
ZGEHPTEH Government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total expenditure on health in 
2011 
WHO 
ZIMR Number of children per 1000 live births that 
die before reaching their first birthday in 
2012 
WHO 
*Z indicates that the variable is presented in standardized Z-score values.   
 
Table 2 shows that GNI per capita among our non-OECD countries is relatively 
modest, but with considerable variance.  The GINI coefficient measures inequality of the 
distribution of an asset (a score of 100 indicates perfect inequality while a score of 0 
indicates perfect equality).  Average inequality among these countries was relatively high 
and varies considerably.  While the average level of doctor density does not appear to be 
a major problem, the high standard deviation and minimum scores indicates that 
physicians are concentrated in some nations.  The percentage of children under the age of 
five underweight reflects, “wasting, stunted growth or both” (Grebmer et al. 2013: 7).  
Roughly 12% of the non-OECD world’s children are underweight and almost 90% 
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receive the DPT3 vaccination.  TEHPGDP varies considerably, while the governments’ 
share of total health care spending averages just over half.  Most concerning, however, is 
that the average IMR for the countries is quite high with significant variation, with one 
country, Sierra Leone, having an infant mortality rate (IMR) of 117.4. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 123 Countries 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
GNIPC 11,179.67   15,361.26 600.00 123860.00 
GINI 41.71   9.05 26.00 64.00 
U5UW 12.16  10.54 0.30 45.30 
DocDen 1.20  1.30 < 0.01 6.72 
DPT3 87.54  12.83 26.00 99.00 
TEHPGDP 6.26  2.77 1.65 19.48 
GEHPTEH 53.03  17.84 15.90 95.00 
IMR 33.44  25.50 2.90 117.40 
 
The first assumption of cluster analysis is that all of the variables are on the same 
scale.  If they are not, standardization is recommended (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984: 
20).  Since the variables gathered were on different scales, the variables were transformed 
to their Z-scores to conduct the cluster analysis.   
Although avoiding multicollinearity is not a crucial requirement of cluster 
analysis, variables that are collinear act as an implicit weight on the concept measured.  
For this reason, certain variables that were gathered initially for the research could not 
prudently be included in the cluster analysis.  These include the female literacy rate, the 
percentage of the population with access to improved water supply and the percentage of 
the population with access to improved sanitation.  These are all highly interrelated and 
each is highly negatively correlated with the IMR at -0.79, -0.73, and -0.81, respectively.  
Since IMR is highly correlated with other essential variables included in this 
cluster analysis (DocDen, GNI per capita), there is already an implicit weight on IMR in 
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this study; while the argument could be made that these variables measure unique 
concepts, their inclusion would apply excessive weight on IMR.  While the inclusion of 
doctor density as a measure of human resources for health (HRH) and GNI per capita as a 
measure of a country’s overall level of wealth relative to population size is deliberate, 
adding even more weight to the concept represented by IMR by including female literacy 
rate or the percentage of the population with improved water supply would have created 
too strong bias in the analysis.  Nevertheless, the presence of correlated variables implies 
causal relationships among elements influencing cluster formation.  As Table 3 shows, 
GNI per capita and IMR are the only included variables included that have a correlation 
over 0.7. 
Another requirement of cluster analysis is to address outliers.  Four of the 
variables had no outliers and ZU5UW and ZIMR had one case each over three standard 
deviations from the mean (Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone, respectively).  ZDocDen had 
one outlier (Cuba) at 4.23 standard deviations above the mean while ZDPT3 had four 
outliers (in part due to its left skew) one of which (Nigeria) was 4.80 standard deviations 
from the mean.  A potential solution is to winsorize the data, by reducing all extreme 
values to roughly no more than a value of three standard deviations away from the mean.  
A winsorized nine-cluster solution was run; and while slightly different mean values were 
obtained on these variables, cluster membership was identical to the non-winsorized 
version.  Since these cases represent actual values and not errors of data entry, we use the 
non-winsorized results. 
Although normality is not an assumption of cluster analysis directly, it is a 
requirement for some of the verification procedures (such as logistic regression).  For this 
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reason, we used a log10 transformation of ZGNIPC and ZTEHPGDP.  Kurtosis in 
ZGNIPC was reduced by the transformation from 28.37 to -0.48 and its skewness from 
4.66 to -0.21, while kurtosis in ZTEHPGDP was reduced from 6.33 to 0.87 and its 
skewness from 1.80 to -0.21.  ZDPT3 was also non-normal, but it was not log-
transformed after we observed that the kurtosis was greatly exacerbated by the 
transformation, going from 5.18 to 15.28. 
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Table 3: Health and Development Correlations* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*N = 123.  Significance for two-tailed test in parenthesis.
Variable ZlogGNIPC ZGINI ZU5UW ZDocDen ZDTP3 ZlogTEHPGDP ZGEHPTEH ZIMR 
ZlogGNIPC 
1 
       
ZGINI 
-.121 
(.181) 
1 
      
ZU5UW -.646 
(.000) 
.032 
(.725) 
1      
ZDocDen .602 
(.000) 
-.359 
(.000) 
-.634 
(.000) 
1     
ZDTP3 .418 
(.000) 
-.203 
(.024) 
-.460 
(.000) 
.324 
(.000) 
1    
ZlogTEHPGDP -.235 
(.009) 
.044 
(.626) 
-.170 
(.060) 
.110 
(.224) 
.178 
(.049) 
1   
ZGEHPTEH .452 
(.000) 
-.113 
(.215) 
-.377 
(.000) 
.254 
(.005) 
.314 
(.000) 
-.069 
(.449) 
1  
ZIMR -.752 
(.000) 
.243 
(.007) 
.670 
(.000) 
-.647 
(.000) 
-.524 
(.000) 
.053 
(.561) 
-.376 
(.000) 
1 
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Clustering Method  
Ward’s method differs from the average squared Euclidean distance method by 
joining cases to clusters “that result in the minimum increase to the ESS” (error of the 
sum of squares) of Euclidean distance until all cases and clusters have been nested under 
a single cluster (Aldenderdorf and Blashfield 1984:43).  Ward’s method tends to avoid 
the production of elongated chained clusters often produced by the average squared 
Euclidean distance method, and for this reason is preferred for the purpose of this 
research.  The equation for Ward’s method is: 
 
      
 
where N is the number of cases,  is the distance between existing clusters K and L and 
is the distance between M, the merger of clusters K and L and any new cluster J, and 
 refers to the number of cases in cluster K.  
 
Clustering Criteria and Verification 
   The goal of cluster analysis is to minimize distance between elements within 
clusters, while maximizing distance between them.  The optimal solution is to minimize 
the amount of variance lost while keeping the number of clusters relatively small.  This 
research uses a combination of traditional techniques (agglomeration schedules of fusion 
coefficients and dendrograms) and statistical techniques (semi-partial R2, pseudo F 
statistic, pseudo t2 and R2 compared with expected R2) to determine the number of 
DKL = BKL =
XK − XL
2
1
NK
+
1
NL
DJM =
(NJ + NK )DJK + (NJ + NL )DJL − NJ DKL
NJ + NM
DKL
DJM
NK
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clusters.  In traditional techniques, one looks for ‘jumps’ in the agglomeration schedule 
or long lines in the dendrogram that signify a significant loss of information or variance 
explained by the joining of clusters and the quantity of clusters.  A potential solution is to 
select the number of clusters just before the ‘jump’ or longer lines in the dendrogram.  
Statistical techniques and their plots work in a somewhat similar way.  Plots are 
examined to see where the jumps are in the graph indicating a loss of data, with the 
number of clusters before the jump recommended as a potential solution to identify the 
number of clusters (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984: 57).   
The three cluster solutions were then ‘checked’ with a logistic regression using 
the cluster solution as a dependent variable in SPSS.  Lastly, clusters were named based 
on the mean z-scores of the variables for the cases in each cluster.  Means, standard 
deviations and minimum-maximum z-scores are presented in tables for each cluster, 
while the actual (non-z) values are discussed within the text.  The z-scores allow the 
reader to assess the comparative value of clusters while the ‘natural’ values discussed 
within the text allow the reader to accurately assess the characteristics of each cluster.  
 
Results 
This research constructs a typology of health and development using Ward’s 
method, a form of hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis.  ZGNIPC, ZU5UW, 
ZGEHPTEH, ZTEHPGDP, ZGINI, ZDocDen, ZDTP3 and ZIMR were used to cluster 
the countries.  Although initially we expected the diagnostic instruments to suggest a 
single solution, both traditional and statistical indicators suggested three to four distinct 
solutions.  The dendrogram suggested solutions of two, three, six and nine clusters, the 
pseudo t2 suggested three, five, six and nine, the pseudo-F plot five and eight, the semi-
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partial R2 plot indicated three, six, and nine and the plot of R2 over the approximate 
expected R2 indicated three, six and nine clusters.  Separate multinomial logistic 
regression with the cluster solutions as dependent variables ‘confirmed’ the solutions. 
The convergence of diagnostic techniques coupled with the logistic regression validation 
suggests that the cluster divisions are genuinely present in the data rather than reflecting a 
mere product of method.  Based on the examination of the diagnostic plots, a three-tiered 
nested cluster solution of three, six and nine clusters was selected and developed based 
on the mean scores of the variables within each cluster. 
Figure 2 shows how these solutions are nested within one another.  As indicated 
by the diagnostic tests, the largest single loss of variance results from joining the last 
three clusters into one.  This reflects major division between countries with severe health 
and development challenges, those that have average to above average health and 
development and those characterized by extremely high inequality (semi-partial R2 goes 
from 0.054 to 0.301, while the R2 drops from 0.403 to 0).  This is then followed by a 
further subdivision into six clusters, named for their most salient characteristics as: High 
HRH, High Income, Divided Fortunes (high inequality), Hungry (food insecure), Critical 
Condition, and Extremely Critical Condition.  Zooming in to a breakdown of nine 
clusters, we examined the specific areas of success or acute challenges faced by member 
countries.  Tables 4, 5, 6a and 6b provide the z-means, standard deviations and ranges for 
each of the variables used to classify cluster membership for each of the cluster solution 
levels.  Table 7 shows which countries belong to which cluster.  Clusters at this level are 
named in terms of overall health and development as either Mild (Type 1), Mild (Type 
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2), Moderate (Type 1), Mild (Type 2), Severe or Critical (Types 1-4), with a higher level 
of type relating to a worse health and development scenario. 
 
Three-cluster Tier 
An examination of Table 4 shows that members of the Virtuous Circle cluster 
tend to have higher GNI per capita, doctor density, proportion of children receiving 
vaccines, lower inequality, proportion of children under age five underweight, and infant 
mortality.  Their healthcare systems are more publically funded and this grouping spends 
the average on health as a percentage of GDP.  In real terms, this cluster averages a little 
over two doctors for every one thousand people with a standard deviation (SD) of 1.32 
physicians.  It has a mean GNI per capita of $19,146 (SD 21,287) but a median of 
$14,900, reflecting that the mean is strongly pulled upwards by high values for the 
wealthy oil exporting countries of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.  Inequality is 
much lower than the average (GINI 35.6, SD 5.2) while GEHPTEH (60.6, SD 17.9) tends 
to be higher but varies considerably.14  People residing in countries within this cluster 
tend to live longer with an average life expectancy of 73.2 years and experience lower 
average IMR and under-5 child mortality rate (CMR) of 14.4 (SD 9.5) and 16.8 (SD 
11.3), respectively.
                                                 
14 These data are averages of the country values for the GINI, doctor density, and IMR that treats countries as 
individuals- they are not separate calculations based on the total populations of the combined countries in a cluster.  It 
should be noted that this is a limitation as it gives equal weight to disparate populations.    
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Figure 2: Nested cluster health and development typology 
Virtuous Circle: Above 
Average Health and 
Development 
Mild (Type 1): High income 
and economic justice, very 
high HRH and health, 
socialized care/financing 
Mild Type 2: Very high income. 
Economic Justice Very high 
income, high health outcomes 
low inequality, socialized 
care/financing 
 
Moderate Type 1: 
Medium/high income & 
health outcomes, very high 
inequality 
 
Moderate Type 2: High HRH, 
average income and health outcomes, 
low inequality, privatized care 
 
Critical Type 4: Very poor, 
low HRH, health and food 
security. Privatized care. 
Highest IMR 
Critical Type 1: Very poor, 
low HRH and health.  Food 
insecure. 
Hungry: Food Insecure 
 
Critical Type 3: Low 
income and HRH.  Very low 
prevention and health.  High 
inequality. 
 
Vicious Circle: Below Average 
Health and Development 
Severe:  ‘Average’ 
income, health outcomes, 
& prevention. Food 
insecure. Privatized care. 
Critical Type 2: Moderately poor, 
very high inequality, low HRH and 
health 
Divided 
Fortunes: High 
Inequality 
High HRH 
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Table 4: Three-cluster Solution* 
Cluster Name N ZGNIPC ZGINI ZU5UW ZDocDen ZDPT3 ZTEHPGDP ZGEHPTEH ZIMR  
Virtuous Circle 
Above Average 
Health and 
Development  
 
48 0.71 (0.69)  
[-0.84 to 
2.69] 
-0.68 (0.57) 
[-1.74 to 
0.36] 
-0.75 (0.30) 
[-1.13 to 
[0.06] 
0.87 (1.02) 
[-0.87 to 
4.23] 
0.54 (0.46) 
[-1.45 to 
0.89] 
0.05 (0.92)  
[-2.60 to 
1.62] 
0.42 (1.00)  
[-1.96 to 
2.35] 
-0.75 (0.37)  
[-1.20 to 
0.61]  
Divided 
Fortunes: 
Average health 
and high 
inequality  
 
27 0.23 (0.73) 
[-1.92 to 
1.09] 
1.21 (0.63) 
[0.25 to 2.46] 
-0.40 (0.56) 
[-1.11 to 
1.01] 
-0.25 (0.52) 
[-0.91 to 
0.58] 
0.30 (0.49)  
[-0.74 to 
0.89] 
0.35 (0.72) 
[-1.18 to 
1.89] 
0.24 (0.72) 
[-0.99 to 
1.37] 
-0.13 (0.87) 
[-1.01 to 
2.59] 
Vicious Circle: 
Below Average 
Health and 
Development  
48 -0.84 (0.75)  
[-2.13 to 
1.15] 
-0.00 (0.86)  
[-1.29 to 
2.35] 
0.98 (0.83)  
[-0.34 to 
3.14] 
-0.73 (0.25)  
[-0.92 to 
0.23] 
-0.71 (1.18)  
[-4.80 to 
0.89 
-0.24 (1.15)  
[-2.95 to 
2.89] 
-0.56 (0.88)   
[-2.08 to 
1.38] 
0.82 (0.87)  
[-1.03 to 
3.23] 
*Note: Mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses.  Minimum and maximum scores provided in brackets. 
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Table 5: Six-cluster Solution* 
Cluster Name 
N 
ZGNIPC ZGINI ZU5UW ZDocDen ZDPT3 ZTEHPGDP ZGEHPTEH ZIMR  
High HRH 38 0.55 (0.52) 
[-0.84 to 
1.22] 
  
-0.70 (0.60) 
[-1.72 to 
0.36] 
-0.81 (0.26) 
[-1.137 to 
0.038] 
1.08 (0.99) 
[-0.63 to 
4.23] 
0.49 (0.50) 
[-1.45 to 
0.89] 
0.39 (0.61) 
[-0.90 to 
1.62] 
0.19 (0.98) 
[-1.96 to 
2.35] 
-0.74 (0.38) 
[-1.20 to 
0.61] 
High income 
Mild (Type 2)  
10 1.30 (0.92) 
[0.12 to 
2.69] 
 
-0.60 (0.47) 
[-1.29 to 
0.14]  
-0.53 (0.34)  
[-1.09 to 
0.06) 
0.07 (0.66)  
[-0.87 to 
1.19) 
0.76 (0.17) 
0.35 to  
0.89] 
-1.26 (0.67) 
[-2.60 to -
0.63] 
1.32 (0.38) 
[0.69 to 
1.73] 
-0.77 (0.34) 
[-1.06 to 
0.09] 
Divided 
Fortunes 
27 0.23 (0.73) 
[-1.92 to 
1.09] 
1.21 (0.63) 
[0.25 to  
2.46] 
-0.40 (0.56) 
[-1.11 to 
1.01] 
0.25 (0.52) 
[-0.91 to 
0.58] 
0.30 (0.46) 
[-0.74 to 
0.89] 
0.35 (0.72) 
[-1.18 to 
1.89] 
0.24 (0.72) 
[-0.99 to 
1.37] 
-0.13 (0.87) 
[-1.01 to 
2.59) 
Hungry: Food 
insecure 
26 -0.59 (0.75) 
[-1.85 to 
1.15] 
 
-0.35 (0.53) 
[-1.29 to 
0.70] 
1.20 (0.90) 
[-0.34 to 
3.14] 
-0.69 (0.25) 
[-0.90 to -
0.00] 
-0.19 (0.70) 
[-1.45 to 
0.89]  
-0.64 (0.81) 
[-2.49 to 
0.99] 
-0.28 (0.80) 
[-2.08 to 
1.25] 
0.46 (0.65) 
[-1.03 to 
1.41] 
Critical Type 
3 
7 -0.64 (0.86) 
[-2.13 to 
0.60] 
 
0.88 (0.88)  
[-0.19 to 
2.35] 
0.55 (0.77) 
[-0.33 to 
1.72] 
-0.61 (0.42) 
[-0.89 to 
0.23] 
-2.78 (1.22) 
[-4.80 to       
-1.45] 
-1.22 (0.95) 
[-2.95 to       
-0.18] 
-0.21 (0.98) 
[-1.31 to 
1.38] 
1.01 (1.16) 
[-0.83 to 
2.25] 
Extremely 
Critical Type 
4 
15 -1.38 (0.37) 
[-2.02 to -
0.71]  
0.18 (0.99) 
[-0.96 to 
2.02] 
0.78 (0.61) 
[0.18 to 
2.23] 
-0.85 (0.07) 
[-0.92 to -
0.71] 
-0.64 (0.74) 
[-1.91 to 
0.43] 
0.89 (0.89) 
(-0.18 to 
2.89) 
-1.19 (0.64) 
[-2.07 to -
0.05] 
1.36 (0.81) 
[0.17 to 
3.29] 
*Note: Mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses.  Minimum and maximum scores provided in brackets. 
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Table 6a: Nine-cluster Solution* 
Cluster Name N ZGNIPC ZGINI ZU5UW ZDocDen ZDPT3 ZTEHPGDP ZGEHPTEH ZIMR  
Mild Type 1: High 
income, health 
inputs, outcomes, 
and economic 
justice  
21 0.84 (0.27) 
[-0.31 to 
1.22]  
-0.83 (0.67) 
[-1.74 to 
0.36] 
-0.94 (0.16) 
[-1.13 to  
-0.35] 
1.35 (0.99) 
[-0.46 to 
4.23] 
0.39 (0.57) 
[-1.45 to 
0.89) 
0.53 (0.57) 
[-0.90 to 
1.41] 
0.84 (0.58) 
[0.12 to 
2.35] 
-0.94 (0.24) 
[-1.20 to      
-0.20] 
Mild Type 2: Very 
high income, high 
health and 
economic justice  
10 1.30 (0.92) 
[0.12 to 
2.69] 
-0.60 (0.47) 
[-1.29 to 
0.14) 
-0.53 (0.34) 
[-1.09 to 
0.06]  
0.07 (0.66) 
[-0.87 to 
1.19] 
0.76 (0.17) 
[0.35 to 
0.89] 
-1.27 (0.67) 
[-2.60 to -
0.63] 
1.32 (0.38) 
[0.69 to 
1.73] 
-0.77 (0.34) 
[-1.06 to 
0.09] 
Moderate Type 1: 
Medium-high 
income & health, 
very high 
inequality  
18 0.50 (0.44) 
[-0.36 to 
1.09] 
1.01 (0.45) 
[0.36 to 
1.69] 
-0.69 (0.34) 
[-1.11 to 
0.08] 
0.03 (0.42) 
[-0.76 to 
0.58] 
0.30 (0.43) 
[-0.51 to 
0.89] 
0.34 (0.60) 
[-0.42 to 
1.51] 
0.07 (0.74) 
[-0.99 to 
1.24]  
-0.62 (0.26) 
[-1.01 to-
0.03]  
 
Moderate Type 2 
Average income 
and health, low 
inequality, 
privatized care  
 
17 0.20 (0.54) 
[-0.84 to 
0.92] 
-0.55 (0.48) 
[-1.18 to 
0.36] 
-0.66 (0.28) 
[-1.05 to    
-0.02] 
0.74 (0.91) 
[-0.64 to 
2.33] 
0.60 (0.38) 
[-0.51 to 
0.89] 
0.22 (0.63) 
[-0.67 to 
1.62] 
-0.62 (0.74) 
[-1.96 to 
0.56] 
-0.49 (0.39) 
[-1.00 to 
0.61] 
*Note: Mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses.  Minimum and maximum scores provided in brackets. 
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Table 6b: Nine-cluster Solution* 
Cluster Name N ZGNIPC ZGINI ZU5UW ZDocDen  ZDPT3 ZTEHPGDP ZGEHPTE
H 
ZIMR  
Severe: Average 
income, health, & 
prevention. Food 
insecure. Privatized 
care.  
13 -0.16 (0.75) 
[-1.55 to 
1.15] 
-0.49 (0.50) 
[-1.29 to 
0.47] 
1.28 (0.92) 
[-0.34 to 
2.66] 
-0.54 (0.27) 
[-0.78 to      
-0.00] 
-0.12 (0.71) 
[-1.21 to 
0.89] 
-1.12 (0.75) 
[-2.49 to      
-0.02] 
-0.83 (0.61) 
[-2.08 to 
0.09] 
0.08 (0.67) 
[-1.03 to 
1.41] 
Critical Type 1 Very 
poor, low HRH and 
health.  Food 
insecure. 
13 -1.01 (0.47) 
[-1.85 to 
0.01] 
-0.20 (0.54) 
[-1.08 to 
0.70] 
1.13 (0.92) 
0.12 to 
3.14] 
-0.85 (0.05) 
[-0.90 to      
-0.75] 
-0.26 (0.71) 
[-1.44 to 
0.82]  
-0.15 (0.67) 
[-2.6 to  
-0.63] 
0.27 (0.53) 
[-0.76 to 
1.25] 
0.83 (0.37) 
[0.29 to 
1.31] 
Critical Type 2 Low 
HRH, health 
outcomes. High 
Inequality.  
9 -0.30 (0.91) 
[-1.92 to 
0.81] 
1.62 (0.77) 
[0.25 to 
2.46] 
0.18 (0.44) 
[-0.91 to 
1.01] 
-0.80 (0.10) 
[-0.91 to  
-0.64] 
0.28 (0.54) 
[-0.74 to 
0.82] 
0.37 (0.97)   
[-1.18 to 
1.89] 
0.57 (0.59) 
[-0.72 to 
1.37] 
0.86 (0.83) 
[-0.20 to 
2.59] 
Critical Type 3: 
Low income and 
HRH.  Very low 
prevention and 
health.  High 
inequality. 
7 -0.64 (0.86) 
[-2.13 to 
0.60] 
0.88 (0.88) 
[-0.19 to 
2.35] 
0.55 (0.77) 
[-0.33 to 
1.72] 
-0.61 (0.42) 
[-0.89 to 
0.23] 
-2.78 (1.22) 
[-4.80 to    
-1.45] 
-1.22 (0.95) 
[-2.95 to      
-0.18] 
-0.21 (0.98) 
[-1.31 to 
1.38] 
1.01 (1.16) 
[-0.83 to 
2.25] 
 
Critical Type 4: 
Poor, low HRH, and 
food security.  
Highest IMR 
Privatized care.  
15 -1.38 (0.37) 
[-2.02 to      
-0.71]  
0.18 (0.99) 
[-0.96 to 
2.02] 
0.78 (0.61) 
[0.18 to 
2.23] 
-0.85 (0.07) 
[-0.92 to -
0.71] 
-0.64 (0.74) 
[-1.91 to 
0.43] 
0.89 (0.89)  
[-0.18 to 
2.89] 
-1.19 (0.64) 
[-2.07 to    
-0.05] 
1.36 (0.81) 
[0.17 to 
3.29] 
*Note: Mean scores with standard deviations in parentheses.  Minimum and maximum scores provided in brackets. 
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Table 7: Countries by Cluster Membership* 
Cluster Name and Description Country 
Virtuous Circle Cluster Countries 
Mild Type 1: High income, very high health 
inputs, outcomes, and economic justice.  
Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Macedonia 
(FYR), Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay 
Mild Type 2: Very high income, high health and 
economic justice. 
Algeria, Bahrain, Bhutan, Fiji, Kuwait, Libya (prior to war), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand 
Moderate Type 2: Average income and health, 
low inequality, privatized care. 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mauritius, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
Disparate Fortune Cluster Countries 
Moderate Type II: Medium-high income & 
health, very high inequality. 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela 
Critical Type II: Low HRH and health. High 
Inequality.  
Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia 
Vicious Circle Cluster Countries 
Severe: Average income, health. and prevention. 
Food Insecure. Privatized care. 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Yemen 
Critical Type 1: Very poor, low HRH and health.  
Food insecure. 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, Timor-Leste  
Critical Type 3: Low income, HRH, prevention 
and health. 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, 
Syrian Arab Republic  
Critical Type 4: Very poor, low HRH, health 
outputs and food security. Privatized, expensive 
care. 
Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania  
*Countries in italics appear not to fit well in their assigned grouping 
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‘Divided Fortunes’ is the next cluster in the three-cluster solution.  This cluster is 
characterized by relatively average values (based on our sample of developing countries) 
of health and development, but with extraordinary levels of inequality.  We named this 
cluster the Divided Fortunes cluster firstly because of its high inequality, and secondly 
because this cluster is the result of the uniting of two clusters that although they were 
similar in inequality levels and ZTEHPGDP, were quite different in terms of other key 
indicators such as ZGNIPC, ZHRH, ZU5UW, and ZIMR.  In real terms, countries in this 
group have an average GNI per capita of $10,302 (SD 5,867), an average GINI 
coefficient of 52.7 (SD 5.7), an average doctor density of 0.87 (SD 0.68), a little above 
average GEHPTEH (57.2 SD 12.9) and a relatively average IMR of 30.2 deaths (SD 9.5). 
As seen in Table 4, the Vicious Circle cluster exhibits below average health and 
development appears as an inversion of the above-average health and development 
cluster.  GNI per capita averages $4,281 (SD 4,449) and ranges from $600 in Central 
African Republic to $22,460 in Malaysia with a median value of $2,245.  Roughly 21 
percent of children were underweight in this cluster (SD 9.00) and just over 20% of 
children under a year of age had not received their DTP3 vaccine in 2012.  Physicians are 
scarcer in this cluster with only one for every 3,909 inhabitants (doctor density 0.26 SD 
0.32).  There are worse healthcare outcomes here with an average IMR of 53.54 (SD 
22.22), CMR 77.41 (SD 36.43), and life expectancy 59.03 (SD 9.53).  The relatively 
large standard deviations in this first cluster solution further strengthened the indications 
of the clustering criteria to examine the next set of clusters. 
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Six-cluster Tier 
In the six-cluster tier, a High Income cluster breaks off from the Virtuous Circle 
cluster leaving a High HRH cluster, the Divided Fortune cluster remains as before, and 
the Vicious Circle is divided into Hungry, Critical Type 3 and Critical Type 4 clusters.  
Here, we will only describe the High HRH and Hungry clusters that are unique to this 
tier.15  Table 5 provides the Z-means, standard deviations and ranges of the ‘middle nest’ 
of clusters.   
The High HRH grouping performs well on health and economic justice indicators.  
It has a high average doctor density of 2.61 per 1000 inhabitants (SD 1.29) a relatively 
average GNI per capita of $13,319 (SD 6,041): GEHPTEH is just above average at 
56.35% (SD 17.53).  This cluster also has the lowest income inequality of the four 
clusters at this stage, with an average GINI of 35.37 (SD 5.41).  Early childhood 
vaccination is high in both this cluster with absolute percentages of children under one 
year receiving DPT3 at 93.73 (SD 6.35).  The High HRH cluster has good health 
outcomes: the percentage of children underweight and the IMR are low at 3.62 (SD 2.75) 
and 14.52 (SD 9.81), respectively.  
The Hungry cluster’s average GNI per capita is significantly lower than the High 
HRH cluster or the Divided Fortunes cluster at $4,802 and a little more compact than 
those clusters (SD 5,088).  Doctor density is extremely low at 0.30 (SD 0.32), second 
only to the Critical Type 4 cluster (discussed below).  Health financing is, on average, 
lower as a percentage of GDP and a little more private, with TEHPGDP at 4.63% (SD 
1.56) and GEHPTEH at 48.03 (SD 14.20).  What makes this cluster stand out, however, 
                                                 
15 The Divided Fortunes Cluster is described in the three cluster tier above and the High Income, Critical and 
Extremely Critical clusters are described in the nine cluster tier below   
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are the very high percentage of children under five that are underweight (24.86, SD 9.51) 
and the troublesomely elevated IMR and CMR at 45.08 (SD 16.65) and 61.77 (25.52), 
respectively.   
 
Nine-cluster Tier 
Tables 6a and 6b show the average z-scores, standard deviations and ranges for 
each of the variables in the third tier of our nested typology.  In the nine-cluster tier each 
cluster is given a name representing the relative severity of the health and development 
situation facing the country grouping.  Here, the Virtuous Circle that at the previous stage 
had divided into a High Income cluster and a High HRH cluster breaks down into three 
clusters.  The High HRH grouping subdivides into Mild Type 1 and Moderate Type 2.  
The Divided Fortunes cluster breaks down into Moderate Type 1 noted for medium/high 
income and health outcomes with average physician density and Critical Type 2 with 
very low physician density, soaring inequality, and elevated IMR.  Lastly, the Vicious 
Circle cluster ultimately subdivides into four distinct country agglomerations.  At the 
previous stage the Vicious Circle cluster separated into a Food Insecure cluster and a 
Critical Type 3 and 4 clusters, at this stage the Critical Types 3 and 4 clusters remain as 
before, while the Hungry cluster subdivides into a Severe and a Critical Type 1 cluster.   
Mild Type 1 is characterized by high income, low inequality, very high HRH and 
health outcomes while the Mild Type 2 cluster displays very high income, high health 
outcomes, public health spending and low inequality.  Many countries in Mild Type 1, 
such as Cuba, Kazakhstan, Russia and Bulgaria, come from the former Soviet bloc or 
otherwise have had some connection to socialist economies.  This type has the highest 
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average doctor density at 2.97 for every 1000 people (SD 1.30), a low percentage of 
children underweight at 2.30 (SD 1.71), the lowest inequality with an average GINI of 
34.24 (6.02), the second highest GEHPTEH at 68.04 (SD 10.38) and the lowest IMR of 
the cluster typology at 9.34 (SD 6.02).  Twenty of the 21 countries that were allocated 
here by the cluster analysis have an IMR below 16.7 and doctor density over 1.22.   
Belarus is typical of the Mild Type 1 cluster.  Its GNI is just above the cluster 
average, at $16,940, and it has 3.8 doctors for every 1000 people.  Its healthcare is largely 
publically financed (GEHPTEH 70.5) and it has a very low IMR (3.9).  Iraq, in contrast, 
is an outlier in this regard, with an IMR at 28.4 and physician density of 0.607 or 1 doctor 
for every 1,647 people.  Iraq’s higher IMR is likely a product of the disruption and 
brutality caused by the history of U.S. sanctions, the 2003 invasion and ongoing sectarian 
violence.  
Mild Type 2 is characterized by high income and economic justice and consists 
primarily of wealthy Middle Eastern oil exporting nations.  It differs from the above 
cluster principally in that it is far wealthier with an average GNI per capita of $41,287 
(SD 39,092) compared to $16,664 (SD 4,627.42) and far lower doctor density 1.29 (SD 
0.86).  It should be noted, however, that the high SD indicates that this cluster still 
contains a considerable amount of variance within it.  Countries such as Qatar, Oman, 
Kuwait and Bahrain are all wealthy with sufficient doctor density and low IMR.  Saudi 
Arabia also exhibits the characteristic features of this cluster.  It has a GNI per capita of 
$53,780, a GEHPTEH of 67.3, just less than one doctor for every one thousand people 
and an IMR of 7.4.  By comparison, Bhutan is a relative outlier with a GNI per capita of 
$7,210, a doctor density of 0.074 or one doctor for every 13,513 people and an IMR of 
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35.7.  The factors that appear to keep Bhutan in this cluster are its high scores on 
GEHPTEH, DPT3 and similar TEHPGDP.  Nevertheless, it would appear that Bhutan 
perhaps would fit better in the Severe grouping. 
The moderate clusters come from the Virtuous Circle and Divided Fortunes 
Clusters.  Moderate Type 1 comes from the Divided Fortunes cluster16 with medium-high 
income and health and very high inequality and Moderate Type 2 with average income 
and health, low inequality and more privatized care.  Moderate Type 1 is a thoroughly 
Latin American cluster; the only Latin American nations outside of this cluster are 
Argentina, Cuba, Nicaragua and Uruguay.  It is characterized by relatively low (but still 
worrisome) IMR at 17.6 (SD 6.68) and very high inequality with the average GINI 
coefficient at 50.83 (SD 4.09).  This contrasts with Moderate Type 2 (from the Virtuous 
Circle cluster) that is characterized by a slightly higher IMR at 20.9 (SD 9.96) and much 
lower inequality (GINI 36.76, SD 4.31).  This is in spite of Moderate Type 2’s doctor 
density (2.16 SD 1.18) that is higher than both that of Mild Type 2 (1.29, SD 0.86) and 
that of Moderate Type 1 (1.24, SD 0.54) clusters. 
Moderate Type 2 consists primarily of European, Central and Eastern Asian 
countries with the notable exceptions of Nicaragua, Morocco and Mauritius.  Mongolia is 
typical of Moderate Type 2.  Mongolia’s GNI per capita is close to the cluster’s mean at 
8810, it has a doctor density just above the cluster’s average at 2.8, its GINI coefficient is 
37, and its IMR is 23.  In a few places in both Moderate types (notably in Honduras, 
Guyana, Tajikistan and Vietnam) we see greater than 10% of children under-five 
underweight. 
                                                 
16 Moderate (level 1) is ranked as level 1 largely because of its lower IMR as compared to the Moderate (level 2) 
although in other ways it performs more poorly then the Level 2 cluster.  
    
91
It is interesting to note that many countries with socialist-oriented governments in 
Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela) were in Moderate Type 1, 
with the other Latin American nations.  This suggests that either a more profound 
transformation has yet to be completed in these countries that would place them in a more 
egalitarian grouping, or that the indicators used in this study do not accurately capture the 
social transformation that is taking place.  For instance, Bolivia and El Salvador have 
relatively high GEHPTEH but also high income inequality, indicating that although the 
working class has been powerful enough to achieve greater public financing of health 
care, it has been thus far unsuccessful at reducing levels of inequality- a difficult task 
given the entrenched economic power of the wealthy classes.   
The World Bank reported that Ecuador and Venezuela have both high levels of 
income inequality, with GINI coefficients of 49 and 45 respectively, and very low 
GEHPTEH at 36.1% and 36.6%, respectively.  Contrast this with Cuba where the GINI 
for 2014 given by Global Peace Index was 30 and GEHPTEH is 95%, reflecting the 
profound social transformation that began over 50 years ago.  Why might this be so?  
Looking at Venezuela, given that the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) has 
led the country since 1998, the country’s low GEHPTEH and relatively high inequality 
may seem surprising.   
The persistently high inequality may reflect the importunate power of the wealthy 
Venezuelans, the low GEHPTEH can be partially explained by the 1990s era 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank mandated neoliberal austerity measures 
that drastically cut public health expenditure, encouraged privatization and 
decentralization of health services.  This was followed by a ‘comprehensive health care 
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strategy’ under the PSUV that has sought to strengthen the public health care system and 
provide free access to health services, most famously through the Barrio Adentro’s four-
tiered program for the poor and uninsured (Alvarado et al. 2008).  Still, the public system 
continues to exist alongside a private one in which wealthier segments obtain access to 
private providers paid for directly or through private insurance (Bonvechio et al. 2011).   
Nevertheless, there have been significant changes benefiting the most 
disadvantaged sectors of the populations in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, including 
significant reductions of poverty and inequality and increased democratic participation  
(de la Torre 2013).  Between 2002 and 2011, CEPAL (2012:18) reported that 
Venezuela’s poverty rate dropped 19.1%, Ecuador’s 16.6% and Bolivia’s dropped 20% 
between 2002 and 2009.  Of the Latin American region covered by CEPAL, only 
Argentina and Peru appeared to experience larger drops in their poverty rates.  
Furthermore, inequality, while still high, has also declined.  According to data tables 
published by CEPAL that accompanied the 2012 report, in 1997 the richest 10% of 
Venezuela received 32.8 percent of the country’s income while the poorest 10% received 
only 1.8%.  By 2011, the wealthiest ten percent’s share of Venezuelan income had fallen 
to 22.9% and the poorest share had risen modestly to 2.4%.  
 CEPAL also reports improvements in Bolivia and Ecuador.  The wealthiest ten 
percent’s share fell by 10.2% and 4.4% in Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, while the 
bottom 10% increased its share modestly from 0.7% to 1.0% in Bolivia and from 1.7 to 
1.9% in Ecuador.  This is also reflected in formal inequality measures.  According to 
CEPAL (whose figures differ from the World Bank used in this research), Venezuela’s 
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GINI has dropped from 50.7 in 1997 to 39.7 in 2011, Bolivia’s GINI fell from 59.5 in 
1997 to 50.8 in 2009 and Ecuador’s fell modestly from 51.3 to 46.0.     
The Hungry cluster breaks down into Severe and Critical Type 1, both with a very 
high percentage of children under the age of 5 underweight.  The Severe cluster is made 
up of predominately South Asian countries and exhibits income and health outcomes 
close to the sample’s average and Critical Type 1 consists of predominately sub-Saharan 
African countries that experience very low income, HRH levels and health outcomes.  
The Severe cluster is noteworthy in that it spends less on health as a percentage of GDP 
(3.75%, SD 1.18) and has lower GEHPTEH (38.18%, SD 10.92) than the critical cluster 
(TEHPGDP 5.52%, SD 1.41; GEHPTEH 57.88%, SD 9.50).  Both the Severe and 
Critical Type 1 clusters had similar percentages of children under the age of one year in 
need of vaccinations with respective DPT3 vaccination percentages of 86.00% (SD 9.10) 
and 84.15% (SD 9.14). 
The Severe cluster has the highest U5UW (25.68%, SD 9.74) of all clusters while 
Critical Type 1 has the second highest (24.04%, SD 9.6).  Nevertheless, the Critical Type 
1 cluster is much worse off than the Severe cluster.  Severe has a much higher average 
GNIPC ($7,230, SD 6,251) and a slightly lower level of inequality (GINI 37.23, SD 4.51) 
than the Critical Type 1 cluster (GNIPC $2,374.61, SD 1,445; GINI 39.9 SD 4.9).  In 
addition, Critical Type 1 has lower physician density (0.10 SD 0.06) than the Severe 
cluster that has a doctor density of 0.50 (SD 0.36).  This lack of critical health inputs is 
reflected in worse health outcomes: Critical Type 1’s IMR (54.59, SD 9.35) and CMR 
(78.2, SD 16.11) are far more elevated than those of the Severe cluster (IMR 37.23, SD 
    
94
17.16; CMR 45.3 SD 22.64) while life expectancy is far lower in Critical Type 1 (59.15 
SD 4.00) than in the Severe grouping (67.77 SD 3.77). 
India is typical of the Severe grouping.  In 2013, India had a GNI per capita of 
$5,350, one doctor for every 1,538 people, and 40.2 percent of children under 5 
underweight.  India’s IMR for 2012 was 43.8.  By contrast, Benin typifies the Critical 
Type 1 cluster.  Its GNI per capita is lower at $1,780, and although its percentage of 
children underweight is lower than India’s at 21.2, its doctor density is incredibly low at 
0.06 or one doctor for every 16,667 people.  Benin also reported a 2012 IMR of 58.5, 
14.7 more infant deaths per 1000 live births than India reported for 2012.   
The countries in the next most difficult situation of health and development are 
those of Critical Type 2.  This grouping is composed of 9 largely Southern African 
countries and exhibits the highest inequality of our typology (GINI 56.33, SD 7.00).  In 
spite of this cluster’s significantly17 higher overall income than Critical Type 1, it is very 
similar to Type 1 in terms of doctor density (0.15 SD 0.13), IMR (55.28 SD 21.24) and 
CMR (80.76, SD 36.32).  Although this grouping has the highest GEHPTEH of the 
Vicious Circle and Divided Fortune clusters at 63.11 (SD 10.48), public financing of care 
is insufficient by itself to address the cluster’s challenges.  Thus, in spite of its relatively 
higher GNIPC, this cluster displays comparably worrisome health outcomes.  Typical of 
this cluster is Swaziland, which has a GNI per capita of $6,220, but a GINI coefficient of 
51.  Swaziland has a doctor density of 0.17, and a 2012 IMR of 55.7.  
Critical Type 3 is a small cluster consisting of just seven countries: Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, South Africa 
                                                 
17 This difference is significant at p < .001 according to a t-test comparing the two clusters’ means resulted in a t-value 
of 169.8.  The critical value for a t-test with 8 degrees of freedom is 4.501. 
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and Syria (prior to the war).  Many of these countries are currently experiencing some 
form of civil conflict.  Only 52% (SD 15.63) of children under the age of one have 
received the DPT3 vaccine, by far the lowest rate of vaccination coverage of our 
typology.  Critical Type 3 has the third highest U5UW (17.9%, SD 8.12), and income 
inequality (GINI 49.71, 7.95) of our typology.  Health care spending in this cluster tends 
to be mixed but varies wildly (GEHPTEH 49.27 SD 17.48). With the exception of Syria, 
which in 2012 reported an IMR of 12.3, these countries have very poor health indicators 
(including South Africa in spite of its higher GNI per capita).  IMR and CMR are the 
second highest of all clusters at 59.16 (SD 29.57), and 88.68 (SD 49.37), respectively.  
As would be expected based on these indicators, life expectancy is also relatively short 
here (58 SD 9.02).  Congo (Brazzaville) is a prime example of Critical Type 3.  Congo’s 
GNI pc is $4,720 with a GINI coefficient of 47.  Fourteen percent of children under five 
in Congo are underweight,) doctors are scarce (doctor density 0.1) and IMR is high at 
62.2.  
Lastly, Critical Type 4 is made up almost entirely of African nations, with the 
exceptions of Afghanistan and Haiti.  We note that many of these nations (Afghanistan, 
Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Uganda) have recent histories of 
war or civil conflict.  This cluster is the poorest with an average GNI per capita $1492.67 
(SD 608) and the little income they have is poorly distributed (GINI 43.33, SD 8.95).  
Physicians are scarce with an average of one doctor for every 10,040 inhabitants (doctor 
density 0.0996, SD 0.086) and healthcare spending is almost entirely private (GEHPTEH 
31.78, SD 11.45).  These data imply significant human resource and financial barriers to 
care for those who can least afford it.  The health-related outcomes are devastating: IMR 
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68.19 (SD 20.67), CMR 102.45 (SD 34.48) and life expectancy 55.47 (SD 4.75).  Mali 
exemplifies Critical Type 4.  Its GNI per capita is low at $1,540, it has low doctor density 
0.08, 18.9 percent of children are underweight, 26% percent of children under one year 
did not receive the DPT3 vaccine and 79.6 infants out of every thousand born did not live 
to their first birthday in 2012.   
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to establish a taxonomy of health and 
development of primarily non-OECD countries.  Using Ward’s method cluster analysis, 
we grouped 123 countries with eight health and development variables.  A three-tiered 
nested typology resulted from this process, with a large divide between Virtuous Circle 
countries characterized by above average health and development, Divided Fortune 
countries noted for very high inequality and Vicious Circle countries characterized by 
below average health and development.  In the intermediate six-cluster stage, the 
Virtuous Circle countries divided into a High Income (Mild Type II) cluster and a High 
HRH country cluster, the Divided Fortunes cluster remained as before, and the Vicious 
Circle cluster divided into a Hungry cluster and Critical Type 3 and 4 Clusters.  These 
subdivisions reflect distinct patterns around the chosen set of health and development 
indicators, particularly ZGINI, ZU5UW, ZIMR and ZGNIPC.  Finally, the third tier of 
nine clusters shows that many of these clusters are further distinguished by physician 
density, GEHPTEH, and vaccination coverage, in addition to the predictable clustering 
around GNIPC and IMR. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, while there is recognition of the importance of 
GDP and/or GNI per capita leading to better health and development, there is also a 
concern among development scholars that this particular variable is used as a substitute 
for a more holistic and nuanced approach.  GDP and GNIPC are limited measures that do 
not capture the nature of a society’s economy, i.e., whether the guiding force of a 
society’s economy is oriented towards the production and distribution of use values for 
the fulfillment of human needs or is simply concerned with exchange value and the logic 
of capital accumulation.  It also does not reflect the distribution of the costs and benefits 
of a society’s economic activity, and while a powerful predictor of other health and 
development outcomes, it does not account for all clustering placements in our analysis.  
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Mild Type 1 has a lower IMR, and higher doctor 
density than Mild Type 2, in spite of Mild Type 2’s greater GNIPC.  Furthermore, 
although the Severe Cluster has only a slightly higher average GNIPC than the Critical 
Type 2 cluster, Critical Type 2 has far greater income inequality and loses on average 20 
children per 1000 live births more than the Severe cluster.  
A notable but worrisome observation is the strong influence of geographic region. 
Algeria, Mauritius, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia were the only African countries to fall 
into the Virtuous Circle cluster, which was largely populated by Eastern European, and 
(other) Middle Eastern countries.  The Divided Fortune cluster consists of Latin 
American and Southern African nations.  The Vicious Circle cluster was almost entirely 
composed of African and Southeast Asian countries.  Once we proceed to the third tier, 
the regional dynamics of under-/mal-development become even more pronounced.  The 
Divided Fortune subdivides almost entirely by region into Moderate Type 1, which 
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almost entirely consists of Latin American countries, and Critical Type II, which consists 
of eight Southern African countries and one Central African country (Rwanda).  The high 
inequality in the Moderate Type 1 reflects the continuing challenge in that region to 
reduce inequality in spite of the rise to power of many left-wing governments that have 
tried to address it.  Critical Types 1, 3 are 4 are entirely composed of sub-Saharan African 
countries with the exception of Afghanistan, while the Severe cluster is a almost entirely 
South Asian, with the exception of Yemen and Gabon. 
Relating the nested typology to the virtuous circle of health and development in 
Figure 1, it appears that countries in the Mild Type 1 cluster best approximate that 
dynamic, while the Critical and Severe clusters approximate the inverse.  Mild Type 2 
also roughly approximates it, but it should be noted that many of the countries in this 
Type depend heavily on either oil or tourism, leaving the cluster vulnerable to shifts in oil 
price and economic crises that could negatively impact tourism revenues. 
The crux of our findings is consistent with the spirit of previous health and 
development typologies.  While our research did not develop a set of welfare state 
typologies to predict health outcomes and is thus not strictly comparable, like Navarro 
and Shi (2001) and Chung and Muntaner (2007) we found that clusters with better health 
and development tended to have higher GEHPTEH (indicating a lower degree of 
commodification of healthcare services).  Additionally, the characteristics of the Critical 
clusters appear consistent with Wood and Gough’s (2006) Insecurity Regime cluster.  
A central concern arising from this paper is how to best improve the situations of 
countries in the Severe and Critical clusters.  These groupings exhibit higher IMR, 
U5UW, low GNI per capita, fewer doctors, lower vaccination rates, slightly greater 
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reported inequality and more privatized care.  The extent and depth of these problems 
will not likely be alleviated without a holistic plan that addresses the specific health and 
development challenges faced by countries in each cluster.   
Countries in Severe and Critical Type 1 clusters should develop a strategy to 
improve food security.  If they address this problem, there would likely be positive 
repercussions in health outcomes, moving them out of the Vicious Circle.  Governments 
in the Severe and Critical Type 4 clusters should take on a greater portion of health 
financing or seek other methods to improve access to healthcare.  Efforts to train and 
retain physicians are essential for all of the Vicious Circle clusters, but are especially 
important for all Critical Types.  Critical Types 2 and 3 need to urgently address the 
severe economic inequalities present in their societies, either by implementing 
redistributive taxation or by more fundamental changes to production relations in their 
economic systems.  Doing this may increase social cohesion and lead to an improvement 
in health outcomes.  Critical Type 3 should prepare thorough vaccination campaigns.  
Finally, Critical Types 1, 3, and 4 need to take measures that will improve GNI but that 
don’t increase inequality substantially.  National and international strategies and 
stakeholder collaboration are necessary to help these nations achieve improved economic 
status, sustained food security, improved reach of preventative care and vaccination 
drives, reduced inequality, and progress towards a universal system of national health 
care.  
Interpretation of the underlying causes of the disparities in health and 
development outcomes and what should be done to address them will likely vary 
according to theoretical orientation.  Modernization theorists would tend to argue that the 
    
100
Severe and Critical countries need to continue to prepare the way for ‘takeoff’ by further 
reducing the role of the state in economic affairs and competing for foreign investment.  
They would likely argue for greater private investment and a reduction of the role of the 
state in healthcare financing and provision.  However, as seen in both the cluster typology 
and in the correlations presented in Table 3, those countries with higher inequality and 
greater privatization of healthcare financing tend to have greater health and development 
challenges.  
Marxists, dependency, and world system theorists, in contrast, would tend to 
emphasize that genuine development cannot occur without sufficient national control 
over the economy, food security, diversification away from reliance on extractive 
industries, technological development, sufficient management of the country’s place in 
the global capitalist economy, and an internal market orientation (Amin 2013: 43-45).  
The challenges faced by these countries are magnified by the context of a global capitalist 
economy dominated by powerful multinational corporations and international financial 
institutions that seek to limit national sovereignty in determining economic and social 
policies while orienting productive and distributive economic arrangements to the logic 
of capital accumulation rather than towards human need. 
The limitations of this work point to many areas of potential future research.  For 
example, due to the importance of doctor density in this study, further research could 
measure the inequality of physician distribution within countries and examine its 
relationship with other health and development outcomes.  Additionally, more work is 
needed that not only examines country characteristics but integrates the socio-economic 
relational dynamics between countries, i.e., flows of surplus value, raw materials, 
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consumer goods, and waste, into explanatory and typological models of health and 
development.  Further research with sufficient longitudinal data could study the trends of 
health and development by examining country movement through the typology over time. 
Finally, future research could remove the health outcome variable from the 
socioeconomic and health system variables around which countries are clustered and then 
test the solution’s predictive power on key health outcome variables. 
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CHAPTER 4: HUMAN RESOURCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH 
OUTCOMES IN CUBA: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR DISTRIBUTIONS OVER 
TIME AND SPACE 
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Isaac Christiansen 
 
Abstract 
 Past research has examined developments and transformations in Cuba’s 
healthcare system, national infant mortality rate (IMR) trends, and the government’s 
commitment to universal healthcare access in the face of economic difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the reduction of spatial inequality among and within Cuban provinces 
regarding human resources for health (HRH) and IMR has received less attention.    
Drawing on Cuban Ministry of Health data, this paper examines changes in the 
distribution of HRH by personnel type and IMRs among Cuban provinces over time, 
emphasizing the period since 1990.  The author contrasts these with global, OECD, and 
developing country distributions.  Using municipal level data from Cuba’s National 
Statistical Office, the paper examines levels of absolute and relative inequality of HRH 
within Cuban provinces in 2010.  The research shows support for declining inequality in 
HRH and IMR across provinces in Cuba over time and provides evidence that inequality 
is greater within provinces than among them.  The contribution to the broader literature 
lies in placing the research within a global context of high between and within country 
disparities.  Cuba’s experience is especially salient given high levels of spatial inequality 
prior to 1959 and material resource scarcity during the ‘special period’ of the 1990s. 
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Introduction 
 
Severe inequality in the distribution of physicians, nurses, and health workers in 
the health sector known as human resources for health (HRH) remains pronounced both 
among and within countries, often in inverse relation to populations’ needs (Dussault and 
Franceschini 2006; WHO 2006:8; Chen et al. 2004; Paradath et al. 2003; Hart 1971).  For 
example, in 2006 the World Health Organization (WHO) indicated that while the 
Americas region had half of the world’s health financing, 10% of the disease and 37% of 
global HRH.  
HRH disparities remain acute.  By way of illustration, in 2010 according to WHO 
data, Sierra Leone had only one physician for every 45,455 people while Austria had one 
physician for every 206 people.  Within countries, too, there is ample documentation of 
highly unequal distributions of HRH.  These are exacerbated by migratory patterns in 
which physicians tend to be concentrated in urban centers, move from the public to the 
private sector, and ultimately migrate from poorer ‘less developed’ countries to more 
wealthy ‘more developed’ ones (Tandi et al. 2015; WHO 2006:8; Dussault and 
Francheschini 2006; Pfeiffer 2003; Schoepff et al. 2000).   
Cuba is noted for its achievements in improving health outcomes and its high 
level of physician and HRH density (Souers 2012; Whiteford and Branch 2008).  In light 
of the global and national challenges in HRH imbalances, this research examines changes 
in the degree of inequality in HRH distribution by personnel type among Cuban 
provinces over time, and among municipalities within provinces for 2010.  Has Cuba 
been able to continue to reduce internal HRH imbalances in spite of the economic crisis 
of the 1990s?  Have the current transformations in Cuba’s healthcare system that began 
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around 2010 had a positive, or negative impact on HRH distribution?  These questions 
are answered to the degree possible by examining the level of inequality in HRH 
distributions, particularly since 1989 when Cuba was on the eve of a severe economic 
crisis, through 2014.  This paper also depicts across-province trends over time in IMR 
disparities in Cuba.  
 
Cuba and the broader context of HRH imbalances 
A central rationale for correcting HRH imbalances is that an unequal distribution 
of HRH and other health inputs may foster unequal access to care, and ultimately lead to 
unequal health outcomes.  It is pertinent, then, that HRH density is identified as a 
determinant of health outcomes.  In a cross-sectional study of 119 countries, Anand and 
Bärnighausen (2004) found a significant inverse association between HRH density and 
infant, child and maternal mortality while controlling for other socioeconomic mortality 
determinants.  These results are consistent with Hanmer, Lensink and White (2003) 
which showed that the higher the population per physician, the higher the IMR. 
Distance between the population and health facilities and personnel is also an 
important factor.  A recent study in India used spatial clustering analysis of deaths in 
4,064 postal codes resulting from time-critical acute abdominal conditions (such as 
appendicitis or peptic ulcer disease) revealed that “the odds of living in a high acute 
abdominal mortality cluster increased with increasing distance from surgical care” (Dare 
et al. 2015: e651).  Vandenbroucke (1990) used a central place theory framework to 
examine the distribution of public and private higher and lower order health facilities and 
travel distance to various healthcare facilities in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala.  He found 
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that of 914 ‘places’ analyzed, 725 did not have any health facility, and that travel patterns 
to obtain health services conformed “to the hierarchy of political capitals, rather than to 
central place hierarchy” (Vandenbroucke 1990: 199).   
There are various factors that influence HRH inequality and migration patterns.  
Regarding migration patterns, ‘push factors’ tend to compel HRH out of areas of greater 
need, ‘pull factors’ attract HRH to areas of lesser need, ‘stay factors’ influence HRH to 
remain in areas of lesser need, and ‘stick factors’ influence HRH to remain in 
communities where they are needed.  Medical professional out-migration may be 
stimulated by factors both endogenous and exogenous to the health system.  Endogenous 
push factors include low salaries, lack of technology, unsafe working environments, and 
insufficient opportunity for career advancement.  Exogenous push factors include 
poverty, inadequate housing or unsafe living environment.  Endogenous and exogenous 
pull factors tend to be the inverse of push factors (WHO 2006; Zurn et al. 2004; Paradath 
et al. 2003).   
Zurn and colleagues (2004) indicate that inequality in HRH distribution occurs as 
a result of socio-demographic, cultural, economic and geographical factors that influence 
the supply and demand of HRH personnel.  Specifically, Zurd et al. indicate HRH 
imbalance results from a combination of fluctuation in the supply of HRH (influenced by 
their perceived economic and cultural costs and benefits of pursuing a career as a health 
professional), and the prominence of ‘market failure’ defined as a violation of the neo-
classical assumption of perfect competition.  Other factors influencing migration of 
professionals include insecurity, civil conflict and low pay in the public sector (Akokpari 
2006).   
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A market driven orientation to healthcare (in which production, distribution and 
resource allocation are oriented to fulfilling effective demand) may also have a negative 
influence on HRH distribution (Deppe 2009; Navarro 1976).  In a privatized healthcare 
system, physicians will go where they have jobs, and these will generally be concentrated 
closer to populations with greater ability to pay.  This contrasts with a rights-based 
approach to health which emphasizes that society (usually states) has a duty to provide 
universal preventative and curative care (generally funded through taxation) based on 
need (Farmer 2005; 1999).  A market orientation of healthcare services leaves a service 
gap between a population’s effective demand and its absolute needs.  This gap is 
reflected in the severe global HRH and disease burden imbalance (WHO 2006). 
In this vein, in a systematic review of the World Bank led health reforms in Latin 
America, Homedes and Ugalde (2005) found that the move towards greater privatization 
and decentralization did little to address urban/rural inequalities in HRH distribution.  In 
addition, these neo-liberal oriented reforms exacerbated the outflow of HRH from the 
public to private sector or to wealthier countries, undermined HRH wages, and did not 
result in productivity increases.   Likewise, Tandi et al. (2015: 9) indicate that in 
Cameroon, neo-liberal reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund “saw the 
shrinkage of public health sector recruitment and the development of other health 
resources and may have accounted for the shortage and distributional inequalities of the 
health workforce as well as led to the proliferation of the private sector.”  
In light of the salience of push and pull factors on HRH migratory patterns, it is 
understandable that a country’s or region’s overall level of wealth and development is 
highly correlated to doctor density.  Out-migration of physicians from poorer to wealthier 
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regions is common, and this out-migration of professionals is exacerbated by economic 
shocks or falls in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Okeke 2013).  Nevertheless, 
there are some notable cases of countries which have higher physician density than would 
be expected based on gross national income (GNI) per capita, even when taking into 
account purchasing power parity which in Cuba’s case is a more than three times the 
value than its GNI per capita measured in U.S. dollars. 
One reason to look at Cuba’s HRH distribution is that unlike other societies in 
which the distribution of HRH is largely determined by market forces, in Cuba it is 
primarily determined by government planning and health care financing is almost entirely 
public.   Another reason why Cuba has been selected as a case study for examination of 
its internal HRH distribution is its high physician density.  In this regard, it is useful to 
examine the difference between the predicted physician density and the actual physician 
density for the Cuban case determined by a simple OLS regression.  Relevant regression 
equations are included in an appendix.  Data for both variables are for 186 countries and 
the most recent year available at the time of collection. 
Using Log10 of GNI per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) data gathered from 
the World Bank as the independent variable and physician density per 1000 population 
data from the World Health Organization (WHO) as the dependent variable for 186 
countries, I ran a simple OLS regression on SPSS.  GNI correlated significantly (p < 
.001) with doctor density at .69.  Specifically, the predicted value for doctor density in 
Cuba based on its GNI in this simple model was 2.18 physicians per 1000.  However, 
Cuba’s actual value for 2010 was 6.78, thus 4.6 doctors per 1000 people greater than its 
predicted value. 
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Similarly, Cuba’s 2012 IMR was far lower than a quadratic (log10) GNI per capita 
model would predict.  Using the same GNI data with the 2010 IMR of these 186 
countries gathered from the WHO’s Global Health Observatory, the centered regression 
equation predicts that Cuba’s IMR would be 13.6 deaths per 1000 live births.  However, 
the actual value for 2012 (the year of IMR data used) reported by the WHO was only 4.3.  
Cuba’s better than expected performance on both of these indicators based on its GNI per 
capita PPP indicates that much could be learned from a closer look at both the 
development of its healthcare system and its internal HRH distribution.   
 
Historical context and development of Cuba’s health provision model 
The history of the Cuban revolution generally, but particularly from 1959 to 1970 
and again during the 1990s, highlights the possibilities and limits of socially 
transformative agency within a context of inherited underdevelopment, resource scarcity, 
U.S. directed invasions, covert war and far-reaching economic sanctions (Perez 2011; 
Parenti 2005; Chomsky 2005).  Prior to 1959, the U.S. largely dominated the Cuban 
economy: U.S. companies owned or controlled the majority of Cuba’s sugar, tobacco, 
coffee, lead, hotels, oil refineries, and trains, and Cuba remained dependent on the U.S. to 
import the majority of its goods (Perez 2011; DeFronzo 1996).  U.S. hostility towards 
Cuba largely originated from measures that the Cuban government took to address 
inequality, underdevelopment and economic independence, most notably agrarian reform 
and nationalizations.  Although these measures took place within international law, U.S. 
animosity and actions hostile towards the island grew (Lamrani 2013).  
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A fundamental goal of the Cuban revolution has been to reduce and/or eliminate 
the severe regional, land, class, racial, gender, educational, and health inequalities that 
existed prior to 1959 (Perez 2011; Frank 1999; Huberman and Sweezy 1969).   
Regarding unequal education, 24 percent of Cuba’s population was illiterate in 1960, 
with the great majority of those located in rural areas.  In 1961, the new revolutionary 
government mobilized large portions of the population to teach people to read and write 
in a massive literacy campaign focused primarily on rural areas.  By December that year, 
the national illiteracy rate had been reduced to a mere 3.9% (Huberman and Sweezy 
1969).  Measures continued thereafter to consistently raise the population’s educational 
level (ibid; Franc 1999).   
 Since the revolutionary government in Cuba acquired power in January 1959, 
eliminating inequalities in access to healthcare has been of paramount importance and has 
been explicitly stated in government policy.  While health policy has evolved over time, 
throughout each period the goals have clearly been to improve both the overall health of 
the population as well as to improve equity in health inputs, outputs and outcomes.  The 
Cuban Constitution, voted on by 98% of the electorate and approved by 97.7% of said 
vote in 1976 and with modifications approved in 1978, 1992 and 2002, is explicit in this 
regard.  Article 50 states:18 
 
Everyone has the right to be attended to and to have his/her health protected.  The 
state guarantees this right.  
-With the provision of free medical and hospital assistance, through the network of 
rural medical service installations, polyclinics, hospitals, preventative and specialized 
treatment centers 
-The provision of free dental service 
-With the development of the plan for sanitary dissemination and health education, 
periodic medical examinations, general vaccination, and other disease prevention 
                                                 
18 Author’s own translation 
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measures.  The population cooperates with these plans and activities through the 
mass and social organizations (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular 2003).    
 
 It is clear that this policy is intended to do three things: first, to eliminate or 
greatly reduce financial barriers to medical care access; second, to promote an equitable 
distribution of human and infrastructural health resources; and third to generate both 
good health care indicators as well as non-disparate health care outcomes. Due to Cuba’s 
investment in health care and focus on developing human resources for health, (according 
to WHO data on physician density) the island as of 2010 had one doctor for every 149 
people with roughly 99.7% of the population covered by family doctors.  In 2011, Cuba 
registered infant and child mortality rates of 4.9 and 6.0 per 1000 live births, respectively.  
Those figures were lower than the corresponding rates in the United States.19  
 
The development of Cuba’s healthcare system 
 Cuba’s aggregate health care situation prior to 1959 left much to be desired.  
Cuba’s IMR, maternal mortality rate and life expectancy in 1958 were 60 per 1000 live 
births, 125.3 per 100,000 live births, and 58.8 years, respectively (Whiteford and Branch 
2008; Nayari 1995)20.  Healthcare in pre-revolutionary Cuba was divided between an 
“under-funded and understaffed” health care system for the less advantaged and private 
clinics for the wealthy, with roughly 34% of people in Havana covered by forms of 
                                                 
19 Infant and child mortality in the U.S. in 2011 were 6 and 7.1, respectively. It is thus ironic that many in the U.S. 
attempt to present Cuba as an example of a failed development model while at the same time the U.S. historically has 
done that all it can to disrupt their development (Feinsilver 2009; Chomsky 2005).  U.S. sanctions against Cuba 
coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union and the socialist block of Eastern Europe took a heavy toll on Cuba’s 
economy and health care system.  Many aspects of the health care system have been impacted, including the physical 
maintenance of medical facilities and the amount medical equipment and medicines available.  In direct costs to the 
health care system, it was estimated that the US ‘embargo’ or more aptly termed ‘economic blockade’ had cost the 
Cuban health care system $1.75M  (Alfonso 2003). Cuba’s permanent mission to the UN estimated that in one year, 
from May 2011 to April 2012, the US blockade cost Cuba’s medical system $10M (Diario Granma 2012).   
20 It is important to note the debate that exists regarding pre-Revolutionary and early revolutionary measures of infant 
mortality.  For more on this matter see the works of Dr. Raúl L. Riverón Corteguera (2000) and Abel Losada Álvarez 
(1999).  
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mutual insurance (Whiteford and Branch 2008; Danielson 1979).  Rural areas typically 
had poorer sanitation systems and a greater risk of infectious disease (Whiteford and 
Branch 2008; Fields 2006; Warman 2001).  While the wealthy had good access to private 
medical care including cosmetic surgery, rural areas suffered among the highest infant 
and maternal mortality rates in Latin America (Warman 2001:313).  Even though other 
estimations of the IMR in the early period are quite lower (34.8 reported for 1959), the 
downward trend in infant mortality in post-revolutionary Cuba, particularly from the 
1970s forward, is strongly supported (MINSAP 2014; Whiteford and Branch 2008; 
Corteguera and Henríquez 2001). 
 Danielson (1979) indicates that inequality in healthcare resource distribution was 
acute during this period; while the city of Havana had one doctor for every 450 people, 
Oriente province had only one for every 3155 people.  Access to medical care prior to the 
revolution was also impacted by one’s racial category in the old mutualist system 
(Danielson 1979).  Due to racial discrimination and the racialized economic stratification 
that characterized Cuban society prior to the 1959 revolution, Black Cubans were 
excluded from the mutualist health associations with the notable exception of Centro 
Benéfico.    
 The new revolutionary government immediately took steps to abolish racial 
discrimination in employment and access to public spaces and services.  Articles 41 
through 43 of Cuba’s constitution criminalize racial discrimination and protect equal 
access to the country’s health institutions “without distinction of race, skin color, sex, 
religious beliefs, national origin or any other harm to human dignity” (Asamblea 
Nacional de Poder Popular 2003).  
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 Although these early successes in fighting for equality reflected the government’s 
willingness to reduce inequality, many structural factors complicated the task in 
addressing the country’s health challenges.  Roughly half of Cuba’s then 3000 physicians 
feared the political and socio-economic changes and migrated to Miami, initially 
hindering Cuba’s efforts to universalize and expand care in rural areas.  Nevertheless, in 
1960 the Cuban government established the Rural Health Service and the Rural Dental 
Service in 1961.  The Rural Health Service built health care facilities, worked to provide 
clean water and adequate sanitation, placed health care personnel in rural areas, and 
improved prenatal, maternal and infant care (Franco et al. 2007; Whiteford and Branch 
2008; Feinsilver 1993).  During the revolution’s early period, Cuba also formally 
identified the state as having the responsibility to provide free healthcare, signaling that 
the country was going to follow a rights-based approach to healthcare provision.  By 
1965, the country had largely abandoned private medical practice and the socialized 
nature of health care was codified into law (Feinsilver 1993).21  
 Over the next few decades, Cuba expanded services and reformulated healthcare 
delivery models.  In the 1960s and 1970s, as part of a community approach to medicine, a 
polyclinic-based model was developed in Cuba.  Interdisciplinary teams comprised of a 
nurse, general physician, internist, pediatrician, and an obstetrician staffed polyclinics.  
These facilities attended to 25,000 to 30,000 people, and had the primary responsibility of 
providing primary care to the community.  In addition, polyclinics engaged in vaccination 
                                                 
21 Under the Principles of Socialist Public Health health care “is a right of the population,” health care provision is the 
states responsibility, services must be equitable and have a scientific base, and health care has a “preventative 
orientation” with high community involvement together with international solidarity and medical collaboration with 
other countries (Ochoa and Serrano 2000). 
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drives, epidemiological surveillance and postgraduate medical training (Whiteford and 
Branch 2008; Novás and Fernández-Sacasas 1989).  
Nevertheless, this model was unable to fulfill all primary care needs and many 
people were still turning to hospitals for primary care.  The family doctor program 
developed in the 1980s deepened the community approach to healthcare provision. 
Physician-nurse teams were responsible for providing care to 120-150 families, living 
directly above the family doctor clinics in government provided apartments (Whiteford 
and Branch 2008).  This led to increased medical surveillance of the community, a focus 
on environmental factors, early disease detection and rehabilitation (Feinsilver 1993).  
This program is a central component of Cuba’s human resource based approach to health 
care delivery; by 1991, Cuba had over 15,000 family doctors, that number growing to 
36,478 in 2010.  These efforts to strengthen primary care likely improved efficiency by 
decreasing the number of hospital and emergency visits relative to cases seen by family 
doctors, while simultaneously contributing to a reduction in the IMR (Feinsilver 1993).   
By 1990, the IMR stood at 10.7 per 1000 life births and life expectancy was 75.2 
years for the 1985-1990 period.  Disparities between town and country had been 
drastically reduced.  Geographically equitable construction of medical facilities had 
eliminated ‘regional imbalances’ when allowing for additional capacity for referral 
centers (Feinsilver 1993).  Coverage of rural areas was complete, and coordination of 
primary, secondary and tertiary care was improved.22  Fiensilver (1993) presented data 
from Cuba’s Ministry of Health which showed that the range of IMR among Cuba’s 
provinces narrowed from 17.9 in 1979 to 5.0 in 1989, indicating a trend towards 
                                                 
22 The commitment of the government to improving health care was also reflected in the rapid expansion of health care 
infrastructure. By 1983 Cuba had built 256 hospitals, 397 polyclinic, 21 blood banks, and 81 maternity homes (Burns 
1986). 
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improved and more equal health outcomes (a trend that will be examined below in greater 
detail).  By this time, Cuba had led successful vaccination campaigns, eliminating or 
virtually eradicating polio, tuberculosis, DPT, typhoid, congenital rubella syndrome, 
hepatitis B and other diseases with an immunization coverage higher than “that of many 
developed countries” (Whiteford and Branch 2008:28-30).  Cuba has continued to make 
impressive strides in fighting disease; an example is the recent recognition by the WHO 
of its elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and syphilis (WHO 2015).  
 The fall of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during 1989-1991 plunged Cuba 
into a time of hardship known as the Special Period.  Cuba suffered a sudden collapse of 
GDP by more than 35%, a precipitous fall in real wages, and a 90% decline in energy 
imports from the former Soviet Union and the end of imports of essential spare parts for 
Cuban industry, affecting virtually all areas of the Cuban economy (Perez 2011; Brenner 
et al. 2008).  Cuba’s surprisingly resilience to the crisis, particularly in terms of health 
outcomes has led to interest regarding how countries may be able to adjust to potential 
economic contraction (Borowy 2013).  In response, Cuba introduced some market-style 
reforms, legalized the dollar, and turned to tourism to increase access to hard currency.   
While these reforms contributed to economic recovery, they also led to increased 
economic inequality; the GINI index grew from 0.24 during the 1980s to 0.38 by the end 
of the 1990s (Borowy 2013; Espina 2008; Saney 2004).  These new inequalities also 
tended to be racially correlated as Afro-Cubans often worked outside the tourist sector 
and were less likely to receive remittances due to historic demographics of emigration 
(De la Fuente 2008; Espina 2008).  Other research suggests that increased economic 
inequality exacerbates health outcomes, with those who are most disadvantaged placed in 
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the greatest risk (Wilkinson and Picket 2006; Hosseinpoor 2005).  This may occur even 
in the context of relatively socialized health care systems as in the UK (Marmot Review 
2010; DHSS 1980; Hart 1971). 
 It is noteworthy in this regard that in spite of the tremendous economic difficulty 
during the 1990s, Cuba did not institute any IMF style austerity measures.  Cuba did not 
privatize any portion of its health care sector, nor reduce its commitment to free and 
universal health care provision.  According to WHO data, in 2011, Cuba’s private 
expenditure on health was a mere 5.3% of the total expenditure on health.  During the 
‘Special Period’, Cuba actually increased its peso budget for health care, although the 
dollar budget (from which the country imports medical equipment) fell following the 
pattern of the Cuban economy and gradual recovery (Nayari 2005:809-810; Franco et al. 
2007: 243; Uriarte 2008; Chomsky 2000). 
 Furthermore, Cuba has continued not only to attend to its own population but has 
sent health care personnel to serve in 103 countries, and currently provides health 
cooperation with 68 countries, including 25 in the Americas, 30 in Africa, 3 in the Middle 
East, 8 in Asia and 2 in Eastern and Central Europe (MINSAP 2011:141; Feinsilver 
2009).  Aspects of Cuba’s international medical assistance include providing physicians 
to remote underserved areas, emergency disaster assistance, and training of thousands of 
physicians through collaboratively building new medical schools in these nations or 
having students from poor nations and backgrounds study under full scholarships in Cuba 
(Fields 2006; Christiansen 2010; Feinsilver 2009; Brouwer 2011).  These international 
commitments should be kept in mind when looking at quantitative data of HRH in Cuba. 
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Still, the island has had fewer funds for hospital maintenance, water infrastructure 
and even some healthcare programs (Williams 2008).  Nevertheless, the Cuban 
government actively pursues strategies to correct problems as they appear.  For instance, 
there was a measurable decline in surgical operations performed between 2005 and 2006 
with 58,043 fewer surgeries in 2006 than in 2005 (936,212 to 878,169)23.  These numbers 
have since recovered; by 2012 there were 108,575 more surgeries performed in 2012 than 
in 2005 in the context of a small population drop (MINSAP 2012: 157).  While per capita 
annual outpatient doctor visits declined from 5.5 in 1999 to 3.5 in 2005 due to family 
doctor office consolidation, by 2010 that figure recovered to 5.1 annual visits through a 
temporary reorganizing of primary care services based on service hours (Iñiguez 2013; 
MINSAP 2010).  Iñiguez (2013) documents similar patterns in the fluctuations of per 
capita pediatric visits for children less than one year of age and maternal home 
residencies.  While not suggesting a causal relationship between the difficulties in this 
period and the IMR, it is relevant that while the overall trend of this period in the IMR 
was downward (from 7.2 in 2000 to 5.3 in 2006), increases were reported in 2002 and 
2005 compared to the preceding years (MINSAP 2011).  
 Since Raúl Castro became president in 2008, and particularly since the passage of 
the ‘Guidelines for the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution’ in 
2011, Cuba has been undergoing a restructuring of its socioeconomic model.  The 
changes also seek to address challenges regarding the complexities of funding healthcare, 
renovating polyclinics and hospitals, and making healthcare services more efficient 
within a context of general economic difficulties and obstacles in acquiring medical 
                                                 
23 Iñiguez (2013:46) argues that this was due to a loss of surgical capacity characterized by  “limited surgical 
resources” during hospital renovations. 
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technologies due to U.S. sanctions.24 In spite of the Cuban government’s efforts to 
prevent these circumstances from causing harm to the population and the healthcare 
system, the sanctions and economic difficulties have taken a measurable toll.   
 The balancing of local needs with large international health commitments is 
necessary for Cuba to maintain/improve health equity.  The need for equilibrium was 
recognized in the policy guidelines adopted by the Sixth Communist Party Congress on 
April 18th 2011.  Guideline 160 states that the country’s health policy needs to “guarantee 
that the formation of medical specialists responds to the country’s needs and to those 
generated by international commitments.”  Relevant changes occurring in Cuba’s health 
sector include the consolidation of services where too many HRH were concentrated 
relative to need, promotion of efficient use of staffing, and regionalization of services.25  
Polyclinics that the Ministry of Health deems to be underutilized by the population will 
be transformed into family doctor offices (Iñiguez 2013).   
 
Research Questions, Implications, and Particular Contribution to the Literature  
Past research has examined developments and transformations in Cuba’s 
healthcare system (Feinsilver 1993; Iñiguez 2013; Ochoa and Serrano 2000), national 
trends in infant mortality (Corteguera 2000; Corteguera and Henríquez 2001; Álvarez 
1999), and the government’s commitment to universal access to care in the face of 
                                                 
24 Measures taken by the U.S. against the island include fining companies that sell medical equipment to Cuba, banning 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, not allowing any ship that enters a Cuban port to enter a U.S. 
port for a period of six months and creating onerous licensing restrictions on the sale of food and medicine (American 
Association for World Health 1997).  These restrictions, (combined with the dissolution of the socialist block countries) 
led in the early 1990s to “the disappearance of more than 300 medicines from local pharmacies” that “together with 
food shortages, threatened the very health of all sectors of the population” (Perez 2011: 296). 
25 One example of this “involves 24% of municipalities in the country with only one health area, meaning a single 
polyclinic reporting to the municipal health department.  The two administrations are now being merged, with the 
polyclinic assuming management of the municipal health system, avoiding duplication of functions” (Iñiguez 2013: 
49).    
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economic difficulties (Borowy 2013; Nayari and Lopez-Pardo 2005; Chomsky 2000).  
Also, current research is examining the impact of the socio-economic changes taking 
place on the nature of Cuba’s evolving socialist model (Piñeiro Harneker 2014; 
Rodríguez 2014).  However, little has been done to examine the government’s goal of 
reducing spatial inequality in general, and the various shifts in healthcare strategies in 
particular, looking at change over time in the spatial distribution of healthcare human 
resources and outcomes.  No article was found that examined the degree of inequality in 
HRH distribution at the municipal level.  This research contributes to the analysis of 
changes in Cuba’s health system by examining HRH distribution both among and within 
Cuba’s provinces.  
Has the provincial distribution of HRH and outcomes in Cuba become more equal 
over time particularly since the economic crisis of the 1990s?  If so, to what degree?  
Have the recent changes instituted in Cuba’s health sector led to an increase in inequality 
in healthcare personal distribution among provinces?  Are Cuban health personnel more 
equally distributed among provinces or within them?  Have provincial differences in the 
IMR continued to narrow since 1989?  Which provinces are those with the greatest 
inequality in HRH distribution and IMR?  
 The question of whether Cuba has been able to maintain or deepen health equity 
amid various economic pressures and certain adjustments to the Cuban economic model 
(including a greater prominence of cooperatives, and more foreign investment) are 
relevant beyond Cuba’s borders.  Understanding Cuba’s successes and challenges of 
establishing a public health care system with a rights-based approach to healthcare is also 
of special interest for those who wish to research further on how this has proceeded 
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within a context of resource scarcity.  This work informs the larger debate between those 
who advocate a distribution of healthcare services by market logic and those who wish to 
promote healthcare as an inalienable human right.  
 
METHODS 
This research uses descriptive and formal inequality measures to examine the degree to 
which Cuba has reduced inequality in the spatial distribution in HRH by personnel type 
relative to the population both over time across provinces (from 1958 to 2014, but with 
the greatest focus on 1989–2014) and within provinces in a cross-sectional analysis at the 
municipal level.  Cuba has 16 provinces with each province containing several 
municipalities.  I also use basic measures (box plots) and GIS mapping to portray the 
provincial and municipal level distributions in health care personnel and IMR.  As can be 
gleaned from the earlier discussion, Cuba’s experience reflects several highly relevant 
‘natural experiments’: the revolution in 1959 and subsequent transformation of the health 
care system, the economic crisis of the 1990s, and the changes initiated by the Cuban 
government headed by President Raul Castro as reflected in the Guidelines approved by 
the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party in April 2011.      
 
Data Sources, Data Quality and Research Limitations 
 The majority of the provincial level data for this research were acquired from 
Cuba’s Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP) statistical yearbooks.  MINSAP’s website 
INFOMED provides yearbooks dating back to 1995.  Doctor density data for Cuba’s 
provinces in 1958 was taken from Danielson (1979: 232).  Doctor and family doctor data 
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by province as well as provincial population data for 1989 comes from the MINSAP data 
provided in Feinsilver (1993).  Provincial mortality data from 1970 to 1990 comes from 
MINSAP data reported by Corteguera and Henríquez (2001).  Country level population 
and total doctor and nurse data used to provide the global, OECD and non-OECD country 
comparisons come from the World Health Organization.  Data on Cuba’s annual GDP 
growth were gathered from the World Bank.   
Data for the municipal level analysis were gathered from the Cuban National 
Office of Statistics (ONE) that publishes data from MINSAP.  The National Statistic 
System (SEN) coordinates the national, territorial and complementary statistics for the 
country.  ONE then approves and integrates these statistics that originate from all the 
“organs, organisms and entities that produce statistics in the country” (ONE 2012).  
Unfortunately, the types of data provided by ONE vary in terms of completeness by 
province, year, municipality, and measures gathered, limiting the number of variables and 
provinces available for analysis.  This problem is significantly more pronounced at the 
municipal level than at the provincial level.  This makes a countrywide analysis on the 
municipal level impossible without ONE or other official Cuban entities providing the 
missing data.  Nevertheless, a significant number of provinces provide adequate 
municipal data for a variety of central indicators used in the study at the municipal level.  
Ten provinces were selected for analysis at the municipal level according to the following 
two criteria: 
 1. Publication of relevant indicators on the municipal level for all of a province’s 
municipalities (or at least a great majority of the municipalities in question). 
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 2. Greater apparent consistency of reported indicators with data provided on the 
provincial level. 
  For these reasons municipal data regarding the number of doctors for Scanti 
Espirtú and Ciego de Ávila were not included in the municipal analysis since summation 
of the numbers provided in the municipal yearbooks available in ONE did not match the 
numbers provided at the provincial level.  This could have been due to some 
municipalities not reporting doctors, or reporting only family doctors, different times in 
reporting, or different definitions.  When I used data despite observed discrepancies 
between municipal summation of total family physicians and provincial figures given 
within ONE (Cienfuegos and Las Tunas), the summation of the municipal figures were 
used, which was always lower.  In addition, I sent e-mails to the respective provincial 
heads of the statistical section of ONE.  While responses were received from members of 
ONE’s staff, I was usually referred to MINSAP, but received no response from them.26  
According to the Ministry of Health’s Statistical Yearbook (2010), MINSAP provincial 
data regarding the number of physicians comes from a registry of medical personnel and 
is used for provincial comparisons over time. 
 The largest threats to internal validity associated with data collection in this 
research relates to the different definitions used and potentially different methods utilized 
in acquiring data for a single indicator.  For instance, MINSAP presents the number of 
doctors and family doctors in a province as listed on the registry through 2014.  This 
number likely includes physicians who are away serving on missions abroad.  While this 
is a useful measure of how many doctors the state has the ability to summon to a 
                                                 
26 The most helpful of the responses were received from the section of ONE working with Granma province, although 
this was a province with no observed discrepancies.  The difference could be attributable to doctors actually serving vs. 
those merely registered but serving abroad. 
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particular area, it does not provide a precise measure for the number of doctors actually 
serving in the community.  While Cuba’s high levels of doctor density may allow for this 
to occur without any given locale suffering severe shortages, more precise and consistent 
categories would have helped the present effort considerably.  
 In this regard, it is noteworthy that since 2011 the MINSAP statistical yearbooks 
have used the category titled ‘Family Doctors Serving in the Community’.  During the 
1990s, MINSAP provided a breakdown of the distribution of family doctors in their 
statistical yearbooks that included this category among others, but during the decade of 
the 2000s these breakdowns did not appear.  The numbers for this measure were roughly 
30-40% of those listed as family doctors in 2010, likely reflecting the high number of 
general practitioners serving abroad.   
This research’s primary limitation lies in its ability to make causal inferences 
regarding fluctuations in HRH inequality, due to scarcity of available data.  Causal 
inferences for explaining variation in HRH inequality at the provincial level are thus 
limited primarily to a comparison of the stated intent of recent policy changes and the 
observed changes in the distribution of HRH.  Neither MINSAP nor ONE makes 
available certain potentially interesting explanatory variables for explaining the variation 
in HRH density (such as poverty levels, racial demographics, or the number of 
physicians, family doctors and nurses by province and municipality serving on foreign 
missions).  Other potential interesting variables such as the number of medical school 
graduates are only available on the national level, further reducing the ability to make 
causal inferences.  This study is also limited in terms of spatial analysis; i.e., data on 
distances traveled to see a care provider or a specialist were not available.  Rather than 
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analyzing access based on central places as in central place theory, this research looks at 
HRH distribution among administrative units (provinces and municipalities).   
 
Hypotheses 
H1:  I hypothesize that the GINI and Theil index for the distribution of each category of 
HRH to be moving closer to zero over time, reflecting a reduction HRH imbalance 
relative to the population since 1989.  Although Cuba has experienced greater economic 
inequality since the opening up to tourism forced by the economic crisis of the 1990s, as 
noted by Espina (2008), I hypothesize that the island nation has been able to continue to 
advance in terms equity of health inputs (operationalized as doctor, family doctor and 
nurse density, where possible) and in outcomes (operationalized as infant mortality).  
Since GDP has fluctuated significantly in the last two and a half decades, I do not expect 
any significant correlations between the HRH GINIs for the years calculated and the 
corresponding GDP growth level.  This hypothesis builds upon previous research that 
reflects Cuba’s determination to implement universal healthcare provision across the 
island since the Cuban revolutionary government came to power in 1959 (Whiteford and 
Branch 2008; Nayari and López-Pardo 2005; Feinsilver 1993).    
 
H2. I hypothesize that there is greater inequality within provinces than among provinces 
regarding doctor density generally.   In part, this would likely reflect natural unevenness 
of distributions in those municipalities with tertiary sectors that require a greater number 
of physicians and specialists.  I anticipate that the level of inequality will be lower for the 
distribution of family doctors as measured by the GINI index than the distribution of total 
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doctors.  Some level of inequality among these total physicians is intentional.  Those 
provinces that have municipalities with major metropolitan centers where tertiary 
services tend to be concentrated will have greater inequality reflecting the higher number 
of specialists concentrated there.  In theory, this problem is addressed by calculating the 
GINI of the spatial distribution of family doctors and to a lesser degree by examining 
nurses relative to the population.  Unfortunately, even for those provinces in which the 
numbers of total doctors were provided, some municipalities did not provide the number 
of total family doctors or total nurses.  In those cases only the GINIs for the total doctors 
relative to the population are calculated.  
 
Measuring inequality in HRH 
This paper uses descriptive and inequality measures (such as the GINI coefficient) 
to capture the degree of inequality in the Cuba’s HRH distribution. Regidor (2004), 
Schneider et al. (2002) and The Pan American Health Organization (2001) present the 
GINI coefficient as a useful way to measure various health inequalities. This method has 
also been used in previous studies (e.g., Munga and Maestad 2009; Tandi et al. 2015).  
I calculated the GINI and the Theil coefficients for the distribution of doctors, 
family doctors and nurses relative to the population using Microsoft Excel.  I used 
Brown’s formula (multiplied by 100) for the GINI coefficient recommended by the Pan 
American Health Organization (2001):  = 100 ∗ 1 − ∑  ( !" +  ) (# !" − # )$%" &'  
where G is the GINI coefficient, Y is the cumulated proportion of health care personnel 
in category i, X is the cumulated proportion of the population in category i, and n is the 
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number of geopolitical units.  I used the Theil formula  = ∑  () *+,-,.
/
 &"  where Hi is 
the share of health workers in category i, and Pi is the share of population in category i. 
Dussault and Franceschini (2006) indicate that a normative approach, which 
focuses on doctors relative to population, may not capture need or productivity.  
Although I did not analyze morbidity data, I did gather data on productivity as measured 
by medical consultations per inhabitant.  Medical consultations per capita correlated 
positively at the provincial level with total doctor density in every year for which I had 
gathered relevant data: in 1989 (0.84 p < .001), in 1995 (0.81, p < .001), in 1999/200027 
(0.681 p =.005) in 2005 (0.75, p = .001), in 2010 (0.72 p = .002), in 2011 (0.83 p < .001), 
in 2012 (0.78 p < .001) and in 2014 (0.54 p = .029). 
 Regarding the measure of inequality in health outcomes, the research does not use 
concentration indices due to the interpretational problem associated with the worst-case 
scenario when discussing the distribution of a ‘bad thing’ i.e., infant mortality vs. an 
asset.28  In its place, I have chosen a far more simple but eloquent measure: box plots.  
The box plot correctly captures the reduction in IMR and provides an accurate visual 
depiction of the spread.  It has the additional attribute of singling out outliers.  I also 
calculate the population attributable proportion (PAP) as explained by Schneider et al. 
(2002), with the sole difference that instead of basing the comparison on the difference 
between the overall IMR and the province with the best socioeconomic indicator’s IMR, I 
                                                 
27 Total doctor data for 2000 was unavailable, so I used the 1999 provincial distribution. 
28 Initially it may appear that the reversal of the sorting order is sufficient to account for the necessary difference in 
interpretation, but I would argue, that this fails to truly invert the scenario of perfect inequality of the distribution of 
something desirable (like human resources for health, wealth or income).  Take for example a case of perfect inequality 
where all geopolitical units lost every child that was born prior to their first birthday save one unit that lost none.  If 
there were 16 geopolitical units and 1000 babies born in each, and we measured the above situation with a 
concentration index, we would have an absolute value of 6.25 as opposed to 100. Yet this is a situation most parallel to 
absolute inequality of the GINI coefficient in which one person owns all the wealth and everyone else has nothing. 
True, this reflects low concentration, but it does not measure the inequality in life chances. The concentration index is 
thus aptly named and measures if one province bears undue weight, but this summary measure does not capture the 
concept that is the focus of this research. 
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contrast the overall IMR with the province with the lowest IMR.  This provides an 
answer to the question of what would have been the percent reduction in the IMR if every 
sub-unit had achieved an IMR equal to that of the unit that had the lowest IMR.  The 
calculation is from Schneider et al. (2002) and is as follows: 0 =
12$2345 678%9:;2<= 678
12$2345 678 . 
 GIS mapping was used to display the geographic dimensions of HRH density and 
health outcome variation.  At the provincial level, choropleth maps were generated using 
ArcGIS to reflect spatial changes in IMR over time and to contrast the spatial variation in 
IMR with population per doctor in 2012.  The municipal level maps contrast population 
per doctor with IMR and percent rural with the population per family doctor. 
Some correlations were run at the provincial, municipal and national levels to 
explore potential relationships between the variables explored (including year) and other 
variables of interest provided by MINSAP and ONE at various levels of analysis.  They 
include the percent of the population classified as rural (provincial and municipal levels), 
and the annual health budget (national level).  In spite of the limited number of years, I 
ran national level correlations to explore potential relationships over time with the GINI 
and Theil coefficients. Inferences about the relationships originating from correlations 
here beyond the years analyzed should be made with caution, and these inferences should 
not be extended beyond the Cuban case.   
 
RESULTS 
 The goal of this research is to ascertain the change in the degree of inequality in 
the distribution of HRH and IMR among Cuban provinces since the beginning of the 
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Cuban revolution with the focus predominantly on distributional changes that have 
occurred since the fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern European Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance in 1989 and the period covering the recent changes in the Cuban 
health sector.  Where data permits some exploration of potential explanations for these 
shifts, they are provided.   
The period evaluated extends through the socioeconomic changes outlined in the  
‘Guidelines for the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution’ that 
were approved by the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in April of 2011.   
Among the recently approved guidelines is Guideline 155, whose purpose is to 
“Reorganize and concentrate the health-care services, including emergency care and 
transportation, on a regional basis and consistent with the needs in each province and 
municipality. The health care system must see to it that each patient receives appropriate 
and quality assistance” (Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba 2011).   This 
research also examines the level of inequality in these distributions within ten of Cuba’s 
provinces in 2010. 
 
Change in HRH distribution among Cuban Provinces 
 Table 1 presents data on the spread of physicians among Cuban provinces by 
year.  Taking a look at Table 1 (below) as both the median and national figures indicate, 
the number of doctors proportionate to the population among Cuban provinces has 
increased dramatically in the time period examined.  National doctor density across the 
island nation increased more than seven-fold since the beginning of the revolution in 
1959.  Pooling all of the provinces, there is further evidence of the strong upward trend in 
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physician density.  This revealed a strong positive correlation in a two-tailed test between 
year and provincial level doctor density at .763 (n=93 p < .01).  It is also notable that this 
trend did not ebb over the ‘special period’ of the 1990s nor did the overall trend subside 
after the passing of the Guidelines in 2010.   
 
Table 1: Physician (density) distribution in Cuba among provinces 
Country/ 
Year 
N Min.-Max. 
Doctor 
Density per 
1000 
Median 
Doctor 
Density 
National/
overall 
Doctor 
Density 
GINI  Theil 
1958* 7 0.38 – 4.00 0.60 0.90 NA NA 
1989 15 1.76 – 6.85 2.42 3.31 27.0  13.1 
1995 15 3.43 – 8.73 4.54 5.18 18.4 6.0 
1999 15 3.98 – 9.14 5.09 5.79 15.6 4.2 
2005 15 4.04 – 9.86 5.49 6.28 15.3 4.1 
2010 16 4.24 – 9.68 6.32 6.81 12.0 2.5 
2012 16 4.64 – 9.99 6.88 7.35 11.3 2.1 
2014 16  5.12 – 9.60 7.29 7.62 9.4 1.4 
World 2013 
or most 
recent year** 
157 0.01 – 6.78 1.23 1.39 40.0 27.3 
OECD 2012 28 1.73-4.96 3.21 2.73 15.0 3.8 
Non-OECD 
2013 or most 
recent year  
129 0.1 – 6.78 1,613 1.07 38.2 26.6 
Note:  N refers to the number of provinces.  Doctor density is the number of doctors per 1000 people.  GINIs and 
Theils are calculated by comparing the cumulative doctors against cumulative population with values ranging from 0 to 
100.  Absolute equality is 0 and absolute inequality is 100. *Data from a MINSAP table of doctor density by province, 
reported in Danielson 2012 **Years range from 2007-2013.  
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 Although there were insufficient data available to calculate the GINI and Theil 
coefficients for 1958, both the size of the absolute range and the fact the provinces were 
aggregated and much larger, suggests that inequality was very high and doctor density 
particularly low in some areas.  For instance, Oriente province was later divided into Las 
Tunas, Granma, Holguin, Guantánamo, and Santiago de Cuba, while Las Villas (also 
known as Santa Clara) was later divided into Villa Clara, Sancti Spíritus and Cienfuegos.  
So, although we may always expect a higher concentration of physicians in urban areas 
(where more secondary and tertiary health services are located), the inequality in the 
distribution of physicians in 1959 Cuba appears stark.  For example, in Oriente and Pinar 
del Rio provinces there was roughly only one doctor for every 2,632 and 2,174 people, 
respectively, but in the capital city there was roughly one physician for every 250 people. 
 By 1989, it was clear that the situation of the overall distribution of physicians 
had improved dramatically, especially in those areas with historically the low doctor 
density.  Aggregating the estimates for the five provinces that once formed Oriente 
province, the combined ‘1989 Oriente province’ would have had a doctor density of 2.27 
compared to the 1958 figure of 0.38.  Still, taking into account the level of inequality as 
measured by the GINI and Theil, there was still significant inequality in Cuba across 
provinces in 1989.  This was, however, considerably less than the between-country 
estimates observed in the world and non-OECD countries in the past decade.  By 2014, 
there was less inequality in the reported distribution of Cuban physicians among 
provinces than there was among OECD countries. 
 From 1989 to 2014 the distribution of total physicians among provinces became 
more equal and the total number of physicians relative to the population has become 
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much higher, providing support for H1.  While there are very few years presented in 
Table 1 with which to analyze national level data (n = 7 years- excluding 1958), these 
numbers generate a significant inverse correlation between year and the GINI coefficient 
(-.948, p < .01).  While quantitative data is insufficient to fully analyze other variables 
that may explain the dynamics of physician placement, we see that doctor density 
correlated negatively with the percentage of the population defined as living in rural areas 
in 2010 (n = 16) on the provincial level at (-.552 p < .05).  However, by 2012 this 
correlation lost significance (-.352 p = .18).  In this limited sample, Cuba’s GDP growth 
did not approach a significant correlation with either its doctor density or any of the HRH 
related GINI or Theil coefficients. 
It is critical to remember, however, that many of these physicians are serving in 
important internationalist missions.  For instance, although MINSAP does not provide 
information regarding the number of physicians serving abroad (only the countries in 
which they serve) in their statistical yearbooks, the Cuban News Agency reported on 
March 26th of 2015 that there were over 25,000 physicians serving in Cuba’s various 
internationalist programs (Padrino 2015).  In 2014, MINSAP reported that the island had 
85,563 physicians, thus subtracting 25,000 leaves roughly 60,000 for domestic service.29 
Given Cuba’s high physician density this may not pose a significant problem to the 
provision of health care in Cuba as according to Fransisco Rojas Ochoa, “We can have 
thousands abroad because 80,000 here would bump heads” (Edith and Terrero 2008).   
Since these numbers include specialists, family physicians, generalists as well as 
those serving abroad, one may suspect that the distribution of hospitals and hospital beds 
                                                 
29 MINSAP does not report the number of physicians that each province provides to internationalist missions.  This 
would have been beneficial for keeping track of any impact it may have on the equity of HRH distribution and for the 
this research. 
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relative to the population would have become more equal as well.  Nevertheless, over this 
period there has been a decrease in the number of total hospitals (from 263 in 1989 to 215 
in 2010 and then further to 152 in 2014).  In the period from 1989 to 2012,30 there was a 
decrease in the number of total hospital beds from 63,068 to 45,649.  Thus, I observed a 
slight increase when calculating the GINI for the total hospitals (relative to the 
cumulative population) between 1989 and 2010 from 14.3 to 18.0, respectively, but a 
decrease in the GINI for hospital beds between 1989 and 2012 (in spite of a reduction in 
total hospital beds) from 23.9 to 13.8, respectively. 
The decrease in the number of hospitals and hospital beds reflects a continued 
emphasis to shift services and technology away from hospitals and towards the polyclinic 
(Iñiguez 2013: 45).  However, while the number of polyclinics increased from 440 
polyclinics in 1995 to 563 in 2010, by 2014 they dropped to 451, likely reflecting 
consolidation of services as specified in Guideline 155.  In spite of the reduction of total 
polyclinics in 2014, the provincial distribution of polyclinics relative to the population 
measured by the GINI coefficient has followed a trend of reducing an already low level 
of inequality - going from 13.8 in 1995 to 12.1 in 2010 to 7.4 in 2014. 
 Since one would necessarily expect a greater concentration of overall physicians 
(particularly specialists) in or near the tertiary facilities, one would expect greater 
inequality in the distribution of total physicians than of family doctors.  Due to the 
importance placed on primary care both in Cuba and in the literature, it is important to 
examine the change in the distribution of family physicians in Cuba as well during this 
period.  It should be emphasized that family doctors are the center of Cuba’s community 
medicine model whose primary duty is “to aggressively investigate and monitor the 
                                                 
30 The MINSAP yearbook of 2010 did not report totals on provincial hospital beds. 
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health of the entire population, not just the diseased” (Feinsilver 1993: 40).  Tables 2a 
and 2b provide data regarding the distribution of family doctors and family doctors listed 
in the community over time. 
As in the case with total physicians, there was a steady increase over time in 
‘overall’ family doctor density.  However, those classified as family doctors in the 
community decreased slightly during the same period.  In 1989, Cuba’s family doctor 
program was very young, having only been piloted in 1984, so some disparities among 
provinces would be expected.  The virtual disappearance of these disparities by the year 
2000, as indicated in Table 2a, is thus quite remarkable.  However, although the 2010 
level of inequality remained minimal and was less than half of what it was in 1989, it did 
increase during 2000-2010.  Nevertheless, since many Cuban physicians spend an 
extended time in international missions, Table 2b likely provides a more precise picture 
of those physicians actually serving in the community.31   
It should be noted that consultation per inhabitant correlates more strongly with 
total doctor density than with either family doctor density or family doctor in community 
density in every year for which I ran correlations with consultations per inhabitant except 
for 1995.  Family doctor density correlated significantly with total medical consultations 
per capita in 1989, 1995, and 2005. These variables did not correlate significantly in 2000 
or 2010.  Density of family doctors listed in the community did not correlate with 
medical consultations per capita in any year analyzed.   
 
                                                 
31 It is important to note that in 1995 ‘community’ was only one of several localized family physician placement 
categories.  Other placement categories included ‘schools’, ‘infant circles’, ‘work centers’, ‘tourism’, ‘agro-industrial 
complex’, ‘agricultural cooperatives’, ‘on reserve’ and ‘other’.  In 2012 and 2014, however, the Cuban Ministry of 
Health (MINSAP) reported only a single category: family doctors located in the community. 
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Table 2a: Family doctor (density) distribution among provinces in Cuba 
Year N Min.-Max. Median National GINI  Theil 
1989 15 0.48 – 2.90  2.44  1.12 22.7 8.9 
1995 15 1.89 – 3.01 2.44 2.47 9.1  1.3 
2000 15 1.98 – 3.15 2.74 2.69 5.7  0.6 
2005 15 2.27 – 3.44 2.83 3.00 6.7  0.7 
2010 16 2.25 – 4.49  3.41 3.24 10.6  1.8 
Note:  All GINIs and Theils are multiplied by 100.  Absolute equality is 0 and absolute inequality is a 100.   
 
 
Table 2b: Family doctors listed in community (density) distribution among provinces in 
Cuba 
Year N Min.- Max. Median National GINI  Theil 
1995 15 1.22 - 1.63 1.46 1.48 3.9  0.3 
2000 15 1.26 - 1.73 1.50 1.53 3.9  0.3 
2011 16 0.58 - 2.53 1.13 1.19 14.1 4.0 
2012 16 0.98 - 1.53 1.18 1.20 6.2  0.6 
2013 16 1.05 - 1.45 1.18 1.19 4.8 0.4 
2014 16 1.01 - 1.29 1.14 1.14 3.4  0.2 
Note:  All GINIs are multiplied by 100.  Absolute equality is 0 and absolute inequality is 100.   
 
MINSAP’s human resources director, Dr. Marcos del Risco del Rio, reported on 
March 27, 2014 on Mesa Redonda (a Cuban news analysis television program) that a 
reorganization of HRH began in 2010 to increase efficiency within the health sector 
while maintaining universal coverage.  The reorganization of much of the health sector 
was based on a countrywide study that provided an analysis of health facilities that 
examined economic and epidemiological factors in every municipality.  One component 
of this reorganization is the reduction the total number of health workers, and according 
to Dr. Risco del Rio, were reduced by 109,000.  This has helped to achieve the goal of 
reducing the total number of health workers on the government’s payroll and to increase 
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salaries for those remaining within the health sector.  Dr. Risco del Rio reports that 
27,257 excess health sector trained professionals relocated based on existing needs and a 
portion was placed on reserve (Mesa Redonda 2014). 
Table 2b shows a decrease in the number of family physicians in the community 
between 2000 and 2011.  The data for 2011 reflects some of the problems discussed by 
Iñiguez (2013).  In 2011, the number of family doctors located in the community density 
overall was roughly the same as in 2012 and 2014, but the distribution was far more 
skewed in 2011, with Villa Clara and Artemisa had very low family doctors in the 
community density (by Cuban standards) at 0.58 and 0.89, respectively.  By the 
following year, however, these had increased to 1.32 and 0.98, respectively. 
The decrease in family doctor density in 2011 (which has remained relatively 
stable since) reflects the consolidation of family doctors’ offices as well as the continued 
efforts to correct the balance between family doctor distribution and caseloads.  While 
according to Edith and Terrero (2008) and Iñiguez (2013), this decrease did not lead to a 
drop in the rate of coverage, it did lead to longer wait times, a reduction in per capita 
doctor visits, increased caseloads and some people turning to the hospital for primary 
care.  The current target is for each family nurse-physicians office to have a caseload of 
300 to 400 families (Iñiguez 2013: 49).  Table 2a thus provides some support for H1, due 
to the difference between the 1989 and 2010 GINIs, while Table 2b indicates that the 
level of equality in the distribution of family physicians spiked in 2011 and decreased in 
each of the following years. This suggests that the reorganization of this part of the health 
system is leading to greater equality in the distribution of physicians in the community 
relative to the population. 
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 Table 3 reflects an overall increase in nurse density with a slight decrease in 2014.  
The inequality in nurse distribution increased in 2012 but reverted to its 1995 level in 
2014.  Nevertheless, as both the GINI and Theil indicate, inequality in the distribution of 
nurses has been minimal even during the years with most inequality.  Overall, it is clear 
that neither the Special Period nor the changes approved by the Sixth Congress of the 
Communist Party have upset a commitment to equality in the distribution of HRH in 
Cuba among provinces. 
 
Table 3: Nurse (density) distribution among provinces in Cuba 
Year N Min.-Max. Median National
/overall 
GINI Theil 
1995 15 5.21 – 8.78 6.79 7.04 8.1  1.1 
2000 15 5.63 – 9.09 7.07 7.43 7.7  1.0 
2005 15 6.93 – 9.79 7.99 7.96 5.5  0.5 
2012 16 4.47 – 13.25 8.49 8.25 12.5  2.7 
2014 16 6.37 – 11.33 7.72 8.09 8.1  1.2 
World 2012* 147 0.14 – 23.74 2.36 2.52 45.8  41.1 
OECD 
2012** 
25 0.16 – 23.74 6.46 6.08 39.6  27.9 
Non-OECD 
2012* 
121 0.14 – 11.72  1.74  1.99  37.6  30.7 
Note: Nurse density per 1000 people.  GINIs and Theils are run plotting the cumulative doctors against cumulative 
population and range from 0 to 100.  Absolute equality is 0 and absolute inequality is a 100. * Or most recent year.  
**Chile is a big outlier in the OECD regarding nurse density.  
 
 
Change in absolute inequality of infant mortality rates among provinces 
Although a national health system has a greater ability to provide relatively equal 
access to quality prevention and care through a managed distribution of HRH and 
facilities (ideally varying solely by need), if those services are distributed and tailored to 
population needs ideally we would see both improving overall trends and a growing 
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degree of equality in health outcomes.  As Table 4 and Figures 1, 2a, and 2b reflect, the 
average of the provincial IMR has improved and there has been a significant reduction in 
the range of the IMR over the period examined. 
Although no province has obtained a lower IMR than Villa Clara (2.5) in 2010, 
average IMR tended to decline.  Nevertheless, 2012 registered a slight increase as well as 
a wider spread in IMR among provinces.  By 2014, the national and median IMR had 
improved, but the provinces Artemisa and Ciego de Avila registered IMRs 1.9 and 2.0 
deaths per 1000 live births above the national average, respectively.  According to the 
population-attributable-proportion (PAP) for 2014, if every province had done as well as 
Cienfuegos and Isla de Juventud (IMR = 3.0 for both provinces), then Cuba’s IMR would 
have been 28.6% lower.  It is important to mention that large increases in the PAP are 
likely mathematical artifacts of the IMR decreasing as opposed to a given province’s 
relative position being exacerbated.  This is why PAP may increase regardless of 
significant decreases in the average IMR of the series or of large decreases in the range of 
IMR (compare the years 1970 and 2010).  Overall, there was an 88.4% reduction in the 
national IMR over the period examined. 
 
Table 4: IMR distribution among provinces in Cuba 
Year N Min.-Max. Median National PAP 
1970 15 33.5 - 51.1 38.3 38.7 13.4 
1975 15 18.8 - 35.1 28.9 27.5 31.6 
1980 15 14.4 - 24.2 19.8 19.6 19.6 
1985 15 14.0 - 23.7 16.4 16.5 15.2 
1990 15 7.6 - 13.6 10.8 9.9 23.2 
1995 15 6.5 - 10.9 9.7 9.4 30.9 
2000 15 4.9 - 9.1 6.9 7.2 31.9 
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Table 4: Continued 
Year N Min.-Max. Median National PAP 
2005 15 3.7 - 8.0 6.4 6.2 40.3 
2010 16 2.5 - 5.7 4.8 4.5 44.4 
2012 16 2.8 - 7.1 4.8 4.6 39.1 
2014 16 3.0 - 6.2 4.1 4.2 28.6  
World 2012 187 1.7 -117.4  15.9 NA NA 
OECD 2012 32 1.7 - 13.9 3.4 NA NA 
Non-OECD 
2012 
121 3.9 - 117.4 26.8 NA NA 
 
Figure 1 includes three GIS generated maps, the first of which shows the 
provincial rates of IMR in 1970, the second displays provincial IMR in 2005 and the 
percent reduction in the IMR between 1970 and 2005, and the third shows the number of 
inhabitants per physician with provincial IMRs for 2012.  The box plots in Figures 2a and 
2b indicate that provincial IMRs are becoming much more similar, portraying much 
greater equality in the IMR among provinces.  Figure 2a shows a strong downward trend 
in IMR across virtually all provinces, with the median, third and fourth quartiles 
becoming lower and tending towards closer scores.  Figure 2b shows a continuation of 
the trend, although due to the lower bound of the IMR it is difficult to push it much 
lower. 
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Figure 1: Infant mortality rates across time and space in Cuba 
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Figure 2a: Box plots of IMR among Cuban provinces 1975-2005 
 
 
Figure 2b: Box plots of IMR among Cuban provinces 2010-2014 
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HRH distribution among Cuban municipalities 
 To delve deeper into understanding the level of inequality in HRH distribution in 
Cuba, I examined the number of physicians relative to the population in municipalities in 
ten Cuban provinces for 2010.32 In the bivariate correlation analysis of the 2010 cross-
section of municipalities, doctor density negatively correlates with percent rural at -0.39 
(p < .01 n = 117).  Nurse density also negatively correlates with percent rural at -.23 p < 
.05 (n = 82).  Family doctor density does not correlate significantly (.21, p = .13, n = 44) 
with the percentage of the population that lives in areas designated as rural.  The various 
HRH categories evaluated in this study are all positively inter-correlated.  Physician 
density correlates with nurse density (0.51 p < .01, n = 82), nurse density correlates with 
family physician density (0.35 p < .01, n = 54) and physician density correlates with 
family physician density (0.44 p < .01 n = 67) as expected, considering that the latter is a 
component of the former.  Neither the HRH density variables nor the percentage of the 
population residing in rural areas correlated with IMR at this level. 
Table 5 shows the range of the distribution of physicians per 1000 population 
within each of the provinces, with the GINI and Theil coefficients providing summary 
measures of the degree of inequality in their distribution relative to the population.  From 
Table 5 one can observe that Cienfuegos province had the most unequal distribution of 
doctors (but the second highest provincial average) while Santiago de Cuba province 
reported both the highest provincial average and the municipality with the greatest 
concentration of physicians.  Cienfuegos’s population is predominately urban with the 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that the reporting municipalities of La Habana province do not include the city of La Habana, 
which has always been reported separately and that this province was divided into Artemisa and Mayabeque in 2011.   
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lowest percentage of population living in rural areas of the ten provinces compared in 
Table 5.  Cienfuegos municipality had by far the largest concentration of physicians at 
roughly twelve doctors per 1000 population in 2010, and has one of the province’s two 
general hospitals and the province’s pediatric hospital Paquito Gómez.  In contrast, Rodas 
municipality in 2010 had a doctor density of ‘only’ 1.9. Guantánamo, which reported the 
third highest overall doctor density, had the most egalitarian distribution.  Figure 3 
(below) includes a map of the number of inhabitants per doctor by municipality. 
Comparing the 2010 GINIs and Theils in Table 1 with the overall GINI and Theil 
in Table 5, it appears that the level of inequality within provinces is greater than the level 
of inequality between them, providing support for H2.  However, the calculation in Table 
1 includes provincial figures for provinces (and a few municipalities) not included in 
Table 5.  Nevertheless, calculating the between provincial GINIs and Thiels for the data 
in Table 5 (by summing the doctors and population by the municipalities of the provinces 
used in Table 5 and then calculating the GINIs and Theils of those summations), the 
between provincial GINI is 8.5 with a Theil of 1.3, as compared to within provincial 
coefficients of 27.3 and 11.8, respectively, clearly indicating greater within provincial 
inequality.  This finding is unsurprising, as one would expect there to be a greater 
concentration of physicians in municipalities where there are more secondary and tertiary 
institutions. 
 
Table 5: Physician (density) distribution within Cuban provinces 
Province N Min.–Max. Median Prov./ 
overall 
GINI  Theil 
Camagüey 13 1.75 – 9.87 3.64 6.21  27.1 13.2 
Cienfuegos 8 1.88 – 11.99 3.63 7.05 31.1  18.6 
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Table 5: Continued 
Province N Min.–Max. Median Prov./ 
overall 
GINI  Theil 
Granma 13 3.55 - 9.45 4.01 5.77 19.5  6.5 
Guantanamo 10 3.65 – 8.24 5.45 6.59 13.9  3.4 
La Habana* 15 2.15 – 6.71 2.95 4.42 19.1  5.7 
Holguin 14 2.62 – 8.20 3.45 5.18 22.7  8.7 
Las Tunas 8 2.45 – 7.65 3.17 4.88 22.8  9.4 
Pinar Del 
Rio 
14 2.93 – 11.03 3.46 5.67 28.7  14.9 
Santiago de 
Cuba 
9 3.01 – 15.95 4.70 7.20 24.2  10.6 
Villa Clara 13 3.61 – 11.45 4.28 6.56 26.0  11.8 
Total 117 1.75 – 15.95 3.91 5.91 27.3  11.8 
* The Habana municipalities Santa Cruz del Norte, Batabano, Bauta and Güira de Melena did not report and are thus 
excluded. 
 
Table 6 shows that the distribution of family doctors, as reported by Cuba’s 
National Statistical Office (ONE) for six Cuban provinces, is more equal than that of 
overall physicians.  Las Tunas’s GINI and the Theil coefficients for family doctor 
distribution reflect a degree of inequality similar to that displayed by the province for 
doctor distribution.  As in the case of the overall distribution of physicians, in 2010 
Cienfuegos had the most unequal distribution of family physicians.  Guantánamo and 
Granma provinces reported the most even distribution of family physicians relative to 
their populations in 2010.  Comparing the overall within province GINI (19.3) and Theil 
(7.4) to the 2010 among province family doctor GINI (10.6) and Theil (1.8), I find further 
support for H2 
The municipalities of Rodas, Cienfuegos and Jesús Menéndez, Las Tunas 
reported the lowest family physician density of the municipalities in the study with only 
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16 family doctors for a population of 33,546 people and 34 family physicians for a 
population of 50,460 people, respectively.  Rodas is the second most rural municipality in 
Cienfuegos, and although Cumanayagua is the most rural of the province’s 
municipalities, it reported highest family doctor density of the province at 2.8. In the 
bottom map of Figure 3, Cienfuegos is enlarged so the spatial inequality can be more 
fully appreciated.  It should be noted that since 2010, according to ONE, Jesús 
Menéndez, Las Tunas has increased its number of family doctors to 55 (2013 population 
49,165) improving the family doctor density to 1.12 and Rodas, Cienfuegos increased the 
number of family physicians slightly to 41 for a decreased population of 34,278, 
increasing family doctor density to 1.20.  This may indicate efforts on part of MINSAP to 
continually manage and improve levels of equality in HRH distribution.  
 
Table 6: Family physician (density) distribution within Cuban Provinces  
Province N Min.-Max. Median Prov./ 
Overall 
GINI  Theil 
Camagüey 13 1.00 – 3.96  2.22  2.88  18.83  6.3 
Cienfuegos 8 0.48 - 2.83 1.00 1.23 23.8  11.4 
Granma 13 2.78 – 4.28 3.37 3.54 6.6  0.7 
Guantanamo 10 3.03 – 4.46 3.78 3.60 3.6  0.3 
Las Tunas 8 0.67 – 3.82 1.97 2.63 21.5 8.5 
Villa Clara 13 1.90 – 4.76 3.58 3.73 12.0  2.4 
Total 65 0.48 – 4.76  3.12  3.09  19.3  7.4 
 
 
Table 7 presents the distribution of nurses within six Cuban provinces among 
their respective municipalities.  With the exception of Camagüey and Guantánamo 
provinces, nurses tend to be more evenly distributed within Cuban provinces than 
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physicians overall, although not quite as evenly as family doctors.  Manzanillo and 
Bayamo municipalities of Granma province both reported exceptionally high nurse 
density with 23.16 and 13.13, nurses per 1000 population, respectively.  Pinar del Rio 
municipality of Pinar del Rio province and Guantánamo municipality of Guantánamo 
province are both quite high at 15.65 and 15.03 respectively.  Camagüey, while not 
appearing to suffer a shortage of nurses, had the lowest nurse density in 2010 and the 
most uneven distribution of nurses of the provinces analyzed.  Total within-province 
GINI (26.9) and Theil (12.7) were higher than the among-province GINI (12.5) and Theil 
(2.7) for 2012 (no nurse density data was reported for 2010) indicating further support for 
H2.   
 
Table 7: Nurse (density) distribution within Cuban provinces 
Province N Min.-Max. Median Prov./ 
Overall 
GINI Theil 
Camagüey 13 1.36 – 9.00 3.12 3.20 35.8 21.3 
Granma 13 6.33 – 23.16 9.72 12.51 19.3 6.9 
Guantánamo 10 1.25 - 15.03 10.09 12.00 14.6  2.3 
Holguin 14 5.21 - 14.90 8.70  8.73 14.4  3.5 
Pinar Del Río 14 6.12 – 15.65 7.88 10.45 19.1  5.9 
Villa Clara 13 5.67 -13.68 7.75 9.24  18.4 5.5 
Total 77  1.25 – 23.16  8.36 9.19 26.9  12.7 
* Includes nurse assistants. 
 
Absolute inequality of infant mortality rates within provinces 
 Table 8 provides the range, median and overall IMR of the municipalities within 
five Cuban provinces.  The highest IMRs among these five provinces were in Guines, La 
Habana and Caimanera, Guantánamo at 11.6 and 11.2 respectively.  Granma province 
had the lowest overall and median IMR, although Amancio, Las Tunas was the 
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municipality with the lowest IMR, where not a single infant death was reported for 2010.  
Here we can also see the hypothetical percentage reduction in the overall IMR of the 
provinces listed if all municipalities would have achieved the IMR of the municipality 
with the lowest IMR.  A map of the distribution of IMR is provided (Figure 3) which 
includes reported IMRs for municipalities that are not included in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: IMR Distribution within Cuban Provinces 
Province N Min.–Max. Median Prov./ 
overall 
PAP 
Granma 13 1.4 – 9.7 4.7 4.7 70.2 
Guantánamo 10 3.1 – 11.2 4.9 5.7 45.6 
La Habana* 16 1.6 – 11.6 6.2 5.1 68.6 
Las Tunas 8 0 – 8.9  5.4 5.5 100.0 
Santiago de 
Cuba 
9 1.9 - 8.9 5.6 5.3 64.2 
Total 56  0 – 11.6 5.1 NA NA 
* The municipalities Madruga, Nueva Paz, Batabano, Bahía Honda, Candelaria and San Cristobal did not report the 
IMR to ONE for 2010.  They are excluded from the Min-Maz and Median calculations.  The overall figure is what 
ONE reported for the province in 2010.    
 
 
 Figure 4 provides the box plots of the municipal IMR of the five provinces 
analyzed.  It is apparent when comparing Figure 2b with Figure 4 that the spread of infant 
deaths tends to be greater within provinces than among them.  For example, the 
provincial range of IMR in 2012 was 3.2 per 1000 lives births for Cuba as a whole, 
whereas Santiago de Cuba, the province with the lowest range of IMR among its 
municipalities of the provinces examined, had an IMR range of 7.0 for the same year.  
 While there are no salient outliers identified by the plots, it is clear that 
Guantánamo has a strong right skew with lower half of the data points between 3.1 and 
4.9, and the fourth quadrant is rather stretched indicating that the greater IMR raised the 
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provincial average significantly above its median.  La Habana had the widest range of 
IMR (10.0 per 1000) and the widest gap between the median and its provincial average, 
suggesting that this province had the greatest variance in IMR of the provinces examined. 
 
 
Figure 3: HRH and IMR distribution at the municipal level in Cuba 
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Figure 4: Box plots of IMR within Cuban provinces 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 The primary goal of this research was to measure changes in the degree of 
inequality in HRH distribution in Cuba over time, with particular interest in the changes 
occurring over the ‘Special Period’ and the period under Raul Castro’s leadership.  I 
found that inequality in physician distribution relative to the population among provinces 
has declined steadily over time, as doctor density increased.  Inequality in the distribution 
of family doctors and nurses is very low and has remained fairly stable, although 
inequality in family doctors spiked in 2011, falling significantly in 2012 and 2014.  
Inequality in both doctor and nurse distributions relative to the population is more 
egalitarian among Cuban provinces than among countries of the OECD.  While this is a 
comparison across different levels of analysis, logic suggests that inequality would be 
higher at more disaggregated levels.  This was the case in this research as inequality of 
HRH distribution within provinces was greater than inequality among provinces.  Further 
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research that gathers data on the distribution of physicians within countries of the OECD 
would allow for more precise comparisons.   
 This research was also examined the trajectory of provincial IMR over time.  A 
steady decline in IMR and in the range of the rates was generally observed with a 
leveling out of the rates in recent years as Cuba’s provinces approach the IMR’s lower 
bound.  Of the provinces examined at the municipal level, Santiago de Cuba had the most 
compact distribution of IMR, although here too, it appears that the IMRs vary more 
within provinces than among them. 
 For some comparisons to other within-country distributions of HRH, Munga and 
Maestad (2009) calculated the GINI coefficient of the spatial distribution of 46,896 
health workers (nurses, physicians, clinical and assistant medical officers, physicians 
make up just a small fraction of the total) among 22 Tanzanian districts at 22.3.  While 
this figure obscures the highly unequal access to physicians in Tanzania, the figure 
remains significantly higher than the GINIs for any of the recent HRH categories in Cuba 
among provinces examined here (except 1989).  Nevertheless, there are some Cuban 
provinces on the municipal level that registered higher internal disparities for particular 
categories of HRH workers than the overall score for health workers in Tanzania. 
 A more methodologically similar comparison can be gleamed from Tandi and 
colleagues (2015) on HRH distribution in Cameroon.  They calculated GINI coefficients 
for ten regions in Cameroon with an overall HRH GINI of 35.4 and a GINI of physician 
distribution of 52.8.  Cameroonian nurses were far more equitably distributed than their 
physician counterparts at 30.8.  While these numbers are far more elevated than the 
provincial Cuban numbers and convey well the crisis in HRH distribution faced in 
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Cameroon, a more apt comparison would be with the HRH distribution of Latin 
American and Caribbean nations. 
 The Cuban experience has relevance beyond its borders.  As shown in the 
introduction of this article, severely unequal distribution of HRH both among and within 
countries remains an area of serious concern.  Many nations suffer severe HRH 
imbalances, which in turn accentuate inequities in healthcare outcomes.  While these 
imbalances are driven by a combination of push, pull, stay and stick factors, when 
healthcare is treated as a commodity, HRH distribution tends to serve effective demand 
over the population’s absolute needs (WHO 2006:8; Navarro 1976:14-29).  The Cuban 
government’s commitment to non-commodified and preventive care, (as reflected in the 
Cuban constitution and in their extremely low share of private expenditure of total health 
expenditure as reported by the WHO), and the country’s long-term commitment to 
general and health education has helped Cuba overcome the challenge of achieving 
greater equality in HRH distribution.  Furthermore, they have not only overcome this 
challenge on their own soil, but since 1963 the Cuban government has assisted other 
nations with their own HRH distribution and shortage challenges (Brouwer 2011; 
Feinsilver 2009; Chaple 2006). 
 While the development of Cuba’s socioeconomic and healthcare models were 
greatly facilitated by a relatively unique set of historical circumstances and would 
therefore be difficult to replicate, there are measures that could be taken by other 
countries, provided there is sufficient political will and stakeholder collaboration.  Many 
Latin American countries including Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador and Bolivia have 
sought to emulate Cuba’s investment in healthcare and collaborate with Cuba in terms of 
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healthcare provision and training of future physicians.  Nevertheless, according to WHO 
data, 63.9% of Ecuador’s health care financing in 2011 was private (either private 
insurance or out-of-pocket), and their income inequality is far more acute than Cuba’s, 
indicating that more can be gained by following Cuba’s example.  Other countries in 
Latin America (particularly Guatemala, Honduras and Panama), but also many Southern 
African countries, exhibit very high inequality and low doctor density.  These countries 
have much to learn from Cuba’s rights-based approach to healthcare, its efforts to train 
health professionals, and the low level of imbalance in distribution of HRH personnel 
present in Cuba. 
Even the United States could learn from various aspects of Cuban healthcare 
organization.  According to Petterson et al. (2013), the U.S. experiences unequal HRH 
distribution, particularly among primary care physicians.  In the U.S., the average 
primary care physician density is .80, with .84 per 1000 in urban areas and .68 in rural 
ones.  Comparing this to our municipal level findings on Cuban family doctor 
distributions, there were only two municipalities of those examined with lower family 
doctor densities in 2010, both of which increased their family doctor densities the 
following year to more than one per one thousand.   
Likewise, according to a 2014 Commonwealth international survey of health 
professionals’ and patients’ views of their country’s healthcare system, seventy percent of 
those surveyed in the U.S. said it was difficult to obtain after hours care and 31% of U.S. 
respondents forwent recommended care due to its cost (Davis et al. 2014).  This latter 
datum encapsulates the moral and public health danger of a healthcare system that treats 
health as a commodity and not a right.  While there may be opposition to learning from 
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the Cuban experience in the U.S., significant progress has been recently made in 
improving bilateral relations, symbolized by the reopening of embassies in the countries’ 
respective capitals on July 20, 2015. 
Cuba’s commendable progress towards achieving greater overall health equity 
results from a genuine social and political commitment to a rights-based approach to 
healthcare provision.  The island’s capacity to overcome insufficient and inequitable 
HRH distribution is the result of more than 50 years of struggle and metamorphoses of 
Cuba’s national health care system.  According to the results from this research, Cuba has 
been largely able to prevent the growth of economic inequality in the 1990s (due largely 
to circumstances beyond its control) from eroding its achievements in health equity.  This 
is notable in light of Okeke’s (2013) findings that economic crises tend to ‘push’ out 
physicians from developing countries.  While Okeke’s research did not examine the 
effects of economic crises on poorer areas within countries, it seems likely based on other 
work (e.g., WHO 2006) that economic crises would exacerbate internal HRH imbalances.    
Today’s achievements in universal access to care trace back to early efforts to 
overcome urban-rural disparities through the establishment of the Rural Health Service, 
the development of the polyclinic and family doctor model.  It would not have been 
possible without a parallel vision to elevate the population’s educational level that 
guaranteed free access to higher education.  These achievements have depended as well 
on the political will not to sacrifice the rights (listed above) established in Cuba’s 
constitution, a vision that is consistent with Article 25 of the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
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Further research examining within-country levels of inequality in HRH 
distribution, and change over time as it relates to political-economic policy changes and 
country comparison studies would be particularly interesting.  It would also be 
advantageous to be able to include a continuous measure of HRH distribution inequality 
(like the GINI coefficient) as a predictor variable in cross-national and panel studies of 
health care outcomes.  Future studies of HRH distribution in Cuba could be improved if 
there were greater consistency in variables reported by municipalities across the island, 
and if clear numbers were provided regarding the numbers of physicians from a given 
province on missions were reported vs. those presently serving in their local communities.  
Finally, future studies could take a central place approach to analyze the relations among 
location of various levels of health facilities, maximum distance and health outcomes.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Referenced regression equations: 
Physician density per 1000 = dependent variable 
Model Unstandardize
d Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  P value 
Constant -6.238 .610  -10.233 .000 
Log10 GNI per 
cap (PPP) 
1.972 .152 .69 12.947 .000 
R2 .477     
N 186     
 
Thus, Cuba’s predicted doctor density is 2.18 = -0.6238 + 1.972(4.27). 
Mean of log10 GNI per capita = 3.968 
Cuba’s centered log10 GNI per capita value = .3 and log10 GNI per capita2 = .09 
Centered quadratic model with IMR 2012 as dependent variable  
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  P value 
Constant 22.947 1.494  15.36 .000 
CenLogGNIPC  -34.554 2.189 -.741 -15.78 .000 
CenlogGNIPC2 11.204 3.633 .145 3.08 .002 
R2 .612     
N 186     
 
In this model, Cuba’s predicted IMR is 13.589 = 22.947 -34.554(0.3) + 11.204(0.09).   
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CHAPTER 5: DISSERTATION CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation examined interrelated questions concerning healthcare financing, 
human resources for health (HRH) distribution, and health outcomes on international and 
national levels of analysis.  This dissertation is comprised of three interrelated papers.  
The first paper examined the relationship between government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total expenditure on health (GEHPTEH) and the infant mortality rate 
(IMR) using World Health Organization and World Bank data.  The second paper 
clustered cases based on eight health and development variables to create a typology of 
123 primarily non-OECD countries.  The final paper examined recent trends in the level 
of inequality in the distribution of human resources for health and infant mortality among 
Cuban provinces. 
Although previous findings regarding government health spending and health 
outcomes such as infant and child mortality have been mixed, these studies used health-
spending measures that did not capture whether health financing was predominately 
public or private.  By contrast, GEHPTEH was selected to capture the impact of the 
government’s share of total health financing on IMR.  The central hypothesis (H1) of this 
research was that countries with higher GEHPTEH would have lower IMR.  A second 
hypothesis (H2) was that the higher the doctor density the lower the IMR, although the 
effects would tend to taper off as IMR reached its lower bound.  A cubic term was also 
needed as the quadratic term created a strong U-shape effect, indicating that further 
increases in doctor density would eventually lead to a sharp increase in the IMR instead 
of simply tapering off.  A third hypothesis (H3) was that there is an interaction between 
GEHPTEH and log10 GNI per capita (GNIPC), indicating that the poorer the country the 
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greater the effect of GEHPTEH.  The study utilized multivariate ordinary least squares 
regression to analyze data for these variables acquired from the World Health 
Organization and the World Bank. 
 I found a significant inverse association with the IMR in a cross sectional 
analysis of 186 countries while controlling for GNIPC (purchasing power parity dollars), 
doctor density (the number of doctors per 1000 population), the percentage of children 
under one year of age who received the polio vaccine and the percentage of the 
population with access to improved water sources.  GEHPTEH and all controls remained 
significant in the expected directions in all models, although the effect size of GEHPTEH 
was most reduced (along with the significance level) in models that included GNIPC.  
Thus, the null hypotheses of H1 and H2 were rejected. 
Regarding H3, a significant positive interaction term was found that shows that 
the effect size of GEHPTEH is larger when GNIPC is lower, suggesting that the 
government’s share of total healthcare financing makes a larger impact in poorer 
countries than in wealthy ones in terms of improving societal level health outcomes.  The 
article concludes by placing these findings within the context of a push towards austerity 
measures and cuts in public health spending.  It is my view that in light of these findings, 
privatization of healthcare services may lead to undesirable health impacts among the 
population. 
The second paper created a 3-tiered nested typology of health and development 
for 123 primarily non-OECD countries.  Countries were clustered based on their values 
on GEHPTEH, doctor density, LogGNIpc, the percentage of children under age 5 
underweight (U5UW), inequality (GINI), the percentage of children under age 1 who 
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received the DPT3 vaccine, total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 
(TEHPDGP), and the IMR.  The result was a three-tiered nested solution with three, six 
and nine clusters.  The first tier differentiated the 123 countries into a Virtuous Circle 
classification with above-average health and development outcomes (average is in 
reference to the mean of our 123 country sample), a Divided Fortunes cluster of highly 
unequal countries, and a Vicious Circle cluster generally characterized by low GNI, 
average inequality, high food insecurity, low doctor density, low vaccination coverage, 
and more privatized care with high IMR. 
The analysis breaks down in the middle tier to six clusters with only two clusters 
that are unique to this level: a cluster from the Virtuous Circle characterized by high 
doctor density and another from the Vicious Circle that is characterized by a high 
percentage of children under the age of five who are underweight.  The final tier consists 
of nine country groupings.  Nested within the Virtuous Circle were Mild Type 1 (with 
low inequality, high HRH, health outcomes and publicly financed care), Mild Type 2 (a 
wealthy predominately Arab country grouping with very high GNIPC, low inequality, 
and high vaccination coverage and GEHPTEH), and Moderate Type 2 (a cluster of 
diverse geographic composition, low inequality, high HRH and DPTS coverage, but more 
privatized care with an IMR higher than Mild Types 1 and 2 and Moderate Type 1. 
Nested within the Divided Fortunes cluster were two disparate groupings, the 
Moderate Type 1 grouping of Latin American countries with high inequality, average 
health inputs and relatively low IMR, and a Critical Type 2 cluster of Southern African 
nations with extremely high inequality levels, very low HRH, average vaccination 
coverage, and very high IMR.  The Vicious Circle cluster ultimately subdivided into one 
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severe cluster (predominately South Asian, the most food insecure, low HRH, 
GEHPTEH, and average IMR), a Critical Type 1 cluster (overwhelmingly sub-Saharan, 
food insecure, very poor, with low HRH and health outcomes), a Critical Type 3 cluster 
(low income, TEHPGDP and health outcomes, and high inequality) and a Critical Type 4 
cluster (most poor, lowest HRH, lowest GEHPTEH and the worst health outcomes of the 
typology).  
The contribution of this research is that it identifies relatively distinct country 
groupings that have a common set of health and development challenges.  Unlike a 
regression, which attempts to parcel out the impact of a particular set of independent 
variables on a dependent variable, cluster analysis allows the researcher to view 
groupings of countries that share similar values across a range of variables.  Strategies to 
address health and development challenges should be specific enough to address these 
particular combinations and health challenges.  For example, while Critical Types 1 and 2 
share many challenges in common, countries in Critical Type 1 face particularly acute 
food security challenges while Type 2 has extreme inequality.  Thus, countries within a 
particular cluster type may wish to work together to jointly address challenges that they 
face together. 
Cuba was selected as a case study for the final paper for several reasons.  First, 
Cuba has both a much higher doctor density and a much lower IMR than simple 
regression models with GNIPC as the independent variable would predict.  Secondly, 
Cuba’s health financing is almost entirely public and its HRH distribution will be far less 
influenced by market forces than in societies in which health financing is predominately 
private.  Previous research on Cuba’s healthcare system has focused on trends in infant 
    
171
mortality (e.g., Corteguera and Henriquez 2001; Corteguera 2000) or the health system’s 
evolution and growing focus on primary care (Whiteford and Branch 2008; Feinsilver 
1993).  
I found a steady decline in inequality in the distribution of total doctors relative to 
population among provinces from 1989 to 2014.  It is noteworthy that the level of 
inequality in HRH distribution continued to be reduced during Cuba’s economic crisis in 
the 1990s, known as the ‘special period’.  Additionally, inequality in HRH distribution 
appeared much more extreme based on descriptive measures among provinces in Cuba in 
1958 provided by Danielson (1979).  Cuba’s distribution of physicians among provinces 
is slightly more equal that the distribution of physicians among OECD countries and 
much more equal than the global and non-OECD distributions.   
Regarding other HRH measures, inequality in family doctors and family doctors 
‘located in the community’ have generally been very low, although the latter spiked in 
2011.  There has been an ongoing transformation of the health sector and much of the 
variation in family doctors in the community distribution seems to correspond with 
challenges identified by MINSAP and with policy shifts.  Nurse density among Cuban 
provinces has remained low since 1995 (the earliest year for which I had data) and 
fluctuated somewhat.  What is notable is that its distribution in any of the years is far 
more equal than the distribution of nurses among countries on a global level, among 
OECD countries or among non-OECD countries. 
Regarding IMR, I observed a general decline in the range of values among 
provinces over time, as well as a strong reduction in the provincial median and national 
IMRs in Cuba from 1970 to 2014.  Cuba’s median IMR remains slightly above the 
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OECD median, but far above the median IMR on a global level.  I also provided the 
population-attributable-proportion (PAP) for the IMR of each year that estimates the 
potential percentage reduction in the IMR if every province would have had an IMR of 
the province with the lowest IMR. 
Within province inequality in physician distribution based on municipal data for 
2010 in HRH distribution was much higher than inequality among provinces, but was still 
relatively low.  Family doctor distribution tended to be less unequally distributed than 
total physician distribution, while the levels of inequality in nurse distributions was 
somewhere between the two.  Particular municipalities and provinces that face more 
extreme challenges regarding HRH distribution were identified.  Ranges in IMR within 
provinces also tend to be fairly narrow but are wider than the ranges among provinces, 
with the widest ranges observed in Guantánamo and La Habana provinces. 
Each of these papers has, at least in some way, challenged my initial assumptions.  
In the first paper, while GEHPTEH retained significance with the logged form of GNI 
per capita in the model, I did not expect the inclusion of GNIPC to erode the effect size 
of GEHPTEH on the IMR to the degree that it did.  The bulk of this phenomenon I 
attribute to the radical and accelerated increase in the size of GNI per capita that is 
inherent in a log transformation.   
In the second paper, while I was not surprised that many countries clustered along 
regional lines, I did not expect them to do so as much as they did.  This may have been 
due in part to the inclusion of GNIPC among the variables based on which countries were 
clustered.  I also did not expect Iraq to cluster with Mild Type 1, nor did I expect Nigeria 
and South Africa to cluster with Central African Republic and Chad in Critical Type 3.  
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Rather, I expected that they would fall into the cluster with the highest inequality, Critical 
Type 2.  I also expected the largely South Asian Severe cluster to reflect a much higher 
level of inequality than it did.  Regarding the third paper, I did not expect to find any 
large increase in inequality in the distribution of family doctors in the community, as was 
registered in 2011.  I was also surprised to see the high levels of inequality in HRH in 
Cienfuegos and Camaguey provinces. 
 
Policy implications 
This research has several important policy implications.  Perhaps the most 
overriding and pertinent implication for our times is that governments should do their 
best to eschew pressure from international financial institutions (IFIs) and others to 
privatize more and more government services and financing.  Much of this type of 
external pressure from IFIs amounts to a loss of sovereignty by poorer countries in terms 
of economic and health policy (Waitzkin and Jasso Aguilar 2015; Mangala 2008).  The 
trend towards greater privatization of health services and financing - a clear move away 
from treating healthcare as a human right - were notably seen across the Global South 
with generally negative consequences for population health as a result of structural 
adjustment programs (SAPRIN 2004; Schoepf et al. 2000), and the push for privatization 
of health financing continues in the Global South and has expanded to Europe 
(Kentikelenis et al. 2014; Palma Solis et al. 2009; Bretton Woods Project 2009; Hermann 
2009).  
Another clear policy implication is both obvious and difficult.  Both paper 1 and 
paper 2 show that health and socioeconomic development variables are closely linked.  It 
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is clear from this (and other) research, that to obtain better population health outcomes it 
behooves developing countries to train and retain more health professionals, improve 
population access to clean water sources, reach 100% polio and DPT3 vaccination 
coverage and reduce income inequality.  Nevertheless, many of these and other critical 
socioeconomic development indicators such as literacy rates, and percentage of the 
population with access to improved sanitation, are highly interrelated and connected with 
overall economic standing as represented by GNI per capita.  Thus, much of the potential 
success in improving health and development and overcoming the legacy of what Samir 
Amin terms ‘lumpen development’ may ultimately depend on strengthening economic 
sovereignty as well as and productive capacity.    
There can be no emergence without state politics resting comfortably on a social bloc, a 
social force that gives it legitimacy and the capability of constructing a coherent project, 
an inward-looking national productive system.  This must at the same time ensure the 
participation of the great majority of social classes and see to it that these social classes 
receive the benefits of growth (Amin 2013: 46). 
 
Nevertheless, my research suggests that countries fall into groups, which face 
different combinations of health and development challenges.  Countries of a particular 
type may seek to align with each other to overcome their specific set of difficulties.  For 
example, countries in the Moderate Type 1 cluster tend to have moderately high income 
and average health outcomes (IMR in 2012 ranged from 7.8 in Chile to 32.8 in Bolivia) 
but all experience very high inequality.  Only the countries of Critical Type 2 exceed this 
high level of inequality.  However, not only is the average inequality for Critical Type 2 
more acute, but also it has very low doctor density.  These countries have a common 
interest in overcoming the challenges presented by acute income inequality; since they 
tend to be more similar in other health and development characteristics, they may benefit 
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from sharing experiences in trying to overcome their particular health and development 
challenges.     
A final policy recommendation emanating form the third paper is for governments 
to try to remove the influence of market forces on internal HRH distribution and to 
prioritize the formation of HRH personnel.  While the third paper did not provide much 
in the way of an international comparative analysis, it did examine the shifts in HRH 
distribution within Cuba, a country in which private medical practice virtually ceased to 
exist in 1965.  The overriding finding was that even in periods of crisis, that according to 
Okeke (2013) stimulate HRH outmigration, Cuba was able to both increase aggregate 
numbers of physicians and maintain and/or reduce inequality levels in their distributions 
relative to the population (depending on whether we are referring to doctors, family 
doctors or nurses). 
 
Implications for future research 
 This research has led to several potential avenues for future research.  A major 
challenge in conducting research for any of these directions is going to be accessing 
sufficient data.  One particular path indicated at the end of the first paper would be to 
obtain panel data to examine the impact of shifts in GEHPTEH over time on the IMR, 
and to look at the relationship among GEHPTEH, the forgone healthcare rate and health 
outcomes.  It would also be useful in this regard to have ample time series data for 
physician density, inequality, and other interesting socioeconomic variables such as union 
density, total debt owed to IFIs, and an HRH GINI that indicated the level of spatial 
inequality of HRH within a given country.   
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Future research regarding typologies could include political variables, as well as 
use panel data to monitor movement of countries between clusters over time.  As 
mentioned at the end of paper two, research is necessary that captures “the relational 
dynamics between countries, i.e., flows of surplus value, raw materials, consumer goods, 
and waste, into explanatory and typological models of health and development”.  To this 
I add the importance of a variable, such as HRH GINI, which captures the level of 
inequality of HRH distribution within a country.  Finally, future studies could cluster 
cases around socioeconomic development and health system variables minus the health 
outcome variable, and examine the relationship between clusters and key health outcome 
variables. 
The third paper points in a few new directions, as well.  First, it is my view that 
the study could have benefited from a detailed comparison of HRH distribution in 
different countries.  While that would have made the study potentially too long for 
publication, it would have facilitated making relevant comparisons.  Another potential 
avenue for future research would be to examine change over time in the municipal level 
in Cuba, but to make that worthwhile, it would be essential to have some basic economic 
data (median income and perhaps even the percentage of residents who receive income 
from abroad) regarding the number of physicians from a given area serving on 
international missions, and for the data to be uniformly gathered across provinces. 
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